THE VALUE OF POLITICAL VALUES

An exploration into the communication of political values by coalition government parties

PhD Thesis
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Part I
Introduction and methodology
Part I consists of two chapters. **Chapter 1** serves to introduce the dissertation. It provides the background and motivation for the study, comments on the gap in research and presents the core assumption of the dissertation as well as the research questions explored. It also introduces the overall theoretical framework and the research design of the dissertation before commenting on the contributions and delimitations of the study. Finally, the chapter presents the structure of the dissertation.

**Chapter 2** presents the methodological considerations of the study and places the dissertation within an overall research paradigm.
1. Introduction

1.1. Background of the dissertation

Modern democracy is in crisis and many Western European countries are experiencing decreasing public engagement in political matters and a general public disenchantment with politicians, the political process and the political party as such (e.g. Blumler and Coleman, 2010; Dalton, 2008; Heath, 2007; Mair, 2008; Stoker, 2006). This disenchantment manifests itself in lower turnout levels (e.g. Blais and Rubenson, 2013), lower levels of party membership (e.g. Dalton, 2008) and lower levels of trust placed in politicians (Stoker, 2006). Indeed, a 2006 study found that politicians represent the least trusted profession worldwide (Stoker, 2006).

The crisis for democracy is a complex matter which consists of various fix points which are somehow and rather intricately interrelated. The actual reasons for the crisis are perhaps even more manifold and complex (see Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000). However, one of the key reasons put forward by scholars is the notion of dealignment in society i.e. the erosion of traditional societal cleavages and the subsequent decline in class voting, partisanship and “collective identities” amongst voters (Mair, 2008; 220; see also Dalton, 2000 and Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). A central consequence of the lack of partisanship is that parties can no longer rely on a loyal set of core voters, but must now compete with other parties for the same group of middle ground voters said to have become more like political “consumers” than believers (Blumler and Kavanagh; 1999: 210; see also Esbensen and Lund, 2009; Lees-Marchment, 2001; Mair, 2008; Slothuus, 2003; Vigsø, 2004).

The notion of dealignment, however, does not by itself explain the growing disenchantment of voters pertaining to political matters. Rather, we need to consider the consequences of the dealignment process for the political party and take into account that the decline of partisanship has changed how contemporary political parties position themselves and communicate their political values and ideological identity to their external as well as internal stakeholders. In their attempt to capture the middle ground voter, many parties are said to have stopped offering proper alternatives to voters and have become increasingly similar “chasing more or less the same bodies of voters with more or less the same persuasive campaigning techniques.” (Mair, 2008: 222).
In other words, many parties are said to have become catch-all parties who appeal to a broad group of voters whilst communicatively toning down their ideological differences – and thus their political values – in the process (Kirchheimer 1966; see also Caul and Gray, 2000; Kavanagh, 1996). As parties fish for electoral support in a turbulent sea of floating and volatile voters, they thereby often fail to communicate their ideological identities and core political values (Kirchheimer 1966; Caul and Gray, 2000; Kavanagh, 1996). By eliminating or downplaying references to their core political values, political parties run the risk of watering down their distinct party identity which may lead to fewer perceived ideological differences – or ideological convergence – between parties (e.g. Green, 2007; Kirchheimer, 1966; Whiteley et al., 2005). It may also cause confusion amongst the party’s internal stakeholders (e.g. its members) as to what the party actually stands for (e.g. Panebianco, 1988).

In sum, the lack of clear communication of their party identity may have a significant effect on the party and the democratic process as such from two different but interrelated perspectives.

First of all, any discrepancies between the party’s identity expressed by the party elite and the party’s identity as perceived by more rank-and-file members may lead to internal disillusionment and perhaps even division amongst members (e.g. Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009; Martin and Vanberg, 2008; Panebianco, 1988). A divided party may in turn create suspicion in the electorate and ultimately to a lack of voter support (e.g. Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009: 13-14; see also Walgraves and Nuytemans, 2009).

Second of all, if parties are perceived to be largely similar, voters may find it increasingly meaningless going to the polls and may simply not find it relevant to pay attention to politics as such (Caul and Gray, 2000: 236; see also Goodman and Murray, 2007). This implies that for the sake of democracy, political parties should offer real choices to the electorate by communicating “clear, distinct and consistent partisan profiles” (Caul and Gray, 2000: 236; see also Smyth, 2006).

### 1.1.1. Central claim of the dissertation

A central claim of this dissertation is that political values lie at the heart of the communicative challenge faced by contemporary political parties. In essence, political values are a key component in the identity of the political party and constitute the party’s moral *raison d’être*, serve to define the party and differentiate it from others (see Bonotti, 2011; Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009; Panebianco, 1988). For the political party to communicate who it is and what it cares about, the party’s core political values should represent a central aspect of a party’s communicated ideological identity towards both internal and
external stakeholders who would otherwise be left “confused” as to what the party stands for (Walgrave and Nuytemans 2009: 202)

From an external stakeholder point of view, communicating a clear ideological identity via the party’s political values may be particularly important for parties in multi-party systems where voters simply have more parties to choose from. Research suggests that the number of parties in a political system may be linked to higher levels of undecided voters and with decreased levels of party loyalty compared to two-party systems (e.g. Orriols and Martinéz, 2014). Furthermore, voters in multi-party systems often identify with and share their loyalty between more than one party belonging to the same ideological family (e.g. Garry, 2007; Mughan, 2009). This suggests that communicating a clear ideological identity through the party’s political values is particularly important for parties within the same political group if they want to increase their own share of the vote.

From an internal stakeholder point of view, communicating a clear set of values serves an important internal function as the political party is essentially normative and value-based (see Albert and Whetten, 2004), and as very the cohesiveness of this type of organisation is provided “by the acceptance of shared values, shared beliefs” (Cummins, 1983: 533). Thus the values of a party serve to induce both member loyalty and mobilisation (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009).

1.1.2. The unity-distinctiveness dilemma

A key feature of the multi-party system is the dominance of coalition governments where member parties go from being distinct actors to being part of a formal group of parties having to present a united political front (e.g. Martin and Vanberg, 2008). This adds an additional communicative challenge for parties attempting to communicate a clear party identity and core political values. In other words, how do parties communicate their unique party identity when they become part of a unified group?

A central task for coalition government parties is to find a common political ground and this requires consensus, negotiation and compromise amongst the member parties (e.g. Laver, 1992; Martin and Vanberg, 2008). This in turn suggests that member parties often focus on the issues and values that unite them rather than those that set them apart (e.g. Timmerman, 2006). However, as the parties are still in a “mutual competition for votes” (Strøm and Müller, 1999: 257; see also Christiansen and Pedersen, 2014) and must also maintain the support of the rank-and-file members (Martin and Vanberg, 2008), they still
need to maintain a distinct party identity. Boston and Bullock (2009) refer to this central challenge of coalition government participation as the “unity-distinctiveness dilemma” which entails:

…the need for governmental unity and cohesion (to maximize effectiveness and durability) and the maintenance of the political distinctiveness and policy integrity of the parties involved (to maximize intra-party cohesion and electoral viability) (Boston and Bullock, 2009: 351)

From the communicative perspective of this dissertation, the unity-distinctiveness dilemma implies that for coalition government parties to remain distinct, they need to communicate their own ideological identity and own political values within the context of the coalition government (e.g. see also Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013; Martin and Vanberg, 2008). This is seen as relevant from both an internal and external stakeholder perspective as it contributes to creating both an internal party cohesion as well as to the continued electoral success of the party.

1.2. Recognising a research gap

Scholars agree that coalition government parties constantly balance on the tightrope of “maintaining distinct partisan ideological identities and participating in the kinds of policy compromises that are necessary to govern in coalition” (Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013: 459; Boston and Bullock, 2009; Martin and Vanberg, 2008). However, despite a growing scholarly interest in the inherent challenges for the individual coalition government parties in maintaining and honouring their core ideological identity and political values within the context or confines of a coalition government, this topic has not yet been explored from a communicative or value-based perspective.

So far, coalition governments have mainly been explored with a focus on the more institutional aspects of coalition formation and focusing on who gets what in terms of “offices” in the actual formation of the coalition government (e.g. Christensen and Pedersen, 2014; Debus, 2011; Strøm and Müller, 1999). Other scholars focus on the coalition government as a group exploring the shared coalition agreement made between the parties (e.g. Paun, 2008; Quinn et al., 2011, Timmermans, 2006), while Boston and Bullock (2009) explore the different kind of coalition government arrangements that may be applied to solve the unity-distinctiveness dilemma. Only a few scholars (e.g. Martin and Vanberg, 2008) focus on the communicative aspects of coalition government membership in their exploration of how coalition partners attempted to communicate to constituents that the party had stayed true to its political
promises within the coalition. However, Martin and Vanberg (2008) do not focus specifically on the communication of the party’s political values.

In the field of political science, the bulk of research into the identity and values of political parties has been carried out with the aim of positioning the parties on the left-right ideological scale and/or identifying change in the party identity and ideological position over time (e.g. Adams et al., 2004; Budge and Laver, 1986; Gabel and Huber, 2000; Janda et al., 1995; Walgrave and Nuytemans, 2009). Some scholars such as Buckler and Dolowitz (2009, 2012) have focused on exploring the challenges of communicating the party’s ideological identity in times of organisational change and renewal (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009; 2012), however, their research does not focus on the specific aspect of coalition government participation nor on values from a strategic or communicative perspective.

Despite an increasing focus on the strategic communication of political parties and the need to communicate a clear and coherent party story e.g. through the party’s political values (e.g. Smith and French, 2009; Strömbäck and Kiousus, 2011; Strömbäck, 2011; Thrassou et al., 2011), the majority of studies into the strategic communication of political parties tends to focus on how parties frame specific issues in order to gain electoral support (e.g. Chong and Druckman, 2007; Schaffner & Sellers 2010; Slothuus, 2010; Slothuus & de Vreese, 2010). To my knowledge, none of these studies empirically explore how political parties strategically express their political values.

There is also limited research into the communication of political values within the field of communication studies. Although the concept of strategic communication has become increasingly inclusive and is now seen to encompass both for-profit and non-profit organisations and institutions such as the political party (Frandsen and Johansen, 2014), studies into the communication of values and identity in organisations still focus primarily on for-profit corporations (e.g. Schmeltz, 2013, Pruzan 2001) or other types of non-profit organisations such as the church (e.g. Aust, 2004).

Summing up, there are to the best of my knowledge so far no scholars who have empirically explored how a political party’s communication of political values is affected by the specific event of entering into a coalition government. This dissertation contributes to filling this gap.
1.3. Purpose and research questions

Set against the backdrop of the current crisis for democracy and the specific communicative challenges faced by parties entering into a coalition government, the purpose of this dissertation is to explore the communication of a party’s ideological identity through its core political values in key value-based genres before and after coalition government entry. The dissertation rests on the belief that for political parties to remain distinct within a coalition government, they must communicate a consistent set of values strategically within the context of the coalition.

However, the central assumption of this dissertation is that member parties become increasingly inconsistent in terms of political value content after entering into a coalition government. To solve this issue it is assumed that party leaders forming a coalition government will attempt to communicate consistency in the political value offering through the strategic use of values (form of expression). Thus, the purpose of my study is thus to verify whether this assumption is true or not. In short, the core assumption explored in the dissertation is that:

Upon entering into a coalition government, political parties change the communication of their party’s political values significantly both in terms of political value focus (content) and the strategic use of values in party leader speeches (form of expression)

The core assumption will be explored by answering the following research questions:

RQ1) Is there a change in the political value content in party leader speeches made before and after coalition government entry?

RQ2) Is the coherence between the political value content in party programmes and party leader speeches greater before coalition government entry than after?

RQ3) Is there a change in the rhetorical focus of party leaders when they express the party’s political values in speeches made before and after coalition government entry?

RQ4) Is there a change in the strategic use of descriptive value statements about the party and of explicit references to the party’s political values in speeches made before and after coalition government entry?
1.4. Framework

Overall, the dissertation is positioned within the vast and interdisciplinary field of political communication which is overall concerned with “the construction, sending, receiving, and processing of messages that potentially have a significant direct or indirect impact on politics.” (Graber, 2005: 479).

However, as the focus of the dissertation is on exploring how the representation and expression of political values in key value-based genres contribute to communicating the political party identity, the dissertation draws on the field of strategic communication which focuses on the notion of “the purposeful use of communication by an organisation to fulfill its mission” (Hallahan et al. 2007: 3; see also Cornelissen, 2014; Hatch and Schultz, 2000; Strömbäck and Kiousis, 2011). As the object of study is the political party, I explore strategic communication in a political context focusing on how parties attempt to communicate a clear and coherent party story (master narrative) to their key internal and external key stakeholders.

In the dissertation, I also draw on the field of political science in order to provide a framework for understanding the specific communicative challenges faced by this type of organisation. As I explore the political value content and strategic use of political values in the texts, I also draw on the fields of linguistics and rhetoric in order to identify the values and strategies represented.

Bridging the fields of communication studies and political science is nothing new, and political communication is vast and interdisciplinary encompassing fields such as communication, political science, psychology and sociology (e.g. Miller and McKerrow, 2010; Ryfe, 2001). Within political communication, the study of politics and language represents a sub-field dating back to Aristotle and his introduction of the now classic forms of appeal in political oratory and public speaking (e.g. Martinelli, 2011).

The inclusion of linguistic methods in the social sciences sparked by Rorty’s (1967) seminal work “The Linguistic Turn”, meant that social scholars increasingly began to regard language as an important way of “framing and shaping the way we see and interpret patterns in the world” (Moses and Knutsen, 2012: 196). Thus, recent decades have seen language play an important role in the study of political phenomena which is aptly summed up in Chilton’s claim that “political activity does not exist without the use of language” (Chilton, 2004: 6). Often research into language and political ideology is carried out
within the field of political discourse analysis (see Dunmire, 2012). Here scholars typically explore the ideological content in political texts in order to uncover how the party’s ideology reflects the underlying social power structures in society (e.g. Fairclough, 2001; van Dijk, 2005; see Dunmire 2012). These studies do not focus on exploring the communication of values and ideology from the perspective of strategic communication nor do they focus on the communicative effects of coalition government participation. In this sense, the dissertation distinguishes itself from other types of qualitative studies on the ideological communication of political parties.

Already Aristotle accounted for the strategic role of language in politics, and political scientists regularly include language as a resource for explaining how politicians gain and hold power (Hudson, 1978; see also Dunmire, 2012). From this perspective, political statements are not merely seen as objective utterances but as tools employed to achieve political goals and create a shared identity (Hudson, 1978, p: 39-61). Concurring with Hudson (1978), this dissertation perceives language to be a strategic resource applied by political parties as they communicate their political values and ideological identity to both internal and external stakeholders. Figure 1 below shows how the dissertation is positioned:
1.5. Research design

The dissertation employs a single-case study which explores the communication of political values within a “real-life” context (Guest et al., 2013: 14). The case chosen is the Danish 2011-2014 three-party coalition government, and the data consists of key value-based genres of the political party namely party programmes and party leader conference speeches. These texts are explored for political values using the qualitative approach to textual analysis focusing on two aspects namely political value content (what value are expressed in the total data set) and the form of expression (what rhetorical strategies are applied to express the values in the party leader speeches).

The dissertation applies the multi-method approach to textual analysis which combines “a detailed textual reading within an exploration of contextual influences.” (Barry et al., 2006: 1091). This approach allows me to combine rhetorical analysis with a more context-based approach to textual analysis where I supplement my textual analysis with contextual knowledge on events etc. outside the text to identify the political values (see section 6.3.1.). Here, it is relevant to emphasise Sauer’s claim that:

Any public speech is part of a larger, more extensive communicative process, and (...) can be characterised as a strategic move in an overarching communicative plan. It can therefore be assessed properly only if the larger context is taken into account (Sauer quoted by Schäffner, 1997: 4).

As the focus is of my empirical investigation is on both content and form, I have chosen to apply rhetorical analysis as allows me to explore for both political value content and form (e.g. the specific rhetorical strategies) of political language (e.g. Wesley, 2014). Rhetoric is defined “as the process of using the resources of language to negotiate a shared understanding (…)” (Smith and Smith, 2000: 454) which falls in line with my focus of exploring how political parties strategically communicate who they are to their key stakeholders.

In practice, I explore for content and form explored against two developed analytical frameworks; the Political Value Taxonomy (table 8-2, p.112) and the Political Value Expression Framework (table 9-1, p.151). The Political Value Taxonomy is developed and applied to identify the political value content in the total data set (both party programmes and speeches). The Political Value Expression Framework is developed and applied to identify the rhetorical strategies used in the party leader conference speeches when expressing political values. Having conducted the two separate analyses, the findings are then
synthesised into an overall discussion answering the research questions of the dissertation thereby confirming or refuting the assumption of the dissertation.

1.6. Contribution of the dissertation

As the dissertation explores the question of how a party’s political value communication is affected by coalition government membership, it adds an important empirical and communicative contribution to the current discussion of the challenges of being part of a coalition government (e.g. Martin and Vanberg, 2008; Paun, 2011; Quinn et al., 2011). By applying a value-based perspective on coalition government participation, the dissertation also adds a communicative layer to the discussion of the “moderating” effect incurred by parties entering into coalition governments (e.g. Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2013) and the unity/distinctiveness dilemma faced by coalition government parties (Boston and Bullock, 2009). Finally, the dissertation contributes empirically towards an understanding of how the communication of a party’s political values helps shape its communicated ideological identity or “master narrative” (Strömbäck, 2011; Westen, 2007).

Theoretically, the dissertation contributes with the introduction of two analytical frameworks namely the Political Value Taxonomy and the Political Value Expression Framework. The Political Value Taxonomy serves to operationalise the concept of political values to be used for the identification of political values in political texts. No scholar has so far attempted to create a “complete” taxonomy of political values across the ideological scale based on party programmes and one which includes both the overall value labels as well as their content. In connection with the taxonomy, it is important to note that since values are highly contextual and are “differently conceptualised, depending on socio-cultural and political embeddings” (Sowińska, 2013: 793), the taxonomy would need to be tested and adapted to the values of political parties in other political systems and national contexts before being applied in other contexts. However as it includes the various sub-features (interpretations) of each value the taxonomy represents a starting point and an overall theoretical framework for future research on the representation of political values in political texts not least in comparative studies where it might be applied in order to identify differences/similarities and changes in political values and their interpretations over time and/or across borders.

The second analytical framework, the Political Value Expression Framework, represents a first attempt at a systematic framework of how political values are expressed in party leader conference speeches.
Finally, as the dissertation explores key communicative challenges for political parties in multi-party systems, the aim is that – despite being a one-country case study – the findings will be relevant to political parties in other multi-party systems with similar party structures across the ideological scale (see Hoppman et al., 2010) such as Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands.

1.7. Delimitations

In the dissertation, I only take a surface structure view on the concept of political values treating them from the perspective of strategic communication rather than from the perspective of political science or political discourse analysis. This means that, although I include a discussion of the content of political values, the purpose of the dissertation is neither to engage in a critical discussion of the political values and ideologies of the parties nor to explore how the political values of the data set may reveal the underlying power structures or ideologies in society as done by scholars within Political Discourse Analysis or Critical Discourse Analysis (e.g. Fairclough, 2001; see Dunmire, 2012). Although I agree with one of the central premises of political discourse analysis namely that language in a political context represents a form of “competition among political actors wishing to promote, to have accepted, their own political “world”” (Chilton, 2004: 50), I regard language from a purely strategic and communicative rather than critical perspective.

Nor is my purpose to evaluate whether the political values expressed by the parties cohere with the actual political steps taken by the parties. Although I fully acknowledge that “organisations express their values both in their ideology and through their actions” (Abravanel, 1983 in van Rekom et al., 2006, p.176), I focus purely on the representation of political values in texts in order to explore how this representation changes in the context of coalition government participation and whether or not the parties communicate a clear ideological identity through their political values in key value-based genres. In other words, I focus on the party’s espoused values (what the party says) rather than its enacted values (what the party does) (see Schuh and Miller, 2006). The relevance of going beyond the political actions and focusing on the language of political actors is emphasised by Martin and Vanberg (2008) who argue that coalition government parties do not simply let the policies speak for themselves, but will instead let party leaders “try to communicate with the party’s target audiences to justify unpalatable compromises the party has supported” (Martin and Vanberg, 2008: 503). In a similar vein, Chilton and
Schäffner (2002) argue that political activity does not exist without language and that “words are also a kind of action” (2002: 10).

A final aspect worth noting is that in the analysis of the party programmes I only consider the verbal and not the non-verbal rhetorical strategies such as images, layout, colours etc. although I fully acknowledge that these aspects may also contribute to communicating political values.

1.7.1. Temporal aspects

Due to the dynamic nature of political life, certain real-life events also need to be emphasised. In June 2015, the Danish general election saw a defeat of the two-party SD and SLP coalition and introduction of a new Liberal minority government. Also, the election saw the birth of a new Danish party, “The Alternative”, which gained entry into the Danish parliament (Folketinget, 2015b). Thus, this now consists of nine political parties rather than the eight parties which my political value taxonomy and subsequent analysis is based on.

1.8. Structure of the dissertation

The dissertation is divided into four parts and 11 chapters as seen in figure 2:

Figure 2: The structure of the dissertation

Chapter 2 positions the dissertation within an overall research paradigm thereby providing a scientific framework for the theories and methods applied in the dissertation.
Chapter 3 presents the key theoretical issues and concepts from the field of political science relevant to provide the reader with an understanding of the party as an organisation, the context of the party and the main challenges faced by the party in relation to communicating its political values within a coalition government.

Chapter 4 discusses the key theoretical concepts of the dissertation namely identity, ideology and values exploring them from a communicative perspective and in relation to the specific challenges of the political party.

Chapter 5 elaborates on the communication of the political values and discusses the concept strategic communication and corporate identity in relation to the political party. It also discusses the strategic aspect of political and the notion of message consistency. Finally, it introduces the concepts of rhetoric and evaluative language which form the basis of the empirical analysis of the dissertation.

Chapter 6 introduces the methods and data of the dissertation while chapter 7 provides an introduction to the specific case. This chapter includes a brief description of the Danish political system and also introduces the 2011-2014 coalition government and the three member parties.

Chapter 8 presents the empirical analysis of political value content. The chapter includes a presentation of the Political Value Taxonomy and an exemplary analysis of the 2003 SPP Party programme. The chapter concludes with a presentation of the findings for political value content in the total data set.

Chapter 9 presents the empirical analysis of the rhetorical strategies (the form of expression) applied by party leaders when expressing the political values in the conference speeches. The chapter presents the second analytical framework i.e. the Political Value Expression Framework and includes an exemplary analysis of the 2010 SD party leader speech. This is followed by a presentation of the findings for form of expression in all the party leader speeches of the data set.

Chapter 10 synthesises the findings for content and form and discusses them within a wider theoretical framework. In this chapter I also discuss the overall implications of the findings and present a critical view upon the concept of strategic communication in the context of a political party.

Chapter 11 concludes the dissertation. The chapter includes reflections on the contributions of the dissertation as well as the limitations of the study and areas of future research.
1.9. Clarification of central concepts

1.9.1. Ideology versus values

Evans and Neundorf (2013) argue that the notions of values and ideology can be used interchangeably as they both refer to an “overarching, or underlying, orientation which summarises important areas of voters’ attitudes towards politics” (2013: 2). Indeed, the concepts are complex and can be difficult to distinguish from one another. However, while the concepts share several conceptual features such as being evaluative and subjective they differ in level of abstraction with ideology being the most abstract concept subsuming "sets of values and attitudes" (Maio et al., 2003: 284-285). In this dissertation, ideology and values are thus seen as two separate concepts and are introduced and discussed separately.

1.9.2. List of party names

The Danish political parties (including the three case parties that entered into the coalition) whose programmes form the basis of the developed political value taxonomy will be referred to in their abbreviated form throughout the dissertation. Below the full party names (In English and in Danish) as well as the abbreviations are listed with the case three parties marked in bold:

- The Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten): RGA
- **The Socialist People's Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti –SF)**: SPP
- The Danish Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterne): SD
- **The Social Liberal Party (Det Radikale Venstre)**: SLP
- The Liberal Party (Venstre): LP
- The Conservative Party (Det Konservative Folkeparti): CP
- Liberal Alliance (Liberal Alliance): LA
- The Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti): DPP
2. Methodological considerations

2.1. A social-constructivist world-view

With the focus on how political parties rhetorically construct their ideological through the representation of political values in key value-based genres, the dissertation is positioned within the social-constructivist paradigm (Moses and Knutsen, 2012). Here, reality and concepts are not seen as something which exists independently of social actors, but rather as something which is constructed by the actors involved (Nygaard, 2005). In this dissertation, the social actors are political parties who seek to construct their version of reality and constructed ideological identity through their use of language and values in political texts.

By adhering to the social-constructivist ontology, the dissertation accepts the existence of multiple interpretations of social phenomena as a central premise of social constructivism is the rejection of one reality or one single truth (Moses and Knutsen, 2012: 11). Instead, multiple realities are said to exist and be constructed by actors in different situations and at different points in time (Höijer, 2008). The concept of “reality” is seen as a construction which is constantly changing and can never be fully defined or explained as “social phenomena and their meanings (...) are in a constant state of revision” (Bryman, 2001, pp. 16–18 in Grix, 2002: 177). As the dissertation poses the question of how a party through its political value communication may change its communicated and constructed identity due to a change of institutional circumstances (entering into a government), it thereby acknowledges the multiple constructions of reality.

It is important to note that within social constructivism there are different understandings as to what is socially constructed with positions ranging from “moderate” to “radical” (Wenneberg, 2002). Proponents of the radical position which Wenneberg (2002) dubs total social constructivism (2002: 9) see everything – even the physical world – to be socially constructed making it virtually impossible to talk about factual scientific knowledge. According to this branch of social constructivism, there is no physical reality outside the social constructions perceived by human beings (Wenneberg, 2002).

In contrast, the more moderate position of this dissertation argues that stable patterns of meaning exist even if reality is a social construction. Höijer (2008) notes the same complex interplay between social reality and understandings of the world:
Ideas and interpretations are thought to at least partly reflect some external reality; there is some kind of relationship although incomplete, between sociocognitive representations and the social and material reality. (Höijer, 2008: 278)

Thus, within this more moderate position, it is possible to talk about some patterns of meaning stemming from certain “historically, socially and culturally established practices.” (Höijer, 2008: 279). In other words, the central actors in this dissertation, the political parties, arguably act and communicate within a social practice characterised by certain norms and patterns such as political systems and party structures which – although socially constructed – are more or less institutionalised in our society. Here, political values are said to constitute a key part of the party’s ideological identity (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2012; Panebianco, 1988), although the values themselves are socially constructed and interpreted in many different ways depending on the actors involved (see Bonotti, 2011; Sowińska, 2013).

Key to the acknowledgement of multiple realities is the social constructivist claim that our entire understanding of the world is shaped by our cultural or social context (Wenneberg, 2000). According to the social constructivist worldview, even “factual statements are value-laden” (Moses and Knutsen, 2012: 11) – a belief which is central to this dissertation as the main focus is on political values and how these are presented in political texts - sometimes in the shape of “facts” when parties rhetorically construct their version of the world and thereby their specific ideological identity and political value interpretation (see Hamilton, 1987).

2.2. Qualitative research criteria

Scholars within the social-constructivist tradition, most often apply qualitative rather than quantitative methods in their research (Moses and Knutsen, 2012). A general feature of qualitative research is that it provides a “better understanding of social realities and to draw attention to processes, meaning patterns and structural features” (Flick, 2004: 3). This is done through the application of methods which allows the researcher to explore the topic in question in depth e.g. through the analysis of specific language use (e.g. Ormston et al. 2014).

In qualitative research, the notion of subjectivity is important to consider as the qualitative researcher inevitably brings his or her personal values and worldview into the study (Creswell, 2009: 17). This aspect is closely connection to the question of generalisability and validity of qualitative research
summed up by Lincoln and Guba (1985) who argue that the legitimacy of research – and thereby its validity, reliability and generalisability – depend on the level of trustworthiness which the researcher can established through four criteria i.e. *credibility, transferability, precision and confirmability*. These aspects are discussed in the following.

### 2.2.1. Credibility

The notion of credibility concerns whether the researcher is able to establish authenticity and truth value in his or her research and findings (Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 294). An authentic analysis offers “a genuine interpretation of reality, or an accurate reading of a particular (set of) document(s)” (Wesley, 2014). In order to establish authenticity, the researcher should offer a detailed description of the methodological and theoretical choices so that the reader is able to see how the findings were reached (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). This is a key aim of this dissertation which seeks to offer explicit and precise descriptions of the research process and choices made throughout.

### 2.2.2. Transferability

Transferability is linked to the notion of generalisability and whether it is possible to generalise from the findings of a particular study (e.g. Höijer, 2008).

In essence, generalisability means that “what is the case in one place or time, will be so elsewhere or in another time” (Payne and Williams, 2005: 296). In positivist terms, this translates into the concept of external validity – i.e. the applicability of the findings of one study to the ‘real’ world (Moses and Knutsen, 2012: 60) whereas the concept is unclear from a social constructivist perspective. Shively (2006) aptly sums up the central difference in the level of generalisation aimed for in the qualitative and quantitative approaches when he argues that qualitative scholars who focus on a limited number of cases “devote their efforts predominately to process-tracing, not to quasistatistical generalization.” (Shively, 2006: 345).

However, the researcher’s stance within the social construction paradigm affects the extent to which s/he believes that it is possible to talk about generalisation in scientific research. Proponents of the radical position of social constructivism dismiss the notion of generalisability arguing that all findings will be case-specific and will therefore not make sense in other cases (Höijer, 2008: 277). Scientific findings are assumed to merely represent an observation of how reality looks in one particular context at
a particular point in time because “meaning is specific, situation-bound, changeable and unstable” (Höijer, 2008: 277). This means that the findings of a study are seen as relevant only for that one study and specific situation.

However, scholars adhering to the moderate position of social constructivism argue that even within qualitative research some level of generalisability is possible. In other words, the findings of one study may be transferred from one context to another depending on the perceived similarity of these contexts (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Here, scholars usually refer to three main types of generalisation i.e. the naturalistic, the analytical and the theoretical (Höijer, 2008).

**Analytical generalisation** is concerned with how the researcher “evaluates and concludes how the results from a specific study can be applicable to another case or situation” (Höijer, 2008: 285). In this dissertation, it may be possible to draw some level of analytical generalisation from my findings, as the case study chosen is viewed as a “typical” case which may be comparable to situations in other countries with similar political and societal structures (Neergaard, 2007). However, the aim is not to achieve statistical generalisations as this would not be possible given the qualitative nature of the dissertation (Neergaard, 2007; Wesley, 2014). Within qualitative studies, there may however exist some level of “moderatum generalization which is independent of (though complementary to) statistical generalization” (Payne and Williams 2005: 297). Moderatum generalisation is above all, moderate and does not attempt to produce “sweeping sociological statements that hold good over long periods of time, or across ranges of cultures” (Payne and Williams, 2005: 297). Also, it is open to change and may be confirmed or rejected in further studies on the same matter. Thus, rather than offering statistical generalisations, the findings of the present study should add an additional layer to the knowledge of how party leaders communicate their political values strategically in and out of a coalition government which may then be further explored, refuted or confirmed by future studies.

**Theoretical generalisation** concerns how the researcher “inductively develops a theory about some social reality from empirical ‘data’ by following a systematic set of qualitative analysis procedures” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990 in Höijer, 2008:285). This type of generalisation is also relevant for this dissertation, partly

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1 *Naturalistic generalisation* is based on comprehensive personal knowledge which can be gained e.g. by ethnographic approaches – living and experiencing a culture or phenomenon (Höijer, 2008). As this dissertation does not apply ethnographic approaches, this type of generalisability will not be further elaborated.
due to the development of two analytical frameworks based on empirical data which are then applied in the coding for political values in the data: a taxonomy of political values and a framework of political value expression. Both frameworks are developed inductively by qualitatively analysing the empirical data, and both constitute an attempt to pose a theory about social reality based on these data. The Political Value Taxonomy seeks to map out the political values which are salient in contemporary Danish politics while the framework of Political Value Expression provides an overview of how political values are rhetorically expressed in party leader conference speeches. The frameworks are introduced and discussed in detail in chapter 8 and 9 respectively.

Although the two analytical tools employed in the dissertation contribute to some level of theoretical generalisation, it is inherent that they only reflect the political values and rhetorical strategies of a certain set of political actors within a specific culture at a certain point in time (see Sowińska, 2013). In line with the social constructivist perception of multiple realities, this implies that they may not be applicable as universal and all-inclusive analytical tools across time, space and culture. However, the tools represent a starting point for the identification of political values and rhetorical strategies in political texts which can then be further developed in other contexts and with different empirical data.

2.2.3. Precision

Lincoln and Guba’s third criterion of validity is that of precision (1985: 298) which concerns the role of context in a particular study. Here, the researcher should seek ensure that the context is thoroughly described so that it is possible to assess its influence on the findings of the study. As I have chosen to apply the multi-method approach (Barry et al., 2006) in the identification of the political values in the text, identifying values were at times done via the inclusion of contextual knowledge (see section 6.3.1). This is arguably a more intricate and less transparent process than merely searching for manifest expressions of political values via explicit or goal-oriented statements. The risk is here that the coding and identification of the values are based on the interpreter’s own worldview which constitutes a central premise of qualitative research. To counter this challenge the researcher must be transparent as to the scientific conclusions or analytical findings are reached (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). In my case, this means specifying how the political values were identified by being explicit as to what contextual knowledge I draw on in my identification of the values and the strategic use of the values as well as by
providing ample empirical examples to support my arguments and the identification of the political values and strategies in the texts.

2.2.4. Confirmability

Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) final criterion concerns the level of impartiality in the role of the researcher and that notion that the findings of a study should be confirmable by other scholars (see also Wesley, 2014). In order to remain impartial, Wesley (2014) argues that scholars must ensure that “their conclusions are drawn from the evidence at hand, as opposed to the predispositions of the researcher” (2014: 145). This again demands a high level of explicit description of the research process as well as of the analysis and the findings.

2.3. Reflections of the study in a communications perspective

In connection with the methodological reflections, the position of the dissertation within a specific communication paradigm will also be considered.

The understanding of what constitutes communication is rich and varied, however scholars typically divide the notion of communication into two main approaches; the transmission-based paradigm and the interaction paradigm (Heath and Bryant, 1992: 29; Frandsen, 2009a). The transmission-based paradigm is founded on the assumption that messages are simply transferred from sender to a largely passive receiver. Thus, this understanding of communication is rather linear and sender-oriented which is reflected in communication models such as those of Laswell (1948) and Shannon and Weaver (1949) (Frandsen, 2009b).

In contrast, the interaction paradigm sees communication as a two-way dynamic process which takes place between sender and receiver in specific contexts (Frandsen, 2009a). In the interaction paradigm, the receiver is regarded as an active participant in the communication process and thereby as an active co-creator of meaning which is reflected in the models of interaction by e.g. Schramm (1954).

A central premise of my study is that it takes a purely sender-based view on the communication of political values. In other words, I do not consider the actual reception of the political texts which may suggest that I view communication as one-way and transmission-based with the electorate simply as passive receivers. However, although the dissertation does not include the receivers in the study, it is
important to state that I fully acknowledge that meaning is created by both sender and receiver (e.g. Heath and Bryant, 1992). Indeed, I view the party leader conference speeches as a genre which aims to create a shared meaning of values between sender and receiver (e.g. March and Olsen, 1984: 741-742), and as a genre which is highly dependent on the co-construction of meaning between sender and receiver.

However, the assumption and research questions of the dissertation focus on how the senders express their values and thereby how they construct their party’s ideological identity through their communication efforts. Thus, the focus of this particular study is not to explore whether the receivers may or may not share the political values communicated by the political parties. This entails that I need to take a purely sender-oriented approach to the communication of values and to rely on in-depth analyses of the political texts as this approach is the most appropriate way to reach an answer to my research question.

In sum, since the texts are only viewed from the perspective of the sender, I am fully aware that the interpretation of the party’s values which I conclude on in the findings may not necessarily be shared by the receivers who may have a different understanding of the values in question as these are indeed socially constructed.
Part II
The theoretical framework
This part introduces the political party as an organisation as well as the overall theoretical concepts which are in play for the political party in relation to communicating its political values.

**Chapter 3** introduces key concepts from the field of political science central to the understanding of the political party as an organisation, the context in which the political party is embedded and the main challenges faced by parties entering into coalition governments in relation to maintaining and communication their unique party political values.

**Chapter 4** discusses the key theoretical concepts of the dissertation namely *identity, ideology* and *values*. As the object of study is the political party and how it communicates its values in key value-based genres, the three theoretical concepts are explored in a political context from a communicative perspective.

**Chapter 5** elaborates on the actual communication of the political values and discusses the concepts of strategic communication and corporate identity in relation to the political party. Here, I also touch upon the strategic aspect of political communication and the notion of message consistency. Finally, the chapter introduces the concepts of rhetoric and evaluative language which form the basis of the empirical analysis of the dissertation.
3. Politics – a struggle for the ‘good’ life?

A core challenge for all political parties is the balancing act between staying true to the party’s core political values and communicating a clear party identity whilst appealing to an increasingly volatile and disloyal electorate. This challenge is particularly poignant for parties that enter into coalition governments and face not only the responsibility of running a country but also the balancing act of staying true to the party’s own values and those of the united coalition government.

In order to understand the challenges faced by political parties per se in connection with their political values, we need to take a closer look at the inherent nature of politics. Essentially, the challenges can be linked to the constant struggle between the party’s political goals and values and the day-to-day business of politics which often centres on a less visionary and more practical aspect; the allocation or distribution of resources in society (Stoker, 2006: 6):

*At a very grand level, a lot of politics is about the different view of the ‘good life’. A central divide for much of the last two centuries has been between those who prefer liberty over equality and those who privilege equality over liberty. At a more prosaic level, a lot of politics is about hanging on to what you have got, and politics often involve crude power struggles over who gets what.*

Stoker argues that while politics may concern competing values and notions of the good life, it is in practice simply a struggle over the distribution of mostly limited resources (Stoker, 2006). The question of how these resources should be distributed is often at the heart of political conflict as people and parties will often have competing interests “demanding incompatible allocations” (Stoker, 2006: 2). This may also be the case amongst coalition government partners although these typically belong to similar ideological families (see Mughan, 2009).

The dichotomy between the practical aspects of politics and its goal or value-oriented focus is reflected in the various definitions of politics as a concept. In his seminal work The Political System, political scientist David Easton (1953: 129) defines politics simply as “the authoritative allocation of values for the whole society”. Easton thus sees politics as essentially concerned with how the resources of a given society are distributed. In contrast to Easton, Dunmire’s (2012) definition of the concept includes the notion of goals and thereby also values as these refer to “cognitive representations of desirable, trans-situational goals” (Schwartz et al., 2010: 422).
At a minimum, politics is understood as the province of the polity and to comprise the actions and practices of professional politicians, formal political institutions, and citizens who participate in the political process. Moreover, political practice is generally understood to involve struggles over power and acts of cooperation in furtherance of a society’s or group’s goals (Dunmire, 2012: 737)

According to Aristotle (Miller, 2011) the key goal of politics is “the noble action or happiness of the citizens” (Miller, 2011) which supports Stoker’s notion that politics – at least at the very grand level – is concerned with the goal of creating a good life for people. However, a central issue for political parties is that the interpretation of a good life is by no means universal. In fact, it is arguably central to the very nature of politics that political parties disagree on what values constitute the idea of a good life (e.g. Rokeach, 1973).

Political conflict and disputes are often rooted in the central question of which values are most important in society and for creating the good life (Rokeach, 1973; Stoker, 2006). Furthermore, parties may also disagree on how to define and understand political values. In other words, although parties may share overall political values such as equality and freedom, they will often have very different interpretations of what constitutes these values (e.g. Bonotti, 2011) (see section 4.3.2.1.) and may also disagree on their relative importance. Parties also often disagree strongly on the means to reach particular end-goals or values (Stoker, 2006). Although parties may agree on values such as equality or environmental sustainability, they may have different views on the necessary means and actions with which to achieve them (Rokeach, 1973; Stoker, 2006).

In sum, this dissertation understands the notion of politics as a complex process which involves the struggle between political parties over competing values and definitions of the good life as well as the practical distribution of resources and the actions necessary to achieve the values.

3.1. Political parties

Political parties, which are the key actors studied in the dissertation, represent an organisation type unlike any other in contemporary society as they function as “major actors in the system that connects citizenry and the governmental process” (Klingemann et al., 1994: 5). Representing the “constitutional heart of the democratic process” (McNair, 2011: 7), the main purposes of the political party are to function as a key link between citizens and government by politicising citizens’ demands and values and
to translate these demands and values into political programmes and platforms with the aim of implementing them if the party obtains political power (Bonotti, 2011, pp. 20-21). Thus, as an organisation, the political party is essentially value-based.

An oft-cited definition of the political party is offered by Sartori (1976) who argues that due to their mediating role political parties function as ‘channels of expression ... for representing the people by expressing their demands’ (Sartori, 1976: 27). The central role of political parties in society has also been emphasised by Schattschneider (1942: 1) who argues that “modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of political parties” with parties performing a variety of function in society such as mobilising citizens, articulating and aggregating interests, formulating public policy and organising power and government (Norris, 2005).

Political parties serve to represent citizen’s interest and concerns in parliament through “free, fair and competitive elections” (Stoker, 2006: 21). Elections are thereby a key link between citizens and those who represent them, and parties “are expected to compete on the basis of their policy preferences, allowing citizens to support the platform that corresponds most closely to their ideals” (Lachat, 2011: 246-247). While some parties are office-seeking and seek to gain control of government, other parties prefer to stay at the fringes of the political system rather than in government (e.g. Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2013). These different approaches to political power accentuate the complexity of the political party as an organisation which in turn is reflected in the categorisation of party types (see Gunther and Diamond (2003) for a comprehensive overview). Here, a key distinction is made between two overall party paradigms i.e. the rational-efficient model and the responsible parties model (e.g. White, 2006: 9) which essentially concern the party’s overall reason for being.

The rational-efficient model suggests that the only relevant outcome for political parties is that of winning elections – at the expense of everything else including political principles (White, 2006). In contrast, the responsible parties model concerns the idea of the party as organised around specific principles and achieving party unity around a “coherent set of ideas” in order to offer clear choices to the electorate (White, 2006: 10).

The two party paradigms thereby highlight the two competing foci of political parties: staying true to their ideals or gaining political influence. Indeed, parties entering into government often face the conflict between ensuring policy purity (staying true to the party values) and gaining policy influence.
(Pedersen, 2011). This, in turn, also reflects the central challenge of coalition government parties who may at times have to compromise on core values in order to appease their government partners.

3.1.1. Political party stakeholders

Like any other contemporary organisation, the political party operates in a complex stakeholder environment. However, the notion of stakeholders have often been explored and categorised from a mainly business-oriented perspective (e.g. Freeman, 1984; Clarkson, 1995). Today, scholars are proposing a broadening of the stakeholder concept to include political parties arguing that “The business of politics is one of the most densely populated stakeholder arenas in the world” (O’Higgins and Morgan, 2006). Indeed as argued by Strömbäck and Kiousis (2011) the political environment is more “contentious and conflictual” than the environment of many other organisations with conflicts that are often enduring due to “incompatible values and interests” (2011: 19).

One attempt to determine the parties’ stakeholders from the perspective of communicating strategically is offered by Strömbäck (2011) who divides the party’s stakeholders into four broad arenas as seen in Table 3-1 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The strategic goals of the parties</th>
<th>Parliamentary arena</th>
<th>Voter arena</th>
<th>Internal arena</th>
<th>Media arena</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To maximise influence in political organ</td>
<td>To maximise votes</td>
<td>To maximise the internal party unity</td>
<td>To maximise the positive publicity of the party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians from own or other parties</td>
<td>Different target and voter groups as well as organisations uniting different voter groups</td>
<td>Members, employees, elected representative in and for the party</td>
<td>Journalists and editors of different media</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision to cooperate or engage in conflict</td>
<td>Decision as to what party to support or engage oneself in</td>
<td>Decision of whether to support or work against the party leadership and the official party line</td>
<td>Decision of whether to give the party publicity and whether this publicity should be positive or negative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3-1: The key stakeholder arenas of political parties (adapted from Strömbäck, 2011: 73)
As is clear from table 3-1, political parties operate in a complex environment – or different arenas – where several internal as well as stakeholders must be considered and all have varying and at times conflicting demands and information needs (Strömbäck and Kiousis, 2011).

For each stakeholder group, the party’s communicative goals are different while the decisions required by the different stakeholder groups and which will be influenced by the party’s communication efforts also differ. This means that in the electoral arena, the choice may be between voting and not voting for the party, while in the internal arena the choice may be between whether or not to toe the party line or whether or not to remain a member of the party.

All coalition government parties have to balance between all four arenas having to accommodate both the coalition government partners and the party elite both of which belong in the parliamentary arena as well as the party’s lower ranked members (e.g. politicians on local level) and the rank-and-file members who both belong in the internal arena. Owing to the public nature of politics, the political party is more than most other organisations subject to public scrutiny (Strömbäck and Kiousis, 2011: 15). Thus any major discrepancies between the two arenas may ultimately be exposed in the media (the media arena) (e.g. Heidar, 1997) and may have an effect on whether or not voters decide to vote for the party (the electoral arena).

The internal stakeholder arena of parties is complex as parties are at the same time both professional and voluntary-based organisations (Panebianco, 1988). Parties are typically hierarchical consisting of several membership layers; the rank-and-file members who may not participate much in the actual organisation, the political activists who are typically more actively involved in the party and may be so to varying degrees, and finally the professional members – those who are active in the organisation on a professional basis – on local or national level (Panebianco, 1988).

Party members may also differ in their main reason for being part of the organisation. Some, dubbed “careerists” by Panebianco (1988) may be driven primarily by “selective incentives” such as status and power or while others, the “believers” are driven by more “collective incentives” such as the sharing of political and ideological goals (Panebianco, 1988:26-27). These incentives may also be linked to what the members may see as the overall purpose of the party; pursuing the organisational goals and policy purity (e.g. Pedersen, 2011) or obtaining policy influence with more willingness to compromise on the organisational goals (Pedersen, 2011). When members differ in their view of the party’s purpose it may
cause internal conflicts in the party. This is why, according to Panebianco (1988), a party will always need to balance these types of incentives as too much focus on selective incentives means that the “organisation’s credibility as an instrument dedicated to the realisation of its cause is threatened” while too much focus on collective incentives may threaten the party as a professionally organised and run organisation (Panebianco, 1988:10).

3.2. Political party systems – the game arena

The type of political system in which political parties operate arguably also affects the party’s ability to stay true to its political values and thus communicate a clear and consistent ideological identity.

In modern democracy, two major party systems prevail namely the two-party system and the multi-party system (e.g. Wolinetz, 2006). In two-party systems, elections are “decisive” as whoever wins the most votes gains power and forms government (Mair, 2008: 226). In multi-party systems, such as the Danish and those of many other Western European countries, several parties exist side by side across the ideological scale. Due to different ballot systems such as proportional representation, one party rarely wins the total majority (e.g. Strøm and Müller, 1999). Here parties must form either majority or minority coalition governments depending on the electoral outcome and the total distribution of votes. This inevitably entails a great degree of negotiation and political compromise between parties.

Multi-party system can be either bipolar, unipolar or multi-polar (Laver and Schofield, 1990: 114-117), which reflects the competitive situation of the political landscape and may also affect the degree of political value compromises faced by parties. The bipolar system is characterised by two dominant parties and a smaller one which often holds the balance of power. In the unipolar system, one dominant party typically faces a group of much weaker opponents while the multipolar system consists of a large group of “evenly balanced” parties, which makes the coalition bargaining process particularly complex (Laver and Schofield, 1990: 116).

The type of party system in which political parties operate is said to have an influence on level of convergence between parties (e.g. Downs, 1957) and thereby the level to which the parties maintain clear and distinct political profiles. Research suggests that in two-party systems, parties typically converge towards the middle promoting centrist politics in order to capture the middle ground voter hereby displaying centripetal tendencies. Here, parties typically focus on valence issues i.e. consensual
issue on which there is widespread agreement instead of position issues where voters are divided (e.g. Clarke et al., 2009; Clarke et al., 2011; Green, 2007; Stokes, 1963).

In contrast, parties in multiparty systems are expected to diverge rather than converge, thereby moving away from the middle ground and displaying centrifugal tendencies (Downs, 1957). In multiparty systems, we typically see a wide distribution of parties – large and small; some characterised as “extreme” in their ideological viewpoints and some as more centrist (e.g. Cox, 1990; Walgrave and Nuytemans, 2009). According to Walgrave and Nuytemans (2009), parties located towards the centre of the political spectrum will often be less ideologically “clear” and have more “ideological manoeuvring space” than parties located at the extreme ends of the political spectrum where they will typically be more set in their ideological tendencies (2009: 194).

### 3.3.1. Blurred lines between party systems?

Today it is argued that the dividing line between the two types of party systems as cannot be drawn as sharply previously believed. First of all, Mair (2008) argues that even in multi-party systems there is a tendency for elections to be increasingly bi-polar:

*Even in those systems that are marked by quite pronounced party fragmentation, party competition is now more likely to mimic the two-party pattern through the creation of competing pre-electoral coalitions which tend to divide voters into two contingent political camps.* (2008: 226)

Second of all, scholars argue that multi-party systems may also produce centripetal forces (e.g. Green-Pedersen, 2004). This is especially so if a pivotal centre party is able to cooperate in government with both sides of the political spectrum (Green-Pedersen 2004). Thus, even in multi-party systems, parties may converge towards the middle which in turn may affect the extent to which parties – at least those located in the middle of the political spectrum – communicate ideologically distinct political profiles.

### 3.3. Coalition governments

A key condition of the multi-party system is that one single party rarely wins the majority of the votes, and that parties must therefore enter into coalition governments in which the executive power and responsibility are shared between governing parties (e.g. Laver and Schofield, 1990; Strøm and Müller, 1999). Although parties in multi-party systems may occupy more or less extreme ideological positions,
they are typically divided into “political families” or blocs with shared ideological baggage (Mughan, 2009: 415). Parties from the same political family will typically want to join together to form a coalition government, thereby obtaining a good match between views and values and a “small degree of internal programmatic heterogeneity” (Debus, 2011: 294).

3.3.1. The challenges of coalition government participation

Coalition government participation requires both inter-party compromise and negotiation (e.g. Boston and Bullock, 2009; Laver and Schofield, 1990; Martin and Vanberg, 2008), and therefore it typically comes at some kind of price for the individual parties (e.g. Mershon, 2002; Pedersen, 2011) who will be drawn to focus on the issues and values that unite them rather than those that set them apart (e.g. Timmermans, 2006). This is manifested in the coalition agreement which represents the central document of the coalition expressing its political values, goals and specific policy suggestions (e.g. Christiansen and Pedersen, 2014; Timmermans, 2006). Often these agreements will contain explicit references to the shared political values of the coalition while they do not “for obvious reasons, draw attention to outstanding points of difference”(Laver, 1992:45)². Rather, they aim to limit the conflict between the coalition partners and coordinate the policy of government (Strøm and Müller, 1999)

For all the ideological similarities between the member parties and the political values shared between them, coalition governments still comprise a group of individual parties each with their own ideological identity and set of political values and which are still in a mutual competition for votes (Strøm and Müller, 1999: 257; see also Christiansen and Pedersen, 2014). A central challenge for coalition parties is thus to appease one another, present a united front and a shared set of political values, whilst maintaining the distinct ideological core and political values of their own party (e.g. Boston and Bullock, 2009; Fortunato and Stevenson, 2013; Martin and Vanberg, 2008). This is referred to as the unity/distinctiveness dilemma (Boston and Bullock, 2009):

In multi-party systems several aspects increase the difficulty for parties of communicating their core political values. For example, parties – especially those entering into coalition governments – are bound by institutional limitations of political life as the coalition government needs a majority to carry through its policies. In the case of minority governments, this may simply not always be possible (e.g. Boston and

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² E.g. the 2011 Coalition Agreement of the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats “We arrive at this programme for government a strong, progressive coalition inspired by the values of freedom, fairness and responsibility” (Government, 2015)
Bullock, 2009). In practice, this means that there will often be a wide gap between what parties may promise before an election and what they are able to deliver when elected to government (e.g. Ormrod et al., 2013). In other words, while parties may build their election promises on values and ideals, these values and ideals may never materialise due to the realities and limitations of the political system.

In a 2008 study, Martin and Vanberg explored the communicative efforts of coalition government members after the actual coalition formation. Through a content analysis of legislative debates, they explored how coalition government party leaders – by focusing on certain issues – attempted to justify their political compromises and persuade its supporters that the party had bargained “effectively on their behalf, given the constraints of the coalition” (Martin and Vanberg, 2008: 513).

Interestingly, the study showed that in the beginning of the coalition government period, the parties were likely to focus on issues on which the coalition government parties agreed. However, as a new election neared and the parties faced “possible electoral costs of compromise” (Martin and Vanberg, 2008: 514), the party leaders tended to debate more on issues that divide the coalition government parties. According to Martin and Vanberg (2008), this conflicts somewhat with the general belief that coalition government parties tend to avoid policy conflicts, but supports the notion that the individual parties are indeed still individual parties attempting to express their own identity and also competing for votes within the coalition government (Boston and Bullock, 2009; Strøm and Muller, 1999). Martin and Vanberg’s (2008) findings also suggest that coalition governments are dynamic and that the electoral cycle has an impact on the communication of the individual coalition government parties (Martin and Vanberg, 2008).

### 3.3.3.1. Internal tensions and the cost of governing

A central internal challenge of coalition government participation is that it has the potential for creating trouble inside the party and may bring about disagreements between the parliamentary party and the party’s rank-and-file members (e.g. Martin and Vanberg, 2008). As the party elite is ideally meant to abide by the decisions made by the coalition government, it may not always be seen to or even be able to serve the interests of the party’s rank-and-file members or more idealistic supporters less concerned with government power. A risk of coalition participation is thus that it may “undermine a party’s carefully established profile and (to) erode support among constituents with a particular concern for the
party’s traditional goals” (Martin and Vanberg, 2008: 503). The different interests of the party elite and the more rank-and-file members of the party are aptly summed up by Laver and Schofield (1990):

*The general rule is that the rank-and-file, more concerned with ideology and less in line for the other spoils of office, tend to resent the policy compromises necessary to enter coalition and hence to oppose them. The parliamentary leaders, at least some of whom will become cabinet ministers, are more inclined to see the virtue of policy compromises if these increase the chance of the party going into government,* (1990: 24)

From an external perspective, it is generally agreed that parties who participate in coalition governments face a so-called cost of governing i.e. a loss of electoral support (e.g. Strøm, 1999; van Spanje, 2011) due to the loss of policy purity in the process of government participation (e.g. van Spanje, 2011). However, while this cost has generally been regarded as being equal amongst parties, current research suggests that in multi-party systems some parties pay a higher price for government participation than others (van Spanje, 2011). Indeed, through his observations of 51 parties in seven Western European countries, van Spanje (2011) found that the cost of government is higher for so-called “anti-establishment” parties than for more middle-ground parties. In a similar vein, parties located at the fringes of the political system such as green parties, radical left-or right parties who enter into governments may also moderate their most “extreme” policies and viewpoints in order to appease the coalition partners and present a united front – a process which is labeled the “moderating” effect (e.g. Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2013; see also Heinisch, 2003). However, although the “moderating” effect of the political party is strongly related to the party’s identity and political values, no scholars have so far explored this “moderating” effect in terms of the communication of political values and party identity. Nor has the cost of governing been considered from a more identity-based perspective pertaining to what the party may lose in terms of its core values throughout the course of coalition government participation.
4. The identity, ideology and values of the political party

For the political party as for all other kinds of organisations, the concept of identity has become increasingly important in recent years as organisations strive to define themselves and differentiate themselves from others (e.g. Hatch and Schultz, 2000; Melewar and Karaosmanoglu, 2006; Ran and Duimering, 2007). For the party, these ‘others’ are parties with whom the party is competing for votes whilst defining the party matters in relation to various internal and external stakeholders such as members, the electorate, political partners and opponents, and the media (e.g. Strömbäck, 2011) (see table 3-1, p. 34). In short, we may say that the concept of identity has a two-fold function for organisations namely a defining function and a communicative function.

Defining and communicating the political party identity matters from both an internal and external perspective. From an internal perspective, a definition and an awareness of the party’s identity provides a sense of self (both personal and collective) to the members of the party (concerning “who we are” and “what we believe in”) and serves to induce loyalty and motivation (e.g. Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009; Panebianco, 1988). From an external perspective, communicating the party’s identity contributes to positioning the party against its competitors with the aim of increasing electoral support (e.g. Baines et al., 2013; Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009; Smith and French, 2009).

From an organisational perspective, the notions of identity, ideology and values are highly interrelated and an organisation’s values represent a key element of both its identity (e.g. Melewar and Karaosmanoglu, 2006) and its ideology (e.g. Knight, 2006; van Dijk, 2005, 2006). As the dissertation explores what political values the party elite disseminates in the party’s key value-based genres, the focus is on the corporate identity of the party as this concerns how an organisation communicates its values and identity (Hatch and Schultz, 2000). However, the dissertation also includes a discussion of the notions of ideological identity and organisational identity as well as a brief introduction to the party’s institutional identity. The inclusion of all identity types is necessary for two key reasons: 1) the complexity of the identity concept and interrelatedness of the identity types and 2) the specific type of organisation which the political party represents. In essence, just as an organisation cannot communicate who it is without knowing who it is (e.g. Cornelissen, 2014), I argue that we cannot explore the concept of corporate identity without including a discussion of the concepts of ideological or organisational identity as they are inherently intertwined in an organisation like the political party.
4.1. **Identity - complex and multi-dimensional**

As a scientific construct the notion of identity is both complex and multi-dimensional (Albert and Whetten, 2004: 104). Not only is it treated within different fields such as political science, social psychology, marketing and organisational studies, but each field also contributes with its own understanding of the concept.

In an organisational setting, the concept of identity has traditionally been treated within two different fields of research i.e. marketing and organisational studies (Hatch and Schultz, 2000:12). These two perspectives can be linked to the defining and communicative functions of identity in an organisational context and have paved the way for two different concepts namely *organisational identity* and *corporate identity*. Organisational identity originates from organisational studies and has traditionally had an internal focus on what the organisation stands for and how it is perceived and defined by its members (Hatch and Schultz, 2000). In contrast, corporate identity has its roots in the field of marketing and has traditionally had an external focus centering on how an organisation communicates its organisational identity to external stakeholders (Hatch and Schultz, 2000).

Although traditionally regarded as two distinct concepts, the lines between organisational identity and corporate identity are blurring with the two perspectives seen to represent two sides of the same coin (see Hatch and Schultz, 2000). In other words, for the organisation to be perceived as credible the corporate identity and what is expressed to key stakeholders need to be rooted in and express the core of the organisation i.e. its organisational identity (Cornelissen, 2014: 70). Furthermore, the concept of corporate identity is today perceived as more inclusive extending beyond the mere “outward representation” of an organisation (Cornelissen, 2014: 67). This means that the organisation’s internal stakeholders also often form part of the target group for corporate identity programmes which were before mainly aimed at external stakeholders (Hatch and Schultz, 2000: 13).

Specific to the field of political science, we find the notions of *institutional identity* and *ideological identity* with the former referring to the structural and institutional aspects of the party and the latter to its key values and core concerns (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009). In sum, the party’s ideological identity reflects its underlying political ideology and what the party stands for and cares about (e.g. Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009; Janda et al., 1995; see also Panebianco, 1988).
The four different types of identity are by no means independent of each other as the main difference between them is the perspective from which they view the phenomenon of an organisation’s identity. Subsequently, they are both intertwined and overlapping.

4.2. The ideological identity of the party – what does the party stand for?

In terms of identity, the political party a complex and unique type of organisation with its “two-fold character” adding to its complexity (Buckler and Dolowitz 2009: 13). First of all, the party has an ideological identity which represents the party’s “most central values and core commitments”, and which defines the party both internally and externally by reflecting the party’s history and moral “raison d’etre” (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009: 13; see also Panebianco, 1988: 11).

The ideological identity is relevant from both an internal and external stakeholder perspective. As it reflects the core values and commitments of the party, the ideological identity defines the party’s central character and positions the party in terms of what values it promotes and ultimately how it defines the good life (Stoker, 2006). In the context of party competition, the party’s ideological identity also affects the party’s choice of rhetorical strategies in communicating what the party stands for and cares about (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009: 13).

Apart from the ideological identity, the party also has an institutional identity which concerns its formal institutional structure, management structure, internal rules and regulations etc. (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009). As the institutional identity concerns the way in which the party is organised internally, it is typically of little interest to external stakeholders such as the electorate and serves mainly an internal function. However, in times of institutional change, internal party discussions and disputes, the institutional identity may be scrutinised by external stakeholders (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009). In this sense, the institutional and ideological identity of the party are highly interrelated as any internal disputes over specific political value priorities or commitments (the ideological identity) may raise doubts over the internal stability of the party (the institutional identity) (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009: 13-14).

If we view the concept of ideological identity through an organisational lens, we see that it strongly mirrors the concept of organisational identity as both concern the essence of the organisation and how it
is defined by its members (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009; 2012; Panebianco, 1988). Malka and Lelkes (2010) refer to ideological identity as a form of self-categorisation i.e. how the party defines itself. This understanding of ideological identity is in line with the concept of organisational identity which concerns with “how organisational members perceive and understand ‘who we are’ and/or ‘what we stand for’ as an organisation” (Hatch and Schultz, 2000: 15). Organisational scholars Albert and Whetten (1985) argue that organisational identity refers to “features that are arguably core, distinctive and enduring” (1985: 292). In other words, they regard the organisation’s identity to be perceived by its members to be defined by the central character of the organisation; how it is distinct from others; and how stable it is over time (Albert and Whetten, 2004: 90).

In this dissertation, the notion of ideological identity is understood and treated as organisational identity in a political context. Thus, from now on, the term ideological identity is used to refer to the core, distinctive and defining features and values of the party.

4.2.1. The notion of ideology

The inclusion of the term ideology in connection with the identity of the political party reflects the political nature of this particular organisation and the notion that the identity of a political party almost always takes point of departure in and is linked to a specific (political) ideology (e.g. Jost et al., 2009).

Although some scholars argue that the role of ideology is decreasing along with the ideological convergence between parties (e.g. Böss, 2013; Kavanagh, 1996; Mair, 2008), a party’s ideological heritage still plays an important part in constructing party identity (e.g. Buckler and Dolowitz, 2012). To this day, political parties are typically classified according to their ideological position on a single left–right dimension and adhere to specific political ideologies such as socialism or liberalism that guide and affect their underlying value system (e.g. Jost et al., 2009: 310).

On a manifest level, the parties’ ideological affiliations are often reflected in the party names particularly in relation to traditionally mass-based parties rooted in the political and class-based cleavages of the 19th and 20th century (see Bild and Nielsen, 2005) e.g. The Conservative Party (e.g. UK and DK), The Liberal Party (DK) and the Social Liberal Party (DK). Newer parties on both sides of the political spectrum such as the Socialist People’s Party (DK) (founded in 1959) and Liberal Alliance (DK) (founded in 2007) also have names that promote specific political ideologies. Other parties may label themselves according to
the left-right spectrum such as the Norwegian Right Party, or according to the social class which they represent e.g. The Labour Party (UK), Arbeiterpartiet (Norway). Another group of parties do not commit themselves to a specific political ideology but are more issue-based in nature. Examples are the plethora of environmentalist Green Parties in Europe; the many far right anti-immigrant parties such as The Danish People’s Party (DK) and the Front National (France); and parties fighting for withdrawal from the EU such as the UK Independence Party (UKIP) (See Castles and Mair, 1984: 74).

As one of the few contentions that originate from political science, ideology is inherently political in nature (Knight, 2006). However, it remains a highly debated concept (e.g. Hamilton, 1987; Knight, 2006; van Dijk, 2006) and one which has in fact been dubbed the most “elusive concept in the whole of social science” (McLellan, 1986: 1). Hamilton attempted to “reduce the diversity” of definitions of ideology by breaking existing definitions into individual elements and restructuring them into a “coherent” definition of the concept (Hamilton, 1987: 19). He identified 27 different elements applied across the various definitions which he aggregated into a single definition of ideology as:

A system of collectively held normative and reputedly factual ideas and beliefs and attitudes advocating a particular pattern of social relationships and arrangements, and/or aimed at justifying a particular pattern of conduct, which its proponents seek to promote, realise, pursue or maintain. (Hamilton, 1987: 38)

A key aspect in Hamilton’s definition is that it stresses, albeit rather implicitly, that ideology essentially concerns the achievement of the good life (reflected in the sentence “particular pattern of social relationships and arrangements”). The notion of the good life is also evident in Erikson and Tedin’s (2003) definition of ideology as a “set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved” (2003: 64).

Hamilton’s definition also emphasises that ideology is a system of collective beliefs. In other words, ideology is not found on an individual level but is a socially shared concept. This is supported by van Dijk (2006: 116-117) who argues that ideology encompasses three overall characteristics: 1) It is a belief system; 2) It is shared amongst social groups (such as the political party) and 3) It is fundamental and axiomatic and controls and organises other socially shared beliefs. Owing to its axiomatic nature, ideology serves to organise the identity, values, actions and norms of a group and also determines the specific cultural values that are important for the group (e.g. freedom or equality) (van Dijk, 2006: 116).
The ideological identity and thereby the political values of a party are thus deeply rooted in the collective identity of the party.

Van Dijk (2005) emphasises the interrelatedness of ideology and values when he argues that values are “constitutive categories” of ideology (2005: 732). In a similar vein, Knight (2006) defines ideology as a “coherent and relatively stable set of beliefs or values” (Knight, 2006: 625; see Maio et al., 2003 for a comprehensive discussion of the interrelatedness of ideology, values and attitudes).

In this dissertation, the notion of ideology is regarded as a system of values which organise and give structure to the ideological identity of the party. As argued by Walgraves and Nuytemans (2009) “what emotions are for human beings is ideology for parties: it shows what they care about and believe in” (2009: 192). It follows that whether or not the ideological identity and the core political values of a party are founded in a traditional political ideology of the left-right scale or whether they are more issue based in nature, they are strongly linked to the party’s history and sense of self (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009).

4.3. The value concept

As established above, values constitute a central part of the party’s ideology and its idea of the good life. As a political party is essentially value-based and concerned with achieving an ideal society (White and Ypi, 2010), values arguably play a particularly defining role in the political party although they constitute a key identity component in all types of organisations (Cornelissen, 2014).

To fully understand the importance of values for the political party as an organisation attempting to communicate its ideological identity, we need to explore the various understandings of the value concept. Just as the notion of identity, values are complex and multi-dimensional and are applied in many different fields and with many different foci (Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004; van Deth and Scarborough, 1995). The various applications and understandings of values in different fields of research as well as a fragmented state of value research make it difficult for scholars to agree on a common definition of the concept (e.g. Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004; e.g. Schwartz et al., 2010; van Deth and Scarborough, 1994). Indeed, Albert (1968) argues that it may even be impossible to find a single definition of values which “embraces all the meanings assigned to the term” or which would be satisfactory to all researchers across fields and disciplines (Albert, 1968: 288 in van Deth and Scarborough, 1995).
Despite the challenge of finding a common definition, Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) identified five features are common to most definitions of values: Values are (a) concepts or beliefs, (b) about desirable end states or behaviors, (c) that transcend specific situations, (d) guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events, and (e) are ordered by relative importance (1987: 551). The notion that values are trans-situational indicates that they serve as guiding principles in people's lives across different situations and are also largely stable although they may change over time (Barnea and Schwartz, 1998; see also Schwartz, 1992; Rokeach, 1973). They function as people's "cognition about the desirable" (Rokeach, 1973: 7) and act as standards that guide human behaviour and lead people to "take particular positions on social issues and (…) predispose us to favour one particular political or religious ideology over another" (Rokeach, 1973: 13).

In the context of this study which focuses on the communication of political values in the party as an organisation, the term values can be seen as an umbrella term which may be sub-divided into personal values (stemming from the field of social psychology), political values (stemming from the field of political science), and organisational values (stemming from organisational studies). These are listed in table 4-1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of value</th>
<th>Field of research</th>
<th>Central definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal values</td>
<td>Social psychology</td>
<td>“an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence” (Rokeach, 1973: 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political values</td>
<td>Political science</td>
<td>“overarching normative principles and belief assumptions about government, citizenship and society” (McCann, 1997: 554)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisational values</td>
<td>Organisational studies</td>
<td>“collective beliefs about what the entire enterprise stands for, takes pride in and holds of intrinsic worth” (Williams, 2002: 220).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-1: Overview of value categorisations relevant for the political party
In the following sections, however, it will become clear that although we are dealing with separate theoretical concepts, they are in fact highly related most especially perhaps in a value-based organisation such as the political party.

4.3.1. Personal values

As mentioned above, a central feature of values is that they refer to cognitive representations of desirable, trans-situational goals (Schwartz et al., 2010: 422) and essentially help people to define what is “good” and “bad” in the world (Jacoby, 2006: 706). The concept of personal values is largely applied within the field of social psychology, (Schwartz et al., 2010) with a classic definition offered by social psychologist Milton Rokeach in his seminal work, The Nature of Human Values (1973):

(values are) an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence (Rokeach, 1973: 5)

In his widely used value inventory, Rokeach (1973) lists a total of 36 human values which he divides into terminal values (desired end-states) such as equality and world-peace, and instrumental values (modes of behavior or means) such as ambitious or cheerful. In other words, Rokeach (1973) sees values as consisting of both means and end-states, and he distinguishes sharply between these two value types which is seen in tables 4-2 and 4-3 below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terminal values (desirable end-states of existence)</th>
<th>Personal in orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social in orientation</strong></td>
<td>A comfortable life (a prosperous life)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A world of peace (free of war and conflict)</td>
<td>An exciting life (a stimulating, active life)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A world of beauty (of nature and the arts)</td>
<td>A sense of accomplishment (lasting contribution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality (brotherhood, equal opportunity for all)</td>
<td>Family security (taking care of loved ones)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom (independence, free choice)</td>
<td>Freedom (independence, free choice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National security (protection from attack)</td>
<td>Happiness (contentedness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inner harmony (freedom from inner conflict)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mature love (sexual and spiritual intimacy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pleasure (an enjoyable, leisurely life)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salvation (saved, eternal life)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Self-respect (self-esteem)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social recognition (respect, admiration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>True friendship (close companionship)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wisdom (a mature understanding of life)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4-2: The 18 Terminal Values (Rokeach, 1973)
Table 4-3: The 18 Instrumental Values (Rokeach, 1973)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrumental values (desirable modes of conduct)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Competence values</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambitious (hard-working, aspiring)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capable (competent, effective)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean (neat, tidy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imaginative (daring, creative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectual (intelligent, reflective)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logical (consistent, rational)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moral values</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad-minded (open-minded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheerful (light-hearted, joyful)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courageous (standing up for your beliefs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgiving (willing to pardon others)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helpful (working for the welfare of others)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest (sincere, truthful)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent (self-reliant, self-sufficient)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loving (affectionate, tender)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obedient (dutiful, respectful)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polite (courteous, well-mannered)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsible (dependable, reliable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-controlled (restrained, self-disciplined)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a clear from Rokeach’s Value System, the terminal values which are social in orientation (Table 4-2) reflect how a person may view the ideal society and after arguably political in nature. Here we find values such as freedom and equality, a world of peace and national security. However, apart from these five terminal and socially-oriented values, the remaining values are personal in nature covering what a person deems important to achieve in life such as inner harmony, mature love and true friendship. Subsequently, these values are not as easily transferable to a political context as the five terminal and socially-oriented values. Another key value theory is offered by Schwartz (1992) who includes 10 distinct value orientations recognised by people of all cultures (see figure 4-1 below).

![Schwartz's value orientations](image-url)

Figure 4-1: Schwartz’s value orientations (Schwartz et.al, 2010: 425)
In Schwartz’s (1992; 2006; 2010) value theory, we see how values such as universalism and security both have a societal focus and thereby are largely political in nature (figure 4-1). However, just as in Rokeach’s (1973) Value System, the focus of Schwartz’s value theory is on personal values with the two societal values not necessarily covering the entire political value spectrum of contemporary political parties.

Although Schwartz’ value theory is inspired by Rokeach’s value inventory (Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004), the two theories differ on one important aspect namely the notion of end-goals versus means. Where Rokeach’s value inventory sharply divides the means (instrumental values) and the ends (terminal values), Schwartz’ value theory argues that the same value can express both motivations for means and ends (see Hitlin and Piavilin, 2004). This is an important distinction in connection with political parties that may disagree not only on the interpretation of a specific value, but also the means with which to achieve it (see section 8.1. on the political value taxonomy).

### 4.3.2. Political values

In the field of political science, personal values pertaining to political matters are mainly referred to as a person’s core political values. Schwartz et al. (2010) claim that political values “express basic personal values in the domain of politics” (2010, 421) while McCann (1997) argue they represent “citizens’ overarching normative principles and belief assumptions about government, citizenship and society” (1997: 554). Goren (2005) offers another definition of political values arguing that they reflect “abstract, prescriptive beliefs about humanity, society, and public affairs” (2005: 882).

From the different value definitions listed in table 4-1 (p. 47), we see how the concepts of personal and political values overlap as both include references to the achievement of societal goals. Personal and political values are thus highly interrelated as voters tend to rely on their personal values in their electoral choice (e.g. Feldman, 1988; Goren, 2005; Kilburn, 2009; Schwartz et al., 2010) with studies on electoral behaviour indicate that political values serve as a basis for voters’ attitude and opinion formation towards many different political issues (e.g. Feldman, 2003; Sotirovic and McLeod, 2001). However, according to Schwartz et al. (2010) personal values are more abstract and fundamental than core political values and serve to organise and give coherence a person’s political values. In their 2010 study of the relationship between personal values, political values and vote choice, Schwartz et al. (2010) conclude that personal serve as “anchors for core political values” (2010: 448) while other scholars have
recognised that personal values function as a “crucial grounding of ideology” (Caprara et al., 2006: 2) and “organise political thinking” (Sotirovic and McLeod, 2001: 273). From this it follows that the political values within a political party are founded in the personal values of the party members and that the party’s political values serve as a key link between party and voters.

4.3.2.1. The content of political values

Although this dissertation does not focus on critically discussing the ideological meanings of the specific political values nor aims to categorise the parties on the left-right ideological scale, a presentation of the content of political values is necessary in order to understand the differences between parties and their ideological identities and in connection with developing the political value taxonomy (see sections 6.4.1 and 8.1).

Traditionally, political parties have been categorised on a left-right continuum according to the classic political ideologies of socialism and liberalism with values typically revolving around the question of how to distribute the resources of society (i.e. questions pertaining to economics and welfare) (e.g. Borre, 1995; Mair, 2007). However, scholars are increasingly acknowledging the emergence of what Ronald Inglehart (1997, 2008) refers to as post-materialist values that extend beyond the mere distribution of economic resources towards “softer” values such as gender equality, sustainability and quality of life (Bild and Nielsen, 2008: 12).

A key scholar within personal value theory from a societal perspective, Inglehart explores “people’s perceptions of the values that are important for society” (Maio et al., 2003: 286). In 1971, he put forward the claim that people’s value priority was changing in western industrialised nations due to the rise of the welfare state (Inglehart, 2008). Based on Maslow’s (1970) theory of basic human needs (see figure 4-2 below), Inglehart’s value theory assumes that when people’s basic needs are met their values will change (1997, 2008). According to Inglehart (1997), societal changes have “brought a shift from political cleavages based on social class conflict toward cleavages based on cultural issues and quality of life concerns” (1997: 237). This means that the value focus amongst new generations of voters has shifted
from focusing on materialist values concerning economic and physical security to more post-materialist values concerning autonomy, quality of life and self-expression.³

![Maslow's hierarchy of needs](image)

**Figure 4-2: Maslow's hierarchy of needs (adapted from Maslow, 1970)**

The notion of “new” versus “old” politics (e.g. Borre, 1995) expands on Inglehart’s ideas and argues for the emergence of other political conflicts apart from the traditional conflict dimension of the economic left-right politics of “distribution” (e.g. Borre, 1995; Petersen et al., 2010). Today, political conflict in many Western democracies is “two-dimensional” consisting of an economic left-right conflict dimension and a cultural or “value-based” left-right conflict dimension (see figure 4-3, p. 53). The first includes issues concerned with economic distribution in society whereas the latter includes more “value-based” issues such as immigration, law and order, and the environment (Petersen et al., 2010; Kriesi et al., 2006). These two dimensions each concern different political values – in Inglehart’s words, materialist and post-materialist values respectively.

³ This, however, varies significantly according to a society’s level of economic development (Inglehart, 2008: 137). Not surprisingly perhaps, countries with a low income and high level of conflict have a higher number of “materialists”, while prosperous and secure countries are dominated by “post-materialists” (Inglehart, 2008).
Figure 4-3: The two-dimensional political cleavages (adapted from Bild and Nielsen, 2008)

The term value-based politics is often used in connection with the post-materialist values which Inglehart emphasises (e.g. Bild and Nielsen, 2008). However, the term is somewhat misleading as it implies that only this dimension is based on political values which is not the case as both dimensions are essentially value-based. Thus, another and less misleading way to distinguish between the two dimensions may be to apply the terms “new“ and “old“ politics as these do not imply that one is more value-based than the other.

As argued by Schwartz et al. (2010), there is no consensus amongst scholars as for the number and specific content of political values. This may in part be due to the increasingly complex environment of political conflict dimensions, the emergence of “new“ politics and post-materialist values (e.g. Borre, 1995; Inglehart, 1997). Several scholars have, however, put forward “lists“ of political values (e.g. Feldman, 1988; McCann, 1997; Goren, 2005) which are summarised in in table 4-4 below:
As it appears from table 4-4, the most extensive list of political values is offered by Schwartz et al. (2010). In their 2010 study of the relationship between personal and political values, Schwartz et al. argue that the listed values constitute the most "prominent core values in the political science literature" as they are in fact based on previous work on political values (Schwartz et al., 2010: 447). However, Schwartz et al. (2010) also acknowledge the existence of other political values such as economic security, post-materialism, humanitarianism, and social welfare (Schwartz et al., 2010) thereby including both new and old political value dimensions. In contrast, despite listing five overall terminal values with a societal focus in his value inventory (see table 4-2, p. 48), Rokeach (1973) extracted only two political values from his values inventory namely freedom and equality as universal political values relevant for all political parties across the ideological scale. Indeed, according to Rokeach (1973), the major variations in political ideology are “fundamentally reducible, when stripped to their barest, to opposing value orientations concerning the political desirability or undesirability of freedom and equality in all their ramifications” (1973: 169; see also Mair, 2007).
4.3.2.2. Limitations to the existing lists of values

Several aspects are worth noting in connection with the existing lists of political values. First of all, the majority stem from an American context with the notion of “American values” often specifically highlighted (e.g. Feldman, 1988; Goren, 2005; Jacoby, 2006; McCann, 1997). For example, Feldman’s (1988) three values were based on a review of the literature on American beliefs and values (1988: 418-419). The focus on American values suggests that the values listed may not necessarily cover the values of other political systems as values are contextual and “differently conceptualised, depending on socio-cultural and political embeddings” (Sowińska, 2013: 793).

A second aspect is that the different lists of values all include rather broad descriptions of the actual value content. For example, Schwartz et al. (2010: 424) define equality as “egalitarian distribution of opportunities and resources” while Jacoby (2006: 709) defines the concept as “narrowing the gap in wealth and power between the rich and the poor”. The lack of specific description of the value content implies that there is little consideration of the notion that the same political values labels may in fact be interpreted differently by different parties (Bonotti, 2011; Rokeach, 1973). Although many western democratic parties share similar universal value labels such as freedom and equality, parties imbue these overall value labels with their own specific meaning (Bonotti, 2011; Rokeach, 1973). This supports the notion that values are in fact socially constructed (Sowińska, 2013: 794) which is also emphasised by Rokeach (1973):

Obviously, then, freedom cannot mean the same thing to socialists and to capitalists even though they may both insist they value it very highly. It is one thing to value freedom highly and ignore and be silent about equality, and it is quite another thing to insist that freedom is not truly possible unless it goes hand in hand with equality (Rokeach, 1973: 183)

This quote captures a central premise of political values namely that parties not only interpret specific values very differently, but also that for some parties certain values are deeply intertwined and simply cannot exist without each other. The specific way in which parties interpret political values constitutes a key aspect of their ideological identity. Apart from sharing similar universal value labels, albeit with individual interpretations, parties may also promote specific values such as patriotism and sustainability which set them apart from others (e.g. Inglehart, 1997, 2008). Thus, it is the specific combination of political values as well as the party’s interpretation of these values that constitute its ideological identity.
A third aspect important to consider in connection with the existing lists of political values is that they are not based on empirical studies of political texts but are founded in the political attitudes of the electorate (e.g. Ashton et al. 2005; Feldman, 1988; Jacoby, 1995) or in the personal values of voters (e.g. Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz et al., 2010). In other words, they do not take a party political perspective regarding political values as the expression of the party’s ideological identity.

A final aspect in relation to the existing lists of political values also concerns the notion of value sub-features but this time from the perspective of operationalisability. While the lists do offer some descriptions of the actual value content, the descriptions do not consider or include the different sub-features which different parties may attach to the values. On a practical level, the lack of detailed descriptions and different sub-features of the values means that the lists cannot easily be applied in the qualitative identification of political values in discourse. As parties attach different meanings to the political value labels, identifying the values in texts requires an understanding of these different meanings at least if the analysis aims to move beyond quantitatively identifying the manifest expressions of values via the specific value labels (keywords such as freedom, equality, peace etc.) as is often done in studies on political ideology and identity (see below).

4.3.2.3. The Comparative Manifestos Project

Within political science, the bulk of research into a party’s communication of ideology and political values has been carried out via quantitative studies of election manifestos with the aim of locating parties on the traditional left-right scale or to explore for changes in the party ideology and identity over time (e.g. Adams et al., 2004; Budge et al., 2001; Gabel and Huber, 2000; Janda et al., 1995; Walgrave and Nuytemans, 2009). Often these studies apply a quantitative analysis of party manifestos focusing on the manifest ideological content and relying on the data set of the Maniifesto Research Group (now known as the Comparative Manifestos Project (CPM) (e.g., Budge and Farlie, 1983; Budge and Keman, 1990; Klingemann et al., 1994; Walgraves and Nuytemans, 2009) which remains one of the most widely used data sources on party political positioning (Pennings and Keman, 2002).

The purpose of the CMP project is to measure the “policy positions of all relevant parties competing in any democratic election in the post-World-War-II period” (Werner et al. 2011). The measurement of parties’ policy positions is done via quantitative content analyses of election manifestos from 25
countries based on a coding scheme consisting of 56 categories divided into seven overall domains such as “Freedom and democracy”, “Economy” and “Welfare and quality of life” (Werner et al., 2011).

Although the coding scheme offers a vast and varied list of policy preferences, there are several reasons while the coding scheme was not deemed applicable in the coding of the parties’ political values in this dissertation. Firstly, the 56 CMP categories were developed on the basis of UK election manifestos of 1979 (Hansen, 2008; Pennings and Keman, 2002). This implies that they do not take into account any societal or political changes from within the last 30 odd years or so. Secondly, as a genre, election manifestos do not necessarily include statements of the party goals in all policy areas – only those which are seen as important for the party in the upcoming election (Hansen, 2008: 207-208). This means that the categories may not reflect all of the political values which exist in the political sphere. Finally, the categories are not actually reflections of political values merely policy “preferences”. Thus they are not immediately transferrable for my specific purpose which focuses on the specific notion of political values as the overriding goals of the political parties and their idea of the ideal society and the good life.

4.4. The role of political values in the party

For the political party as an organisation, political values serve a multitude of functions. They represent the party’s visions of a better society and its idea of the desirable or good life (Stoker, 2006, White and Ypi, 2010). As they constitute a core part of the party’s ideological identity, the party’s political values also define the organisation and differentiate it from others (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009, 2012; Panebianco, 1988) and thus also serve as the party’s organisational values defined as the “collective beliefs about what the entire enterprise stands for, takes pride in and holds of intrinsic worth” (Williams, 2002: 220). Having a clear idea of the party identity and a clear understanding of what the party stands for is central to the members’ feeling of “identity and solidarity” (Panebianco, 1988: 11).

This is supported by organisational studies which show that the strength of an organisation depends on the extent to which the organisational members are aware of and convinced of their organisation’s characteristics and distinctive features (Dhalla, 2007:246).

As established in section 3.1, one of the main functions of a political party is to “politisise citizens’ demands, values and interests” and translate these into concrete political programmes and manifestos which the party aims to put into action if it obtains power (Bonotti, 2011: 21). In this sense, the party’s political values also represent the parties’ political offerings or promises towards the electorate.
(Henneberg and Ormrod, 2013; Ormrod et al., 2013). Over time and due to the “logic of electoral competition” parties build reputations for defending particular values (Petersen et al., 2010: 533). This results in a specific value reputation for the party which enables citizens to make “value-oriented inferences about policies from the positions parties take” (Petersen, et al., 2010: 534). The central role of values in the political party is supported by Mair who argues that parties need clear identities and thus values if they wish to avoid becoming “marginal organisations” (Mair in Enyedi, 2014:201) while Bonotti (2011) claims that parties who wish to remain distinct "ought not to forgo the specific values and interests of which they are political expressions" (2011: 23).

4.4.1. The political party as a value-based organisation

From an internal stakeholder perspective it is reasonable to claim that, owing to the essentially value-based nature of the political party, the identity and the core values of the party are of particular importance to this type of organisation. Here we may consider Albert and Whetten’s (2004) distinction between utilitarian and normative organisation as this distinction is related to the extent to which the parties may stay true to their political values and their ideological identities.

In general terms, utilitarian and normative types of organisations differ in terms of their main function in society (Albert and Whetten, 2004). While the utilitarian organisation is primarily aimed at production and achieving economic gains (e.g. for-profit companies and corporations), the normative organisation mainly has a “cultural, education and expressive function” (Albert and Whetten, 2004: 106) such as religious or voluntary organisations, hospitals, universities as well as strongly ideological political associations.

In normative organisations, the members’ commitment is often high, and normative power is the main source of control especially for lower level members (Albert and Whetten, 2004: 106). In the case of the

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4 A party’s value reputation is closely linked to the notion of issue ownership which refers to the idea that parties tend to focus on issues where they are seen to be the most competent i.e. on issues that they “own” (e.g. Petrocik, 1996). Indeed, once a party has achieved “issue ownership” in the mind of voters this ownership is said to be “enduring, changing only slowly or not at all” (Greene and Haber, 2015: 16). The notion of issues is highly debated with some scholars seeing issues as broad and inclusive such as welfare and the environment (e.g. Dolezal et al. 2014) and others taking a more narrow approach seeing them as specific policy responses (see Guinaudeau & Persico, 2014 for a further discussion ). However, although some scholars see issues and values as highly similar, I argue that there is a conceptual difference between the two concepts as values constitute the party’s overall normative goals and thus constitute the core characteristics and essence of the party. In contrast, I see issues as the party’s specific responses. Although you could argue that the values expressed in the data thus constitutes the party’s issues, I view this data from a value and identity-based perspective and use the term values throughout the dissertation.
political party this could be the party’s rank-and-file members and the party’s true believers who emphasise the organisation’s values and ideological goals (Panebianco, 1988). In contrast, the main source of member control in utilitarian organisations is financial remuneration, and a person’s loyalty towards the organisation is defined in terms of self-interest and power much like political careerists emphasised by Panebianco (1988).

A key feature of the normative organisation is values as the very cohesiveness of this type of organisation is provided “not by information, logic and rationale, but by the acceptance of shared values, shared beliefs” (Cummings, 1983: 533). As membership of the normative organisation is so strongly linked to a person’s individual values, people are in fact likely to leave the organisation if they experience a loss of faith (Albert and Whetten, 2004: 112).

Due to societal changes, an increasing number of organisations have a dual identity and possess both normative and utilitarian characteristics functioning as both as businesses and voluntary associations (Albert and Whetten (2004)\(^5\)). It is arguable that the increased competition amongst parties due to changes in the electorate has also made the parties more utilitarian and less normative in nature. Indeed, according to the catch-all thesis (Kirchheimer, 1966), the normative element is becoming less important in contemporary political parties as they downplay references to their ideological “baggage” in order to capture the middle-ground voter (see Kirchheimer, 1966; Kavanagh, 1996).

In this connection, it is relevant to revisit the notion of party types and party paradigms (White, 2006; see section 3.1). Simply stated, some parties may essentially be more normative than others and thereby more concerned with maintaining ideological or policy “purity” than with achieving policy influence (Gunther and Diamond, 2003; Pedersen, 2011). Relating the notion of normativity to the two dominating party paradigms, there is likely to be a link between the responsible parties-model and the perceived – and desired - level of normativity in political parties (White, 2006).

According to the responsible-parties model, parties are essentially normative as they are founded on a core set of values and beliefs which they seek to stay true to regardless (e.g. White, 2006). Indeed, it is likely that some parties may be purely normative in nature as they are not founded with the aim of

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\(^5\) The university is one example of an organisation which increasingly possesses a dual identity. Traditionally a highly normative organisation functioning as an elevated place of learning aiming to offer students wisdom and emancipation from ignorance, the university is now increasingly regarded as a utilitarian business seen to fulfil a societal demand by supplying the surrounding world with educated students, and which is also in a severe competition with other universities for external funding (Albert and Whetten, 2004: 107-110).
gaining political power but merely to voice their opinion and make their viewpoints known (e.g. White, 2006; Petersen, 2011). This assumption is supported by the continuous formation of small fringe parties or third parties who stand little chance of getting into government and are not formed with the aim of winning elections (White, 2006: 5). In a study of the central dilemma faced by political parties in multi-party systems, i.e. policy purity versus political influence, Pedersen (2011) supports the notion of the purely normative political party when she argues for the likelihood that “small, dogmatic, parties with very little likelihood of getting into office see it as their calling to give voice to certain opinions and positions in society which would otherwise remain silent in the parliamentary debate.” (2011: 300).

In practice, there are significant differences as to the strength of the ideological identity of political parties and the extent to which parties are willing to compromise on core values and adapt in order to gain political power (Pedersen, 2011). If we juxtapose the responsible-parties model with the rational-efficient model we see that, although political parties are essentially based on values and the members’ idea of a better world, some parties, such as those primarily seeking office, may be highly utilitarian in nature. For these parties, the main utility function would be to secure votes and gain power in office even if it means compromising on central issues and political values. In contrast, strongly normative and ideological parties would be less concerned with gaining power and more concerned with the parties’ ideological “purity”.

However, for all major political parties a key premise for survival – at least in parliamentary terms – is to ensure a certain number of votes so that the party can gain legitimate access to parliament. Subsequently, it can be argued that the major political parties in multi-party systems, who all aspire to achieve political influence in parliament, albeit not necessarily in office, also have a significant utility function. Owing to the political system of negotiation and compromise, the majority of parties may at times have to compromise on central issue and lose their policy purity in order to gain influence (Pedersen, 2011). The extent to which the party compromises may of course vary greatly according to the party’s position on the ideological scale and the very nature of the party (see Gunther and Diamond, 2003; Pedersen, 2011; Walgraves and Nuytemans, 2009).

### 4.4.2. The notion of value stability

The notion of stability and temporal endurance of identity and values is central to the discussion of the ideological identity and political values in a normative organisation such as the political party. If we
revisit the notion of ideological identity and related concept of organisational identity (see section 4.2.), we see that temporal endurance plays a key part in Albert and Whetten's (1985) definition of organisational identity as consisting of core features which not only define the organisation and set it apart from others, but also remain stable and endure over time.

Although not explicitly a part of the definition of ideological identity, the notion of ideological stability is an important and debated aspect within the field of political science. Some scholars argue that political parties continuously adapt their ideological positions – and thus their values – in order to accommodate for social and political changes (Buckler and Dolowitz (2009). Indeed, according to Bevir (2000), ideologies can never be fixed as they represent “contingent, changing traditions that people produce through their utterances and actions” (Bevir, 2000: 281). Ideology is therefore a malleable concept which can be continuously redefined as meaning arises through usage of language (Bevir, 2000).

This viewpoint is largely consistent with the notion of adaptive instability discussed by Gioia et al. (2004) who contest the idea of temporal endurance in connection with an organisation’s identity. According to Gioia et al. (2004), organisations must be able to adapt in order to survive, and there is a difference between organisations having an “enduring identity and an identity having continuity” (2004: 351). The former refers to an identity which remains the same over time, while the latter refers to an identity that maintains its core value labels over time, but continuously changes its interpretation of these labels. Gioia et al. (2004: 351) name this process adaptive instability.

In connection with the values of political parties, it is thus likely that although the party continuously stresses the values of freedom, equality and welfare society etc. the party may over time redefine or adapt its interpretation of these specific value labels and ascribe to them changing features along with political and social changes.

One example of a change of value interpretation is provided by Buckler and Dolowitz (2009) who focus on the transformation of the Labour Party into New Labour. In their 2009 study, they note how Tony Blair in his rhetoric succeeded in redefining the value of equality and in that rhetorically breaking with the past: “Linking opportunity to the requirement that individuals make the most of the economic and social opportunities supplied a further contrast with ‘old labour’ who were seen to have been happy to further a ‘dependency culture’” (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009: 23-24).
At the same time, however, the Labour Party is an oft-cited example of party elite which was ultimately punished by voters for changing the core identity and political values of the party. Despite immediate success at the polls, this success waned over time, and the party was criticized for abandoning its core identity which eventually led to an unclear party identity and a loss of core voter support (Evans and Tilley, 2011; Evans and Neundorf, 2013; White and de Chernatony, 2002).

The example of the Labour Party suggests that while ideologies and values may be malleable on a theoretical level, there is less ideological maneuvering space in practice (e.g. Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009; Walgraves and Nuytemans, 2009). Since parties are essentially value-based organisations, scholars argue that they cannot move in any direction if they wish to maintain the trust of the electorate (e.g. Walgrave and Nuytemans, 2009). Indeed, as the ideology of a party constitutes a key part of the party’s identity towards internal and external stakeholders there are limits as to how much and how radically a party can adapt its ideology without losing core support (e.g. Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009; Walgraves and Nuytemans, 2009).

The notion of adaptive instability and the change in core value content, may again be related to the notion of normative versus utilitarian parties as there may be significant differences as to the way in which the party elite and the rank-and-file members view the party’s values. This central conflict is summed up by Müller and Strøm (1999: 193) who claim that party leaders “are prepared to adapt the party program to maximise the chances of office party members and activists are more policy (ideology) oriented and less prepared to make programmatic sacrifices”. As noted by Walgrave and Nuytemans (2009), the party elite may change the party’s core ideological statement i.e. the party programme in order to increase the party’s chances of electoral success (Walgrave and Nuytemans, 2009).
5. Communicating the party’s ideological identity

Values constitute a powerful construct in political communication (e.g. Sowińska, 2013; Doherty, 2008) and in disseminating the party’s ideological identity to stakeholders (e.g. Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009; 2012). Indeed, communicating the party’s ideological identity through core political values lies at the very heart of the communicative challenge faced by contemporary political parties. Although many aspects such as party leader image and specific policy positions may contribute to the final decision of the voter (e.g. Dean and Croft, 2009; Strömbäck et al., 2012), political values represent a significant variable in a party’s electoral success as people tend to vote for the parties whose values best mirror their own (e.g. Feldman, 1988; Goren, 2005; Kilburn, 2009; Schwartz et al., 2010).

5.1. Strategic communication in a political context

As parties enter into coalition governments and face negotiation and compromise, it may put strong pressure on the party in terms of communicating its core values. Indeed, the very centrality of political values in the party’s ideological identity suggests that political parties, especially those entering into coalition governments, should carefully consider how to communicate these values so as to not dilute the ideological identity of their parties and alienate their key stakeholders (e.g. Bonotti, 2011; Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009, 2012; Martin and Vanberg, 2008).

The communication of an organisation’s identity and values is often explored from the overall perspective of strategic communication which is overall defined as “the purposeful use of communication by an organisation to fulfill its mission (Hallahan et al. 2007: 3) and concerns how an organisation “presents and promotes itself through the intentional activities of its leaders, employees, and communication practitioners” (Hallahan et al., 2007: 17).

Cornelissen offers another definition of the concept emphasising that it is overall a management function that “offers a framework for the effective coordination of all internal and external communication with the overall purpose of establishing and maintaining favourable reputations with stakeholder groups upon which the organisation is dependent” (Cornelissen, 2014: 5).

Thus, strategic communication is essentially a management process which requires a top-down approach to communication (Christensen and Morsing, 2005) and which is linked to wide variety of both for-profit and non-profit organisations and institutions which are navigating in complex environments and
need a more “strategic, integrated and stakeholder-oriented approach to their external and internal communication activities”. (Frandsen and Johansen, 2014: 220). Strategic communication is thereby seen as just as important for public institutions such as political parties as for corporate entities (Hallahan et al., 2007). Hallahan et al (2007) also specifically highlight political communication as a sub-field of strategic communication which aims to build “political consensus or consent on important issues involving the exercise of political power and the allocation of resources in society” (Hallahan, 2007: 6).

The overall aim of strategic communications is to present the organisation’s identity to key stakeholders (Hallahan et al, 2007). The identity presented to stakeholders through the organisation’s communication efforts as well as its actions (e.g. Abravanel, 1983 in van Rekom et al., 2006: Cornelissen, 2014) is referred to as the corporate identity of the party. Despite a general lack of consensus on how to define the concept of corporate identity with definitions ranging from highly academic to the more practitioner-based (Melewar and Jenkins, 2002), a core definition is that corporate identity refers to the “central or distinctive idea of the organisation and how this idea is represented and communicated to a variety of audiences” (Hatch and Schultz, 2000: 13). In the case of the political party, that the corporate identity presented to stakeholders by the party elite through the party’s strategic communication efforts thus constitutes the party’s communicated ideological identity.

5.1.1. The strategic nature of political communication

A central feature of strategic communication is that it not only seeks to inform stakeholders about the organisation, but that it is a highly strategic act aiming at “symbolically crafting and projecting a particular image of the organisation” (Cornelissen, 2014: 64). In other words, the way in which the organisation’s management communicates the organisation’s identity, and the values it chooses to emphasise reflect how the elite would like the organisation to be perceived by key stakeholders. This explains why some scholars equate the notion of corporate identity with the intended organisational image (e.g. Boros, 2009).

The notion of strategy is indeed central to the understanding of political communication per se. Scholars agree that political communication is inherently strategic as politics itself essentially concerns problem-solving and gaining support through “discussion and persuasion” (Chilton, 2004: 4). This is also evident in the general understanding of political messages as having a strategic aim aiming to “affect” and “influence” the receiver (e.g. Denton & Woodward, 1998; Nimmo & Sanders, 1981). In his 2011
definition of political communication, McNair (2011) also highlights the notion of strategy when he defines political communication as the “purposeful communication about politics” entailing “all forms of communication undertaken by politicians and other political actors for the purpose of achieving specific objective” (McNair, 2011: 4). Here, the terms “purposeful” and “specific objective” suggest that the communication of political senders does indeed have a strategic aim.

Although the inherently strategic nature of political communication was already recognised by Aristotle (e.g. Charteris-Black, 2014), scholars are increasingly arguing that in a complex and competitive political environment with increasingly volatile voters, strategically communicating the party’s values and identity should constitute a key part of the political party’s communication efforts (e.g. Strömbäck, 2011: Thrassou et al., 2011). Thus in the context of a political party, strategic communication entails that parties and other political actors may use communication strategically to achieve political goals (Strömbäck, 2011: 67; Strömbäck and Kiousis, 2011). Indeed, political communication is increasingly seen as a “strategic resource” which helps “in adopting shared values and goals between an organisation’s internal and external stakeholder groups, be it voters, members, or the general public.” (Thrassou et al., 2011: 285). Along with the growing focus of communicating strategically, political values have thus become the object of attention from a more strategically-oriented perspective and are seen not only as representing a system of beliefs and assumptions categorising the political party’s visions of a better society (e.g. White and Ypi, 2010), but also as “tools for political communication” (Doherty, 2008: 420). Indeed, Buckler and Dolowitz (2009) note how references to political values in speeches often play a key role in how parties rhetorically position themselves against their competition.

5.1.2. Message consistency

Scholars within strategic communication advocate that the organisation aims for message “clarity, consistency, and orchestration (…) across different situations and different audiences” (Christensen et al., 2008: 96). A key feature of strategic communication is that for the organisation to be perceived as credible and coherent, the communicated identity of organisation must be aligned with and reflect the actual and organisational identity of the organisation (e.g. Balmer and Greyser, 2003; Belasen, 2008). This has two implications for the political party, namely that there should be a strong alignment between the way in which the party is perceived by its members and the communicated ideological identity i.e. the identity as perceived and communicated by the party elite. Also, the political party should seek to communicate a consistent and coherent ideological identity e.g. through its political
values in order for internal and external stakeholder groups to know what the party stands for (e.g. Strömbäck, 2011).

What distinguishes the Strömbäck’s (2011) understanding of strategic communication in a political context from other approaches to political communication is the emphasis on parties communicating an overall coherent party story or “master narrative” (Strömbäck, 2011; Westen, 2007: 151). This story should ideally be communicated in all levels of the party’s communication efforts from its grand strategy to its specific campaign tactics (Strömbäck, 2011: 70):

To be compelling and durable, the master narrative of a party – the “big picture” story that defines its principles – must be clear, coherent and emotionally alive, allowing flux and change at the level of specific attitudes and gradual change at the level of values. This master narrative is the emotional constitution of a party, a living document that resides in the minds of its adherents and defines the overarching message of its framers, its leaders, and those who identity with it (Westen, 2007: 151)

From this definition of the party’s master narrative, we see that it serves to define the party’s principles and values and also to define the party to its stakeholders (“framers, leaders and those who identify with it”). In this sense, the notion of master narrative may be seen as another word for the party’s communicated ideological identity or corporate identity as these concepts also concern the communication of the party’s core values and concerns to its key stakeholders. Although it allows for “flux and change” on attitude level, Westen (2007: 151) argues that it should in terms of values be relatively stable allowing only for “gradual change” and overall “clear and coherent”.

The focus on a coherent story can be linked to the notion of message consistency which is defined as the “degree to which organisations communicate consistent messages in all internal and external communication channels” (Cornelissen, 2011: 65). From the perspective of a political party, message consistency is seen as necessary if parties wish to attract and maintain the support of members as well as voters – and stand out against its competitors (e.g. Smith and French, 2009). The importance of message consistency for the political party is summed up by Smith and French (2009) who argue that:

When a party becomes disunited and/or sends conflicting messages to voters, the perceived cohesion of the party brand breaks down, its credibility is lost – and voters are notoriously disinclined to support a disunited party. (2009: 213)
In their 2009 and 2012 studies on ideological renewal in the UK Labour Party and the Conservatives, Buckler and Dolowitz explore the role of party leader rhetoric in communicating a party’s change of ideological position and ensuring that a “suitable sense of identity can be sustained in the context of renewal” (2009: 11). With their focus on the rhetorical strategies of the party leaders, the studies offer an interesting insight into the rhetorical choices made by party leaders in times of ideological repositioning. Buckler and Dolowitz (2009) conclude that the process of repositioning the party is no easy feat as a party’s ideology is more or less “institutionally embodied in parties or movements” and serves as an important reference point in the construction of party identity (2009: 12). They note that party leaders need to be particularly careful to link the renewed ideology to the parties’ ideological past in order to ensure a sense of continuity. This also entails including references to the party’s core political values and commitments which play an important role in creating party loyalty and electoral mobilisation in times of change (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009: 13). This is further supported by Panebianco (1988) who argues that if parties wish to maintain the continued support of party believers, the party leaders must make “constant and ritual references to the ideological goals” of the party (Panebianco, 1988: 27).

5.1.3. Challenging the notion of corporate identity

In essence, whatever values the party elite chooses to disseminate in their strategic communication efforts present the communicated ideological identity (its corporate identity) to key internal and external stakeholders. Here, it is relevant to consider that corporate identity is a much more political concept than previously believed (Rodrigues and Child, 2008).

According to Rodrigues and Child (2008), scholars exploring the corporate identity of an organisation often assume that some kind of organisational agreement exists as to what constitutes this corporate identity (Rodrigues and Child, 2008). However, defined as a “set of attributes that senior managers ascribe to their organisation” (Rodrigues and Child, 2008: 885), corporate identity merely reflects the organisational identity as interpreted and expressed by a “powerful interest group” in the organisation (2008: 885). In other words, the interpretation of the organisation’s identity as perceived and expressed by this group may not reflect the party’s identity as perceived by other members of the organisation.

Linking this to the political party, the communicated ideological identity as expressed by the party elite may not necessarily reflect the ideological identity as perceived by the rank-and-file members or the more ideologically founded members of the party. Today, most major political parties are increasingly
managed top-down with centralised and professionalised communication departments which often involves an increasingly wide communication gap between the elite party members, the rank-and-file members and even the lower level politicians (e.g. Knudsen, 2007). This may in turn involve conflicting ideas of the ideological identity of the party and indeed of how the values constituting this identity should be interpreted and thus expressed in discourse. In sum, the party may experience a lack of internal “ideological cohesion” defined as a “general agreement within a party about certain ideological standpoints” (Jahn and Oberst, 2012: 225).

The “political” understanding of corporate identity offered by Rodrigues and Child (2008) adds an important perspective to the central problematic highlighted in this dissertation namely that by diluting the party identity through an inconsistent communication of values following coalition government entry, parties risk alienating key internal and external stakeholders who become confused as to what the party actually stands for. In other words, any discrepancies between the communicated ideological identity expressed by the party elite and the party’s ideological identity as perceived by more rank-and-file members and lower level politicians may lead to disillusionment and perhaps even division amongst members (e.g. Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009; Martin and Vanberg, 2008; Panebianco, 1988). As these divisions are likely to be reported on by the media (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009), they may in turn affect the party from an external stakeholder perspective as internal disputes and debates divided may create suspicion of the party in the electorate (e.g. Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009: 13-14; see also Walgraves and Nuytemans, 2009).

5.2. The communicative practices of political parties – from theory to method

While strategy has arguably always been a premise of political communication, scholars argue that the actual communication practices have changed considerably over the past 50 years or so (e.g. Negrine and Lilliker, 2002). Several scholars emphasize the increasingly centralized and professionalised communication practices of political parties and argue that the use of communication specialists and centralised communication departments have, in a communicative sense, made the parties increasingly similar to more corporate organisations (e.g. Bro et al. 2006; Knudsen, 2007; Lees-Marchment, 2001; Vigsø, 2004). This is also manifested in the emerging and interrelated fields of political branding (e.g. Lupo, 2013; Needham, 2006; Scammell, 2007; Smith and French, 2009) and political marketing (e.g. Lees-Marchment, 2001; Ormrod 2007; Ormrod et al. 2013; Nielsen, 2013; Nielsen and Larsen, 2013)
which combine political communication with tools and concepts traditionally applied in more commercial entities.

The communication practices of political parties are typically divided into two overall forms i.e. internal and external (e.g. Schäeffner, 1996). Internal political communication constitutes all kinds of discourse that relate to the functioning of politics and concerns political institutions such as governments or parties with internal texts typically discussing ideas and beliefs such as the party programme (Schäeffner, 1996). External communication is typically aimed at the general public (Schäeffner, 1996) and typically consists of advertising, press releases etc. (e.g. McNair, 2011: 6).

As noted by Schäeffner (1996: 2), the lines between the party’s internal and external communication are blurring, as sometimes particular genres may function as both internal and external communication (1996: 2). This could be the case for political speeches which may be primarily addressed at an internal audience, but may also be aimed at the general public via the media (Heidar, 1997). Along with the proliferation of social media in which political parties and politicians communicate directly with the electorate, as well as with members of the party, these lines have become increasingly blurred (Kreiss, 2012).

Two genres are particularly suited for the dissemination of political values namely the party programme and the party leader conference speeches (Finlayson and Martin, 2008; Hansen, 2008). Despite some overall differences, both genres reflect the strategic choices made by the party elite in disseminating the party’s political values and ideological identity towards the party’s key stakeholders.

5.2.1. The party programme

The party programme represents the core planned and formalised value document of a political party and presents the party’s central concerns, goals and attitudes in all policy areas (Hansen, 2008: 207).

Party programmes are normally approved by delegates at the annual party conference or members of a central party body after a thorough debate on all levels of the party (Folketinget, 2015a; Budge and Klingeman, 2001). Thus, they are meant to reflect the shared values and visions of the political party as an organisation and serve to communicate its core ideological identity and core values. Although largely aimed at the internal members, any significant changes in the party programmes will typically be picked up and reported on by the media (e.g. Clement, 2014).
Being a longitudinal document (Hansen 2008), party programmes differ from election manifestos which are often made in connection with specific elections and contain specific policies (Smith and Smith, 2000). However, the two genres are similar in the sense that election manifesto also represent the party’s formal statement of values (Smith and Smith, 2000).

**5.2.2. Party leader speeches**

A key purpose of political speeches is to “continuously affirm and reaffirm the party’s culture and identity (Finlayson and Martin, 2008: 448)”. As political values constitute the core of the party identity, it is evident that the inclusion of political values contributes to expressing this identity.

A rather generic definition of a political speech is that it represents a “coherent stream of spoken language that is usually prepared for delivery by a speaker to an audience for a purpose on a political occasion” (Charteris-Black, 2014: xiii). The sub-genre of the party leader speech is typically formulated by a select group of people in the party elite be it professional speech writers, spin doctors or the party leader him or herself (Finlayson and Martin, 2008). This implies that this genre in particular reflects the strategic choices made by the party elite as to which of the party’s political values – and thereby which communicated ideological identity – to communicate to internal members as well as the media and their audiences.

A key sub-genre of the political speech is the party leader conference speech which is delivered by the party leader at the party’s annual conference and which represents another key value-based genre within the political party (e.g. Finlayson and Martin, 2008). Typically, this speech covers a wide variety of policy areas (Charteris-Black, 2014: xiv), while the main target audience typically consists of both internal stakeholders such as existing members and followers of the party as well as external stakeholders such as mass media representatives and media audiences (i.e. potential voters) (Finlayson and Martin, 2008: 448).

With regards to their rhetorical aim, political speeches can be divided into either deliberative speeches which aim at gaining support for specific political decision-making; or epideictic speeches which aim at establishing shared values (Charteris-Black 2014: xiii). As the division between these two types is not always clear-cut, party leader speeches given at annual conference may be both deliberative and epideictic. However, a main aim of the party leader conference speech is to establish shared values and a
common ground between sender and receiver (March and Olsen, 1984) and to continuously affirm and reaffirm the party’s culture and identity (Finlayson and Martin, 2008: 448). As a genre, the party leader conference speech is thereby primarily epideictic in nature.

In essence, party leader conference speeches offer an insight into how the party’s “ideas and beliefs are manifested in argumentative contexts” (Finlayson and Martin, 2008: 449). The party leader speeches are also highly contextually bound and reveal how the party responds to recent events in society. This implies that while they may not be a “systematic statement of political philosophy” like the party programme, they represent a “snapshot of ideology in action” (Finlayson and Martin, 2008: 448) representing:

...an argument of some kind: an attempt to provide others with reasons for thinking, feeling or acting in some particular way; to motivate them; to invite them to trust one in uncertain conditions; to get them to see situations in a certain light. (Finlayson and Martin, 2008: 450)

Political speeches have long been the focus of scholarly attention ever since Aristotles noted their persuasive power (Charteris-Black, 2014). However, although political speeches are the object of intense scholarly attention (e.g. Benoit et al., 2000; Charteris-Black, 2014; Finlayson and Martin, 2008; Myers, 2000), only a few scholars (e.g. Doherty, 2008; Nelson and Garst, 2005; Sowińska, 2014) focus specifically on how political leaders apply political values in their speeches. Doherty (2008) explores the use of values in presidential speeches and concludes that by using value cues speakers may succeed in altering how the public connects values to the party and the candidate. Sowinska (2013) finds that politicians may use values in speeches to argue for and legitimise political actions, while Nelson and Garst (2005) examine the persuasiveness of value-based political messages in order to produce attitude change in the receiver. Their conclusion is that relying on value-based messages is most effective when the sender and receiver share similar values. However, while the scholars all agree on the potential power in of appealing to values in discourse, none of the studies focus on how party leaders may apply the values strategically in order to communicate consistency in the communicated ideological identity of the party.
5.3. Identifying values in texts

A key feature of values is that they are communicatively manifest in messages and are therefore able to be examined in discourse (Rokeach, 1973). Building on Rokeach’s notion of manifest values, organisational scholar Aust (2004) argues that it is only possible to assess the identity of an organisation if we consider the “principal way an organisation presents its values to its internal and/or external publics (be it by oral or written messages)” (2004: 521). In other words, if we wish to explore the communicated ideological identity of a party, we need to examine what values are communicated by the organisation (Aust, 2004).

In his 2004 longitudinal study of a church organisation, Aust conducted an exploration of the values expressed in key value documents in order to determine the organisation’s corporate identity from these values. By quantitatively identifying values via specific keywords reflecting Rokeach’s (1973) terminal and instrumental values, Aust (2004) found that the organisation did indeed communicate a distinct value structure through reference to a limited number of values which remained stable over time.

Within political science studies, most research into the communication of political values are carried out via the quantitative approach searching for specific keywords in party manifestos based on either Rokeach’s values (e.g. Wilson, 2004), but more often the categories defined by the Comparative Manifesto’s Project (see section 4.3.2.3) with the aim of exploring the ideological position of the parties. Studies exploring the ideological positioning of political parties generally find that parties are reluctant to change their ideologies in their election manifestos (e.g. Adams et al., 2004; Janda et al., 1995 Walgraves and Nuytemans, 2009). No doubt, these studies reveal a great deal about the parties in terms of electoral promises and party positions on central issues and also about how these may change over time. However, with their focus on election manifestos, the studies do not reveal much about the difference in party ideology and political value content in periods in between elections or in other key value-based genres. Furthermore, these studies tend to focus on identifying values via quantitative approaches and do therefore not conduct qualitative studies into how the values are actually expressed in political discourse.

Within the inter-related fields of political discourse analysis (PDA) and critical discourse analysis (CDA) scholars are conducting more qualitative studies into the expression of political ideologies in discourse (e.g. van Dijk, 2006; Dunmire, 2012; Fairclough, 2001). Here, studies are often of a critical nature aiming
to uncover the underlying ideologies and power structures of society and how these are either changed or reproduced by political discourse (e.g. Fairclough, 2001). Within the fields of PDA and CDA, the focus is most often on the concept of ideology whereas the notion of values and valuation in texts are often taken more “for granted” with scholars not recognising that political values may also be a separate topic for empirical research (Sowińska, 2013: 793). Within this strand of research, only van Dijk has explored the concept of values noting that that all ideologies are based on a “selection and combination of values drawn from a cultural common ground” (van Dijk, 1998: 286). In other words, van Dijk acknowledges the central role of values in communication as they are what defines the goals of groups and contribute to differentiating “us” from “them” (Van Dijk, 1998: 67–69) manifested in van Dijk’s ideological square (see figure 5-1 below).

Based on an exploration of political discourse, van Dijk (2006) argues that political—or ideological—discourse often shows signs of polarisation rooted in the ideological differences between parties (2006: 734). Thus, ideological discourse often features the following strategies which collectively make up van Dijk’s ideological square:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emphasise our good things</th>
<th>De-emphasise their good things</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>De-emphasise our bad things</td>
<td>Emphasise their bad things</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In her 2013 study, Sowińska drew on van Dijk’s ideological square and conducted a critical discourse study into the analysis of values in political contexts focusing on references to freedom in President Bush’s state-of-the-union address. Sowińska concluded that reference to “re-definitions of particular axiological and value-laden concepts” (e.g. values through metaphors, etc.) constitute an important communicative tool for politicians in order to separate the “us from them”, gain support for specific policies and legitimise political actions (Sowińska, 2013: 809).

Although the aim of this dissertation is not to explore the use of values in discourse from a critical perspective, the ideological square may be useful to consider as it illustrates that the overall rhetorical patterns employed by political actors in their communication include a positive self-expression versus negative other-expression and creating and “us” versus “them” (2006: 735). However, although van Dijk’s (2006) ideological square offers a useful insight into the overall rhetorical strategies of political
senders, it does not focus specifically on the values of the party from a strategic communication point of view. Also, although he offers a detailed list of linguistic markers indicating ideology in discourse, such as the use of euphemisms, evidentiality, irony etc. (van Dijk, 2006: 125-126), van Dijk’s focus on ideology means that the theory does not focus specifically on uncovering the rhetorical strategies applied by political actors when expressing the party’s specific political values. Nor does his framework offer a systematic tool for identifying specific political values in texts.

5.3.1. Rhetoric

In this dissertation, the focus is on identifying values in political texts to explore how parties seek to convince their audience of a distinct, clear and consistent ideological identity through both their value content and the rhetorical strategies applied to communicate these values. Thus, I am concerned with uncovering the underlying value system of the speakers, but also the way in which these value systems are expressed and are applied strategically.

An analytical approach devoted specifically to identifying values in language is evaluative language (Bednarek, 2010) which may be characterised as a sub-discipline of rhetorical analysis. On a general level, rhetoric concerns the “art of persuasion” (Wesley, 2014: 136) and is highly linked to political language. Indeed, Krebs and Jackson (2007: 42) argue that “rhetoric lies at the heart of politics”, and studies applying this type of analytical method often focus on exploring how the author makes use of language in order to achieve a particular communicative goal (Wesley, 2014: 136).

Finlayson and Martin (2008) specifically advocate for the use of rhetorical analysis in the exploration of political language in party leader speeches. In a 2008 study of political rhetoric in British party leader conference speeches, Finlayson and Martin found that studying political rhetoric offers a “rich seam for those seeking both to interpret and explain the interplay of tradition, innovation, ideology, action, performance, strategy and rationality in British politics” (Finlayson and Martin, 2008: 446). In other words, studying political the rhetoric of the party leader enables us to explore not only the ideology and values of the party, but also the more strategic aspects of the party manifested in the specific rhetoric strategies applied.

Although rhetorical analysis is typically associated with the classic forms of appeal (e.g. Charteris-Black, 2014), Smith and Smith (2000) extend on the notion of rhetoric defining it as “the process of using the
resources of language to negotiate a shared understanding (...) through the management of themes, visions, symbols, needs, preferences, and reasons” (2000: 458) (see also Wesley, 2014). In their 2000 study of how UK political parties characterise themselves in their party manifestos, Smith and Smith (2000) conducted a rhetorical and narrative analysis of the party manifestos of the three major UK parties with the aim of exploring how the parties attempted to create a shared understanding between themselves and the electorate. The study was based on the assumption that political texts such as party manifestos represent a strategic tool and a purposive text “intended to attract voters to each party’s “us”” (2000: 469) much in line with van Dijk’s (2006) ideological square.

5.3.1.1. Evaluative language

A specific form of rhetoric is found in the concept of evaluative language which concerns “standards, norms, and values according to which we evaluate something through language” (Bednarek, 2010: 18). Exploring the evaluation in a text may thereby tell us something about the values of the sender:

> Generally speaking, evaluation is concerned with the expression of speaker/writer opinions, and is worthy of our attention because it fulfils three important functions: expressing speaker/writer opinions that reflect their value systems and those of their community, constructing relationships between speakers and readers, and organising text. (Bednarek, 2010: 16; see also Thompson and Hunston, 2000: 6)

From this quote we see that evaluative language essentially serves to express the sender’s value system and also to organise the text itself. It also attempts to communicate shared values between sender and receiver whereby it is in line with the view of rhetoric as a strategic way of applying language to create a shared understanding (Smith and Smith, 2000). In essence, by expressing opinions on the state of the world, the sender communicates his/her underlying value system (Bednarek. 2010: 16) which we as researchers are then able to uncover by exploring the evaluative parameters of language applied by the sender. In her 2010 study of evaluation of news stories, Bednarek offers a useful framework of evaluative parameters to be applied in the qualitative evaluation of language. Table 5-1 below shows the complete list of parameters which may indicate values in discourse.
Table 5-1: List of evaluative parameters (adapted from Bednarek, 2010: 19)

As is clear from the list of parameters, it includes some parameters which are directly related to journalistic texts on which the parameters are based (e.g. sourcing and mental states of the news actor). However, the remaining parameters can easily be applied to other types of texts (Bednarek, 2010: 42) such as political speeches and party programmes.

Evaluative language and rhetoric is closely related to the linguistic concept of modality which encompasses the linguistic means employed by speakers to convey certainty and conviction i.e. a specific value-system (Charteris-Black, 2014). This connection is further stressed by Sulkunen and Törrönen (1997) who argue that modalities are linguistic structures employed to evaluate the state of affairs – or in the case of this study, a view on the world through political values. One definition of modality is that it indicates:

…the speaker’s stance, attitude or position towards what he or she is saying and in particular the extent to which he or she believes it is: True, Necessary or obligatory; or Desirable or undesirable. (Charteris-Black, 2014: 110)
This definition coheres well with the notion of evaluative language which involves the sender communicating his/her opinion via expressions of certainty, necessity and desirability (whether something is good or bad) (Bednarek, 2010). As we saw from Hamilton’s definition (1987: 25; see section 4.2.1) ideology encompasses both normative ideas and beliefs (how society should function) as well as reputed facts. These reputed facts refer to the way in which an ideology may - on manifest level - be a “system of statements which are factual in nature” but which in reality serves to express values and norms as though they were facts (Hamilton, 1987: 25). The notion of reputed facts in language supports the dissertation’s analytical focus on evaluative language and modality as both are expressions of what the sender believes to be true (reputed facts), while they are in reality merely expressions of the truth as interpreted by the sender via a specific value system.
Part III: The study
This part of the dissertation presents the methods and data chosen, the case study itself, and the analytical tools applied in the empirical analysis. Also, part III presents the findings of the analysis.

The main focus of the empirical analysis is to explore the communication of political values with the overall assumption that a party changes its political value focus after it enters into a coalition government, but that the party leader seeks to communicate consistency through strategic references to the party’s political values. The aim of the analysis is twofold: 1) to explore the political value focus (content) in party programmes and party leader speeches and on how this focus develops over time (before and after government entry), and 2) To explore the rhetorical strategies (form) applied in the expression of the party leaders’ political values in speeches.

Part III is divided into four chapters. Chapter 6 introduces the methods and data of the dissertation while Chapter 7 introduces the specific case. It describes the overall political context of Denmark as a case country and also offers a brief introduction to the 2011-2014 coalition government and the three member parties.

Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 present the two analyses and follow the same structure. In Chapter 8, the first empirical analysis is presented namely the analysis of political value content in the data set. This chapter includes a presentation of the Political Value Taxonomy as well as an exemplary analysis of the 2003 SPP Party programme for political values. This is followed by a presentation of the findings for political value content in the total data set.

Chapter 9 presents the second empirical analysis which focuses on the form of value expression in the party leader speeches. The chapter introduces the second analytical framework i.e. the Political Value Expression Framework and includes an exemplary analysis of the 2009 SD party leader speech for the rhetorical strategies applied in communicating the political values. This is followed by a presentation of the findings for form in all the party leader speeches. Figure III-7 shows the structure of chapters 8 and 9.
Figure III-7: The structure of chapters 8 and 9
6. Methods and data

This chapter accounts for the research design, data and methods adopted in order to explore the overall assumption of the dissertation and answer the central research questions.

The perception of language as a strategic tool which reflects how the sender sees the world (see Hudson, 1978) has shaped the main assumption of the dissertation namely that a party’s communicated ideological identity expressed through political values changes significantly when a party enters into a coalition government, but that the party leader will attempt to communicate consistency through a strategic use of values. Thus, the communicative change is assumed to take place both in terms of content (what values do party leaders talk about) and form (how do party leaders express the values) before and after government entry. In order to explore these questions, the dissertation employs a qualitative single-case study to show how political values are communicated in a ‘real-life’ context” (Guest et al., 2013: 14). The case study approach is applicable as it allows for an in-depth exploration of a specific topic which has not before been the focus of scholarly scrutiny (Neergaard, 2007: 19).

In connection with the empirical analysis it is important to consider that as a genre the political speech is particularly context dependent (Finlayson and Martin, 2008). In order to accommodate for the importance of context in the speeches, I needed to apply an analytical approach which allowed for the notion of context in the analysis. Thus, I chose to apply the multi-method approach to textual analysis (Barry et al., 2006) which entails “a detailed textual reading within an exploration of contextual influences.” (2006: 1091). In practice, this meant that the identification of political values was done by applying knowledge of the text itself (the endo-textual approach) and at times of the wider context in which the text is embedded (exo-textual approach) (Barry et al., 2006).

In essence, the multi-method approach allows the researcher to combine a specific approach to textual analysis with a more contextual-based approach. When choosing a textual analytical approach, I needed to consider that I perceive language as a strategic resource which contributes to uniting the political sender and receiver through reference to specific values (content) and using specific rhetorical strategies (form of expression) to express these values in party leader conference speeches. As my analysis focuses on both the political value content as well as the form of expression, I chose to apply rhetorical analysis as my main textual analytical approach as this allows for a focus on both content and form (Finlayson and Martin, 2008). The multi-method approach is elaborated on and exemplified in section 6.3.1.
6.1. Research design and method

The qualitative approach is chosen for the data analysis as it allows for a rich and in-depth exploration of the data (Creswell, 2009).

The case study chosen is the Danish three-party coalition which existed from September 2011 to January 2014 and consisted of the Socialist People’s Party (SPP), The Social Democrats (SD), and the Social Liberal Party (SLP). The specific parties and the coalition government will be described in greater detail in chapter 7.

The particular coalition government represents a typical case (Neergaard, 2007) as developments in the Danish political sphere highlight the central challenge faced by parties entering into coalition governments namely how to maintain a consistent political value communication and communicated ideological identity within the “confines” of a coalition government. The case is illustrative of other countries with similar political systems and party structures such as Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands, and the research findings may therefore inform discussions of issues and challenges elsewhere (see Hopmann et al., 2010)

In order to explore how entering into a coalition government affects the parties’ value communication it is necessary to conduct a longitudinal study; exploring texts representing a specified amount of time. The benefit of a longitudinal study is that it makes it possible to detect any changes in the representation of political values in the parties’ core value-based genres over time i.e. before and after the parties’ government entry.

The time span chosen for the empirical data is 2008 until the 2014 collapse of the coalition government. This particular time span includes the full coalition government period (2011-2014) as well as the previous election period leading up to the 2011 election (2008-2011) where the coalition government was formed. The time span thereby encompasses all parts of the “political” cycle and represents the case parties both in and out of power.

6.2. Data set and data collection methods

The data consist of texts which are value-based and thereby appropriate for the identification of political values. They encompass two types of core political genres which are suited for the dissemination of
political values namely the *political party programme*, and the *party leader conference speech* (see Finlayson and Martin, 2008; Hansen, 2008).

Both genres reflect the strategic choices made by the party in order to communicate what the party stands for and aims to create a common understanding of the political values between sender and receiver (March and Olsen, 1984: 741-742). The party programme represents the core value-based document of the party expressing the party’s overall set of values and idea of the good life (Hansen, 2008). Party leader speeches are more ephemeral in nature, represent a “snapshot” of the ideology of the party (see Finlayson and Martin, 2008) and reflect which of the party’s political values the party elite chooses to focuses on. Thus, exploring how party leaders in their speeches weigh and prioritise the set of political values contained by the party programme may reveal the relationship between the overriding visions and values of the party (the ideological identity) as expressed in the party programmes and the realities of everyday political life of compromise and negotiation in a coalition government.

For each party, the data set consists of relevant party programmes covering the period from 2008-2014 and six party leader conference speeches given at the parties’ annual conferences before the party’s entry into the coalition (2008-2011) and after (2011-2013). In total, the data set consists of five party programmes (three for SPP and one for SD and SLP respectively) and 18 party leader speeches (six for each party). Table 6-1 provides a full overview of the data:

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6 All the data is in Danish. However, when reporting on the findings and adding illustrative examples, I have translated the examples into English.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>The Socialist People’s Party</th>
<th>The Social Democrats</th>
<th>The Social Liberal Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party programme(s)</td>
<td>SF’s Princip-og Perspektivprogram 2003 og fremefter (11,514 words)</td>
<td>Hånden på hjertet (Hand on the heart) 2004 (foreword 2011)</td>
<td>Party programme 22 February 1997 1,964 words</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SF’s Reformprogram (Approved 25 – 26 April 2009) (4,893 words)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partiprogram (Approved 15 April 2012) (2,429 words)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,596 words</td>
<td>4,039 words</td>
<td>3,853 words</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,524 words</td>
<td>5,367 words</td>
<td>3,548 words</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech 3</td>
<td>23 April 2010</td>
<td>25 September 2010</td>
<td>11 September 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,632 words</td>
<td>6,054 words</td>
<td>4,625 words</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech 4</td>
<td>14 May 2011</td>
<td>5 November 2011</td>
<td>12 September 2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,826 words</td>
<td>5,602 words</td>
<td>2,309 words</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech 5</td>
<td>13 April 2012</td>
<td>21 September 2012</td>
<td>15 September 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4,173 words</td>
<td>5,809 words</td>
<td>2,865 words</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech 6</td>
<td>4 May 2013</td>
<td>28 September 2013</td>
<td>14 September 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,846 words</td>
<td>5,103 words</td>
<td>4,139 words</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6-1: Overview of the data (*Speeches given after the coalition government was formed are dark grey*)

6.2.1. The party programmes

The party programmes were all downloaded from the parties’ websites in early 2013 and vary in length and longevity. The party programmes of SD and SLP have remained unchanged for a number of years. SD’s party programme was written in 2004 and contains an updated introduction from 2011 while the SLP party programme was written in 1997.

SPP has formulated two new programmes within the past 12 years (2003 and 2012) and also a 2009 reform programme. Although not strictly a party programme, but more similar to an election manifesto, the 2009 reform programme superseded the 2003 party programme and is therefore included in the data.
set (see Politiken, 2009). The SPP programmes thereby cover the same time span as the speeches to allow a full comparison of developments in political values in the programmes compared to the speeches. All programmes are called “Principprogrammer” (“Programmes of principles”) indicating that the programmes refer to the principles which the parties live by.

6.2.2. The party leader conference speeches

Most of the party leader conference speeches (2008-2013) were available in transcribed format on the parties’ official websites and were downloaded during late 2013 and early 2014. Some speeches were only available on credible news sites such as www.altinget.dk and www.politiken.dk.

Although the spoken version of a political speech is often seen as the official version, the written version found on the party websites arguably reveals the “speaker’s real intent” (Savoy, 2010: 123-124). Thus, the transcribed versions of the speeches were deemed appropriate for analysis.

Owing to the different dates on which the party conferences were held, three SD party leader speeches were given before coalition government formation and three after, while the data for SPP and SLP, respectively, consist of four speeches made before and two speeches made after the party’s entry into the coalition government. The speeches also vary greatly in length as seen in table 6-1 above.

6.3. Data analysis approach / coding for values

To identify both the content and form of the political values in the data (what values are represented and how are they expressed), the coding process involved four distinct but interrelated phases which all focus on the identification of political values in texts.

7 www.altinget.dk is an impartial political website (Altinget, 2015) while www.politiken.dk is one of Denmark’s biggest daily broadsheet newspapers (Politiken, 2015a).
Figure 6-1 below shows the progression of the coding phases:

**Figure 6-1: Overview of the coding process**

Phase 1 consisted of developing an analytical instrument – the Political Value Taxonomy - necessary to be able to systematically identify political values in the data set. Having created the taxonomy, phase 2 involved testing the taxonomy by coding the party programmes of the data set for political values and identifying the parties’ political values against the values of the taxonomy. Phase 3 consisted of coding the speeches for political values against the taxonomy whilst developing the second analytical instrument – the Political Value Expression Framework. This framework enabled me to systematically code for the rhetorical strategies (form) applied by the party leaders when expressing political values in their speeches which was the aim of phase 4.

I will go through the different phases in greater detail in sections 6.4.1 -6.4.4. However, first I will present my overall analytical approach in the identification of the political values in the data set.

**6.3.1. Applying the multi-method approach to textual analysis**

As is clear from figure 6-1, phases 1-3 all centered on the identification of political values. Phase 1 served to operationalise the concept of political values and building my analytical tool for identifying the political values in the data set. In this phase, I identified the political values inductively inspired by the general inductive approach (Thomas, 2006) (see section 6.4.1.). Having developed the political value
taxonomy, in phases 2 and 3, the political values were identified and categorised against the framework of the taxonomy.

Despite the different procedures, all three phases relied on the multi-method approach to textual analysis of organisational texts (Barry et al., 2006). This meant that a comprehensive identification of political values at times required both an in-depth reading of the text as well as knowledge of the context in which the text is embedded (Barry et al., 2006). In practice, the identification of political values was done by applying rhetorical analysis (the endo-textual approach) and when necessary combining it with knowledge of the wider context of the text (Barry et al., 2006).

6.3.1.1. The endo-textual approach – rhetorical analysis focusing on evaluative language

In practice, the rhetorical analysis drew on two of Bednarek’s (2010) evaluative parameters namely those of emotivity and necessity. As argued by Bednarek as it is rarely necessary to include all of the 12 parameters in one single study (Bednarek, 2010: 42) and these two interrelated parameters were seen as the most relevant to include in the study as they most clearly serve to communicate the parties’ idea of the good life.

In essence, the parameter of emotivity reflects how positive or how negative something appears to the sender. The parameter of emotivity relates to the sender’s evaluative stance both “politically and ideologically” and is also applied to create a “bond and establish solidarity” with a specific target audience (Bednarek, 2010: 22). This falls in line with the view of language as a strategic tool applied to create shared understanding between sender and receiver (Smith and Smith, 2000). Identifying political values via the parameter of emotivity involved exploring for declarative statements using semantic markers reflecting either positive or negative evaluation. In practice, this meant identifying rhetorical expressions of certainty (via declarative verbs), desirability (via positive wording) and undesirability (via negative wording) (Bednarek, 2010). Examples of positive and negative evaluative statements are (with the semantic markers in bold): “The world is facing a financial crisis” (negative) or “The state of the environment is improving” (positive). In both examples the declarative verb “is” also connotes certainty.

The parameter of necessity is used to express whether something is seen as necessary by the sender, whereby the sender is also implicitly evaluating whether something is positive or negative hence the interconnectedness of the two parameters (Martin, 1992: 363 in Bednarek, 2010). Identifying political
values via the parameter of necessity meant exploring for the use of modal verbs, nouns, adjectives, adverbs and “other linguistic items as expressing the writer’s evaluation of what is (not) necessary.” (Bednarek, 2010: 25). In other words, here the political values were identified by evaluating how necessary or how unnecessary something appeared to the sender (Bednarek, 2010: 19) such as (semantic markers in bold): “We need to improve the environment” or “There should be focus on welfare”.

In connection with applying the evaluative parameters, I needed to accommodate for the differences in genre between my data set and the journalistic texts which form the basis of Bednarek’s (2010) framework as these differences were likely to affect how the sender expresses values in the text. Although journalistic texts are value-laden through their choice of words and evaluative parameters (Bednarek, 2010) they do not serve to communicate the explicit values of the sender. In contrast, my data set consists of texts which are value-laden by nature as the sender aims to communicate a specific party identity through its values (March and Olsen, 1984: 741-742). These texts are therefore likely to include more explicit and manifest expressions of the party values.

The difference in genre meant that I had to supplement the evaluative parameters with searching for more direct and explicit expressions of values reflecting the value-based nature of the genres e.g. via sentences which explicitly stated the values of the party e.g. “Our values are freedom and solidarity”. These statements included the term “value”, an explicit value label and the personal pronoun “we” or the party name. I also explored for descriptive or defining statements about the party itself as these would serve to communicate what the party stands for in terms of values. These specific sentences did not include the specific term values, but the party name or personal pronoun followed by a relational verb providing a description or definition of the party e.g. “SPP is Denmark’s green party” (SPP 2012, Appendix 15, p. 3)

I also identified the party’s political values via goal-oriented sentences which constitute explicit ‘indications of the existence of goals and their (non-) achievement’ (Thompson and Hunston, 2000: 21). References to goals are closely linked to descriptions of the party as goal-oriented sentences describe what the party is fighting for and aiming towards and thus also say something about the party. However, goal-oriented sentences refer specifically to the goals of the party either explicitly through semantic markers goal-oriented verbs such as “aspire to”, “hope”, “want” (example 1 below), but also more implicitly e.g. through reference to what the party can and cannot accept (example 2 below):
The Social Liberals want more. More human being, more Denmark, more Europe. We want more, not less. We want to break down the barriers which ultimately put us all in a worse position. We want to find good solutions. Solutions which unites rather than divides” (SLP 2008, Appendix 23, p. 1) (Example 1)

We cannot live with the notion that for the first time in Denmark’s history the new generations are poorer educated than their parents. We cannot watch passively while the countries with whom we are competing surpass us on our most valuable ressource namely high quality education (SLP 2010, Appendix 25, p. 3) (Example 2)

6.3.1.2. Combining the endo and exo-textual approach

In the vast majority of cases, the political values of the texts were identifiable by relying on the semantic markers relating to the text itself (the endo-textual approach). However, at times and especially in the party leader speeches, the values were expressed via references to aspects outside the text such as recent events in society.

In these cases, in order to identify the political values in the texts I needed to combine the rhetorical analysis with a more context-based reading incorporating my contextual knowledge of events outside the texts and the wider context in which the text was embedded (Barry et al., 2006). However, it is imperative to note that when I applied contextual knowledge, I still drew on the semantic markers of the text relating to specific events, etc. in order to know what contextual knowledge to draw on.

In the following, I will illustrate how I applied the multi-method approach and identified the political values in the text by use of both the endo and exo-textual approaches. In other words, how I identified the political values of the text by relying on semantic markers indicating values in the text as well semantic markers pointing towards aspects outside the text. The example is found in the 2010 SD speech where the party leader talks about the state of the Danish economy:

There is no reason to hide the fact that the challenges for the Danish economy are enormous. If you want sleazy talk and expensive red wine, you should go somewhere else. If you want to own the whole world or a house where the lights are always on, you must go somewhere else (SD 2010, Appendix 19, p. 2)
In this quote, the political values identified were those of (lack of) economic sustainability (the sub-features of economic growth and economic responsibility) and (lack of) equality (the sub-feature of social justice) (see table 8-2, p. 111). However, these values were identified through a combination of explicit and implicit semantic markers and the exo- and endo-textual approaches.

So, how did the specific references in the quote allow me to determine that this specific quote expresses the political values economic sustainability and equality? The answer is found in the presupposed knowledge which I as part of the cultural discourse community share with the sender (Albrecht, 2005). Arguably, the statement “challenges for the Danish economy are enormous” in itself connotes a lack of economic growth via an evaluative statement about the state of the world (Bednarek, 2010). Thus, the decoding of this particular sentence primarily relies on the semantic markers in the text. However, coding the next two sentences for political values requires some level of specific knowledge of the wider societal context in which the speech is embedded.

The reference to “red wine” makes little sense on its own and would be uncodable for values if not for the receiver’s contextual knowledge. Considering the time in which the speech was held (September 2009), I infer that the party leader by mentioning red-wine is most likely referring to a 2009 tax reform which was introduced by the former Liberal/Conservative coalition in early 2009. This reform was dubbed “the red wine reform” by the left side of the political spectrum as it supposedly favoured the wealthy part of the population and was seen as being both socially unjust (reflecting the value of equality) and financially irresponsible (reflecting the value of economic sustainability) as it did not safeguard economic growth (e.g. Dagbladet Arbejderen, 2009).

Decoding the next sentence “owning the whole world” for values also relies on contextual knowledge. Most likely it is an implicit reference to the financial irresponsibility of the incumbent government. In 2006, the Liberal Minister of Finance, Thor Pedersen, supposedly stated that Denmark was so wealthy it would soon own the whole world (Finansministeriet, 2015). Although it later turned out that it was taken out of context, the quote nevertheless became an oft-cited example of how the

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8 Albrecht (2005: 136) refers to the notion of a presupposition pool which refers to the general knowledge and presuppositions shared by members of a specific discourse community (see also Sauer, 2002). This general knowledge is often culture and context-bound meaning that certain aspects in texts are not explained as the sender expects the audience to know what he/she is referring to and therefore to be able to decode the meaning (Sauer, 2002)
Liberal/Conservative coalition government was seemingly too optimistic in its assessment of the country’s financial prospects (e.g. Jessen, 2007; Pedersen, 2008).

6.4. **The coding process**

Having described the overall analytical approach to the identification of the values in the texts, the following sections return to figure 6-1 (p. 86) and elaborate on the actual coding process by explaining the different phases.

6.4.1. **Phase 1 - Operationalising the concept of political values**

The first phase of the coding process involved operationalising the concept of political values by creating a political value taxonomy based on Danish parties across the ideological scale. This phase consisted of three overall steps seen in figure 6-2 below:

![Phase 1: Developing the Political Value Taxonomy](image)

**Figure 6-2: Phase 1: Developing the Political Value Taxonomy**

Developing the taxonomy was necessary for me to be able to systematically code for political values in data set. The aim of the coding was to identify the values qualitatively and not just on the basis of the presence of specific keywords as done in quantitative studies of political values (see section 4.3.2.3.). In order to identify values beyond the surface level and move one step deeper, it was insufficient to simply look for the overall political value labels (e.g. keywords such as equality and freedom) as equality may mean something very different to party X and party Y (see Bonotti, 2011; Rokeach, 1973) and be differently expressed in discourse.

To accommodate for the different interpretations of political values and the different ways in which parties may express these values in discourse, (Bonotti, 2011), the taxonomy includes both the overall
political value labels (e.g. freedom) as well as the different sub-features associated with the value label (e.g. freedom of speech, freedom of choice etc.). Thereby the taxonomy provides a comprehensive picture of the different sub-features which parties may attach to the overall political value labels.

The method for developing the taxonomy of political values was inspired by the general inductive approach which aims at condensing “raw textual data into a brief, summary format” by letting the values emerge from the data (Thomas, 2006: 237).

The taxonomy was created inductively on the basis of close and repeated readings of the most recent party programmes of six Danish political parties representing all points on the traditional left/right scale: The Red/Green Alliance (RGA) (2003), the Socialist People’s Party (SPP) (2012), the Social Democrats (SD) (2004), the Social Liberal Party (SLP) (1997), the Liberal Alliance (LA) (2013), and the Danish People’s Party (DPP) (2004). Having developed the taxonomy, I crossed checked the political values against the latest party programmes of the Liberal Party (2006) and the Conservative Party (2012) to ensure that no values were overlooked and that the taxonomy represented the entire political spectrum.

In the actual identification of the values, I applied rhetorical analysis as described in section 6.3.1.1. An overall criterion for a statement to be coded as a political value was that it met McCann’s (1997) definition of political values as an “overarching normative principles and belief assumptions about government, citizenship and society” (1997: 564) thereby reflecting the parties’ goals, aspirations and idea of the good life. Although the taxonomy was created inductively, I drew on my existing knowledge of political values (e.g. Feldman, 1988; Inglehart, 1997, 2008; Jacoby, 2006; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz et al., 2010; see section 4.3.2.1.). Thus, whenever possible, I applied the same overall political value labels in the final taxonomy as those already identified by scholars (e.g. freedom and equality) but adding the value sub-features which I identified in the programmes. The inductive approach to creating the political value taxonomy involved three overall steps which are described below.

6.4.1.1. Step 1 - Initial reading of the data

The first step involved a preliminary coding of the raw data in order to identify which text parts constitute relevant and meaningful units (Thomas, 2006:242). For a unit to be relevant it had to meet McCann’s (1997) definition of political values. Units describing e.g. the party’s historical development or the actual concept of politics (“e.g. politics is about values”) did not meet McCann’s (1997) definition and
were therefore omitted from further analysis. A meaningful unit was essentially defined as a sentence(s) in which the party’s political values were expressed either via goal-oriented statements explicitly expressing the values and goals of the party (Thompson and Hunston, 2000); descriptive and defining statements about the party; and by statements expressing evaluative markers of emotivity and necessity (Bednarek, 2010).

6.4.1.2. Step 2 - Identifying the political values

Having identified the relevant units of the text, the second step involved identifying the actual political values of each party and the features which each party attaches to these values through close and repeated readings of the relevant units of each party programme.

The repeated readings of each programme allowed me to narrow down the number of political values for each party by reducing overlap and redundancy. As an example, the first round of coding was very broad as here I did not differentiate between overall values and the sub-features of the values. Thus, in the first round “freedom”, “freedom of mind” and “freedom of expression” were all categorised as separate political values rather than sub-features of the value of freedom. However, each re-reading of the texts provided new insights into the interpretation of the political values of each party and allowed for a continuous refinement of the political value system. Through the repeated readings I was able to organise and structure the values into overall value labels and sub-features. This meant that I would categorise freedom of mind and freedom of expression as sub-features of the overall value label of freedom. Figure 6-3 shows the overall progression in step 2:
6.4.1.3.  Step 3 - Synthesising the political values into the taxonomy

Step 3 involved the final creation of the taxonomy based on the detailed summary description of the each party’s political value and related sub-features identified in step 2.

Having identified the parties' main political values and related sub-features, the identified political values and the sub-features were synthesised and summarised into the final taxonomy. The taxonomy thereby represents an aggregation of the political values and their sub-features in parties across the ideological scale. Table 6-2 below illustrates how the taxonomy accommodates for the different interpretations of the political values listing an aggregation of the different value sub-features identified under each political value label.
Table 6-2: Extract from the taxonomy of political values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political values</th>
<th>Sub-features of the values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Democracy*</td>
<td>1A) Extended democracy (workplace, industrial etc.); 1B) Active citizens; 1C) Direct democracy; 1D) Informed citizens; 1E) Transparency and debate in decision-making processes; 1F) Respecting the Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Equality*</td>
<td>2A) Equal opportunities in life; 2B) Equal distribution of power and means of production; 2C) Limited distance between rich and poor; 2D) Equal worth; 2E) Openness and trust towards other cultures; 2F) Social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Freedom*</td>
<td>3A) Basic democratic freedom rights; 3B) Freedom of choice; 3C) Freedom from oppression; 3D) Freedom of expression; 3E) Private ownership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By synthesising the lists of political values from each party and including the sub-features of each political value label, the taxonomy (presented in its entirety in section 8.1) offers a comprehensive list of political values and different interpretations across the ideological scale. It thereby represents the theoretical framework which I apply in the coding of the data set order to identify the political values and the sub-features expressed in the texts.

6.4.2. Phase 2 - Coding for political value content in the party programmes

Having developed the political value taxonomy in phase 1 of the coding process (see figure 6-1, p. 86), the aim of the second phase of was two-fold: 1) to test the validity of the taxonomy by re-coding the party programme of the data set against the taxonomy and 2) to code the 2003 and 2009 SPP programmes against the taxonomy. Here, I paid close attention to any discrepancies between the values of these two (older) programmes and the values of the taxonomy which was based on the latest party programmes. In case of any discrepancies, I adjusted the taxonomy accordingly. By re-coding the party programmes of the data set against the political value taxonomy and coding the two former SPP programmes, I aimed to establish the case parties’ political value focus and thus their communicated ideological identity or master narrative as expressed through political values in this core value-based genre.

In the coding process, the values were identified by exploring the texts for the expression of value sub-features. If a party referred to limiting the distance between rich and poor, this would be coded as sub-feature 2C under equality while references to equal access to healthcare would be coded under 2A – equal opportunities. At times, the parties make generic references to the values rather than to a specific
sub-feature. In such cases, the sentences were coded under the generic value label such as in the examples below:

*SPP wants to unite the general population in an alliance for change which will extend the democracy, strengthen unity, promote equality and ensure sustainability* (SPP, Appendix 3, p.1)

*For more than 130 years, the Social Democrats have been a decisive promoter for change in Danish society. In all these years, our core values have been freedom, equality and solidarity* (SD, Appendix 5, p. 2)

To increase the credibility of the coding process, all party programmes were coded for political values twice manually and twice using NVivo’s qualitative data analysis software. Combining the manual and computer assisted data analysis method meant that I was first of all able to immerse myself in the data as I coded the data by hand and then revisit the data when I coded the data in NVivo. This re-coding process should add to the credibility of my findings.

Finally, one of the benefits of qualitative data analysis software such as NVivo is that it offers the researcher an easily accessible overview of the texts and “eases” the process of finding the overall patterns in the data (see Ward, 2007).

#### 6.4.3. Phase 3 - Coding for political value content in the party leader speeches and operationalising the expression of political values

Phase 3 involved two tasks. The first task was to code the speeches for political values against the Political Value Taxonomy in order to uncover what political values were expressed in speeches before and after coalition government entry. The second task of phase 3 was to develop an overall framework of the rhetorical strategies applied by the party leaders when expressing the political values in their speeches (focus on form). This developed framework was to be applied in the subsequent systematic coding for form of expression in the speeches (phase four). Phase 3 involved several steps which are illustrated in figure 6-4 below:
6.4.3.1. Preliminary coding and coding for political values in the speeches (content)

In practice, identifying the values of the party leader speeches was again done through various rounds of coding. First of all, the speeches were subject to a preliminary coding in which the text parts which did not include political values were excluded from further analysis. Again the criterion was McCann’s (1997) definition of political values. Examples of excluded text parts are introductory or concluding statements made by the party leaders such as “have a great conference”, but also statements pertaining to the aspirations of the party once it reaches power e.g. “We will work hard” etc. While these statements arguably reflect the party’s organisational values, they are not, however, expressions of the party’s political values.

Having omitted the irrelevant text parts, the speeches were coded for values against the framework of the Political Value Taxonomy. When the party leader referred to the overall value label (e.g. we work for freedom) and not a particular sub-feature, the statement was code under the overall label. To increase the reliability of the coding, the coding process involved several rounds as all speeches were coded three times by hand and once in NVivo.
6.4.3.2. Identifying the rhetorical strategies in the speeches and creating the Political Values Expression Framework (form)

While coding for the political value content in the speeches (phase 3), I made note of the rhetorical strategies applied in the communication of these values (form). The identified strategies largely cohered with the theories of Bednarek’s (2010) evaluative language, Thompson and Hunston’s (2000) goal-oriented sentences as well as the positive self-representation and negative other-representation emphasised in van Dijk’s ideological square (2006). Thus, inspired by these theories and on the basis my empirical findings in the speeches, I developed a Political Value Expression Framework listing the main rhetorical strategies used to express values in the party leader speeches (see table 9-1, p. 150). This framework was the applied in the final phase of the coding process: phase four.

6.4.4. Phase 4 - Testing the validity of the Political Values Expression Framework and coding the speeches for form of expression

The developed Political Value Expression Framework (presented and discussed in full in section 9.1) formed the basis of the final round of coding (phase 4) where I tested the framework against the party leader speeches and re-coded the speeches for form of expression. By re-coding the speeches, I aimed to test the usability of the framework as well as increase the credibility of the findings by adding an additional round of coding. In practice, all speeches were re-coded twice in NVivo.

The aim of round four was to systematically explore and map out the rhetorical strategies applied by the party leaders when expressing their political values as well as to explore their strategic use of explicit references to values and values through descriptive statements about the party in order to answer RQ3 and RQ4 of the dissertation.

6.5. Quantifying the qualitative data

In order to provide a better overview of my findings for political content and form, I chose to quantify my findings by noting the relative importance of specific values (the value content) and rhetorical strategies (the form of expression) in the texts. The quantifications were based on my qualitative coding of the data set in NVivo. This type of quantification of the findings is increasingly used in qualitative research as it adds to the qualitative findings by providing an overview and increasing the understanding of the data by letting numbers “speak” instead of words (Ward, 2007: 10)
For political value content, I drew up a table for each text showing the relative importance of the values within the specific text as well as the dominant sub-features of each value. By drawing up tables of the dominance of political values in each text in the data set I am able to: 1) compare the political value focus of the party programmes to that of the party leader speeches and 2) to uncover the development in the value focus in the party leader speeches over time i.e. before and after government entry.

For form of expression, I drew up tables showing the distribution of rhetorical focus and rhetorical strategies in all party leader speeches. This also allowed me to compare the differences in the party leaders’ rhetorical strategies before and after government entry.

The percentage of a specific value or rhetorical strategy will always reflect the relative importance of this value or strategy in the text as the percentage is based on the text as a whole. However, it is important to note that since the percentage is in fact based on the whole document it also covers text parts that do not contain references to values. This will affect the total percentage numbers.

For example, if a party’s explicit references to values covers 4% of the text it means that 4% of the total text (including the text parts which do not express political values) expresses values via explicit markers. The same principle goes for the political value content: if the value of freedom is said to cover 7% of the total text, it covers 7% of the entire text including the text parts which are devoid of political values such as introductory statements etc.

Despite the omission of “value-less” text parts, the percentages drawn up for content will often exceed 100% (see table 6-3 below). The reason is that many sentences were coded under several values at the same time which is seen in the example below.

*We have a vice-Prime Minister who in all honesty believes that Islamism is a greater threat to our democracy that the economic crisis and the world’s climate changes.* (SLP 2010, Appendix 25, p.10)

In this quote, the party leader refers to the values of democracy (democracy), economic (economic crisis) and environmental sustainability (the world’s climate changes).

In contrast to the percentages for content, the total percentages drawn up for form will often – but not always – be lower than 100% as there is generally less overlap between the rhetorical foci an overall
level (see table 6-4 below). However, within the specific rhetorical foci, there may be more overlaps between the different strategies which can be seen in table 6-5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political values</th>
<th>%- covered</th>
<th>Key sub-features of the values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>29 %</td>
<td>2B (Equal distribution); 2A (Equal opportunities); 2D (Equal worth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>1A (Extended democracy); Democracy generic; 1E (Transparency/openness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International outlook</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>13E (Part of a global world); 13A (Pro-transnational fed’s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare society</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>9E (Labour market); 9 (Welfare society generic); 9A (Welfare system)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong state</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>7C (Curbing capitalism); 7A (State regulation of the market)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>11B (Selflessness); 11A (United people)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental sust.</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>5A (A healthy environment); 5C (Green solutions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>3B (Freedom of choice); 3D (Freedom of expression)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6-3: Political values in the SPP 2003 Party Programme**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Rhetorical focus in the 2013 SPP party leader speech</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal org. focus (48%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External focus (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Societal focus (40%))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External competitor focus (0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6-4: Internal organisational focus in the 2013 SPP party leader speech**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Internal organisational focus in the 2013 SPP party leader speech</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actions (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party goals (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party leader (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party description (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit values (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov. goals (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov. description (0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6-5: Rhetorical focus in the 2013 SPP party leader speech**
In table 6-4 above, we see how the external and internal foci make up a total of 88% of the 2013 party leader speech. This means that the remaining part of the speech consists of text which does not contain any political values (e.g. introductory and closing statements, statements about the state of the party etc.).

In table 6-5, however, which zooms into the internal organisational focus of the 2013 SPP party leader speech, we see that the total percentage of the rhetorical strategies within this overall focus exceeds the 48% listed in table 6-4. This is due to overlaps in the specific rhetorical strategies in the speech in terms of internal organisational focus. This is seen in the example below where the party leader expresses both party goals as well as provides a description of the party in the same sentence:

*But SPP is still, in terms of attitudes, the Danish party who desperately wants social justice, a strong welfare and which has ambitions for the climate and the environment which extends far into the future for the benefit of the generations to come (SPP 2013, Appendix 16, p. 2)*

Having described the methods and data of the dissertation, the next section provides an introduction to the case country (Denmark) as well as the case itself namely the 2011-2014 three-party coalition government composed by the Socialist People’s Party (SPP), the Social Democrats (SD) and the Social Liberal Party (SLP).
7. Introduction to the case

The case chosen for the dissertation is the 2011-2013 Danish three party coalition government. This chapter offers a brief introduction to the coalition government, the Danish political system in which the case is embedded and to the three coalition parties (SPP, SD and SLP).

7.1. Denmark as a case country

The Danish political system is a stable, multi-party system with eight parties across the ideological scale represented in the Danish parliament as of 2014 (Folketinget, 2013a). Until 1971, the political structure was characterised as unipolar with the Social Democrats (SD) as the dominant party facing a series of smaller right-wing and left-wing parties (Laver and Schofield, 1990). After 1971, however, the Danish party structure has been characterised as multipolar with many parties of similar size and effective power (Laver and Schofield, 1990).

The Danish parliament consists of 179 seats including four seats from the North Atlantic countries of Greenland and the Faroe Islands. In order to gain political power, a coalition government must have the support of at least 90 seats. All parties in parliament nominate a Prime Ministerial candidate typically either the party leader of the Social Democratic Party or the Danish Liberal Party. The party leader with the most seats behind him/her following a general election will then become the country’s Prime Minister responsible for forming a coalition government.

A key characteristic of the Danish political system is that the coalition governments are often minority governments who are dependent on support-parties in order to gain and maintain political power. In practice, this means that minority coalition governments are forced to cooperate with parties outside the government as they do not have a majority amongst themselves. It also means that coalition governments may end up being dependent on their support party.

Despite the presence of eight different parties in the Danish parliament, scholars argue that the Danish political system is becoming increasingly bipolar (e.g. Laver and Schofield, 1990) as Danish political parties are often divided into two competing blocs i.e. a “blue” (right) and a “red” (left) (e.g. Winther, 1990). The 2015 Danish general election saw the new party “The Alternative” elected into parliament. However, this was after the main analysis of this thesis was conducted and therefore this party is not considered in the dissertation. However, it means that there are in fact now nine parties represented in the Danish parliament (Folketinget, 2015b).
These blocs constitute political groupings who agree to form coalitions should they gain power. Each block consists of both government parties and support parties who offer their support for the government parties but do not participate in the government itself.

Typically, the political parties within the blocs have not formalised their cooperation, but in 2009, Denmark saw its first ever Pre-election coalition (PEC) defined as “a (formal) statement between political parties to form a coalition government after an upcoming election” (Christiansen et al., 2014: 3). The PEC was formed between the SPP and SD with the two parties joining forces and presenting a joint tax programme labeled “Fair Change” which the parties pledged to pursue should they gain power (Christiansen et al., 2014: 3; Ringberg, 2011).

In terms of organisational structure, Danish political parties are typically composed by several institutional “layers” from grassroots level to party elite. Any person can become a member of a Danish party and the local branch of the party which is typically represented in all major councils (Folketinget, 2015b). The party members who get elected to parliament constitute an individual part of the party. The highest authority in the party is the party congress with representatives from all levels of the party and selects the executive committee which is the highest authority in between the party congresses which typically take place each year. The executive committee decides on the main party political lines all within the framework of the decisions made at the party’s congress (Folketinget, 2015b).

7.1.1. Ideological convergence in the Danish system

Although the Danish system is displaying increasingly bipolar tendencies which supports Mair’s (2008) notion of increased bi-polarism in multiparty systems, it also displays examples of ideological convergence amongst parties which is typically associated with two-party systems (Downs, 1957). Most pronounced is the notion that the 2011-2014 “red” coalition was continuously accused of adopting many of the “blue” policies and simply continuing the economic politics of the former Liberal/Conservative Coalition (Gjertsen and Vibjerg, 2014; Gudmundsson and Burhøi, 2012; Nielsen and Olsen, 2014; Østergaard, 2013) despite two of the member parties being traditionally left-wing (or “red”) in their ideological convictions. This may be seen as an example of how parties in multi-party systems at times compromise on central issues due to the conditions of coalition government membership which are discussed below, or it may be a reflection of the increased ideological convergence of political parties.
Adding to the complexity of the Danish multi-party system, we find the increasing existence of two-dimensional political conflicts (e.g. Borre, 1995; see figure 4-3, p. 48). This means that while two parties may agree on the old political dimension which concerns the question of welfare and distribution of resources, they may disagree on the cultural or “value-based” dimension such as immigration, environment and law and order (Olsen, 2006).

As argued by Green-Pedersen (2004), multi-party systems may also see parties converge towards the middle if a pivotal centre party is able to cooperate in government with both sides of the political spectrum. In the Danish political system, it could be argued that The Social Liberal Party represents such a centre party, as it has in the past cooperated with parties on both the left and right side of the ideological scale (Radikale Venstre, 2015a; see also Laver and Schofield, 1990: 116-117).

7.2. The case

7.2.1. The three-party coalition government (2011-2014)

The coalition government explored in this dissertation was formed in October 2011 between the Socialist People’s Party, The Social Democrats and the Social Liberal Party following the September 2011 general election. The three-party coalition government was a minority government as the three member parties could only muster a total of 77 seats between them with SD winning 44 seats, SLP 17 seats and SPP 16 seats. Thus, the coalition government had to rely on the seats of its support party RGA (12 seats) and three North Atlantic seats in order to gain power in office (Folketinget, 2013b).

The coalition agreement drawn up between the parties was entitled “Et Danmark der står sammen” (A Denmark united) (Statsministeriet, 2015). Representing the united coalition government, the coalition agreement was nevertheless dubbed ”red with blue stripes” (Ringberg, 2011) with many of the economic policies included taken directly from the former government. This was perhaps a result of the pivotal centre party SLP (see Laver and Schofield, 1990) having the upper hand in the negotiations as the party were one of the “winners” of the election (Ringberg, 2011; Jerking, 2011) and had voted for some of the former government’s economic reforms (Hjortdahl and Vangkilde, 2011; Pedersen, 2011a).

From the very beginning, the three-party centre-left coalition went through turbulent times. Partly due to the “blue” colour of the coalition agreement (Ringberg, 2011), SD and SPP in particular were heavily accused by both internal and external stakeholders of acting against their core political values (even in
the coalition agreement), and both parties experienced considerable membership decline, different degrees of internal party dissent and decreasing electoral support in the polls (Ib, 2012; Krasnik, 2012; Rehling, 2013; Østergaard, 2012;). While SPP gained 9.2 per cent of the votes in the 2011 election, in September 2013 (two years after the coalition government formation), the party stood to get only 4.9 per cent of the votes while SD went from 24.8 per cent to 18.9 per cent in the same period of time (Danmarks Radio, 2013).

The three-party coalition government lasted from October 2011 to January 2014 when SPP left the coalition following an internal debate about the sale of shares in a national energy company to the American hedge fund Goldman Sachs (Fancony, 2014). Since then, the coalition government has carried on with just two parties, SD and SLP until June 2015 general election where the “blue” bloc won (Folketinget, 2015b).

To understand the apparent similarities and differences in values across the three parties which may have contributed to the turbulent life-span of the 2011-2014 coalition government, a brief introduction to the member parties will be helpful and is provided below.

7.2.2. The Socialist People’s Party

The Socialist People’s Party was formed in 1959 after a split with the Danish Communist Party due to conflicts surrounding Denmark’s relationship with Russia (SF, 2015a). Since its formation, the party has focused on a “socialist change of society” and its core values as formulated on the party website are freedom, unity, equality and security (SF, 2015a). The first party programme was formulated in 1959 followed by a series of party programmes often termed “principle and action programmes” (1963, 1980, 1991, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2009 and 2012) (Arbejdermuseet, 2015a).

In terms of electoral support, the party experienced its best ever result (13 per cent) in the 2007 general election which according to some commentators was caused by the so-called “Villy-effect” with reference to the party’s charismatic and popular 2005-2012 leader, Villy Søvndal (e.g. Kastrup, 2014). In 2009, the party entered into a historical pre-election coalition with SD (Christiansen et al., 2014) which centred on the slogan “Fair Change” (Fair Forandring). In 2011 it became a first time member of a coalition government alongside SD and SLP although the party’s vote share dropped to 9.2 per cent in the September 2011 general election (Økonomi- og Indenrigsministeriet, 2015) with the party losing a
considerable part of its core voters to RGA and SLP (Redder, 2011). In 2012, Villy Søvndal stepped down as party leader and Anette Vilhelmsen took over (SF, 2015a). In January 2014, the party left the coalition government following a series of internal debates (Fancony, 2014; Lund, 2014).

7.2.3. The Social Democrats

The Social Democrats were formed in 1871 with the aim of “gathering the growing working class in a party based on a socialist foundation” and with values which revolve around ensuring democratic rights and just conditions in life (Socialdemokraterne, 2015a). The party’s first programme from 1876 emphasised the political values of “Freedom, equality and brotherly love amongst all nations” (Danmarkshistorien, 2015a). In 1913, the party formulated a new party programme followed by new programmes in 1961, 1977, 1992 and 2004 (Arbejdermuseet, 2015b). Still today, the party highlights freedom, equality and solidarity as their core political values on the party website (Socialdemokraterne, 2015b).

In 1924, the Social Democrats became the biggest party in Denmark with a 36.6 per cent share of the votes. The party remained the biggest Danish party until 2001, and has - since 1924 - held the prime ministerial position for a large part of the 20th century albeit with a rather fluctuating vote share. This peaked in 1935 where the party got 46.1 per cent of the vote, but has plummited since 1998 (Folketinget, 2012a). In the 2011 general election, the party gained only 24.8 per cent of the vote, but still came into power due to having the majority of the votes along with its coalition government partners (SPP and SLP), its support party the Red/Green Alliance and the three North Atlantic votes (Folketinget, 2013b). The party leader since 2005, Helle Thorning-Schmidt, became the Prime Minister of the coalition government in October 2011.

7.2.4. The Social Liberal Party

The Social Liberal Party was founded in 1905 as a breakout party from the Danish Liberal Party as this had “let down the democratic liberalism and swerved to the right” (Radikale Venstre, 2015a). The first party programme from 1905 emphasised Danish neutrality, the increase of democratic rights and the welfare state (Radikale Venstre, 2015b). The party has since then formulated new programmes in 1922 and 1997 (Radikale Venstre, 2015c).
Denmark has seen a Social Liberal Prime Minister twice throughout the 20th century, and since its formation the party has experienced fluctuating electoral support. Never one of the biggest Danish parties, the party’s vote share peaked in 1913 (18.7 per cent) and reached its lowest point in 1990 (3.5 per cent) (Folketinget (2013b). Since the 1970s, the party has acted as either a supporting party for coalition governments or as coalition government member cooperating with both the left and the right side of the political spectrum. Since 1992, however, the party has supported the left side which meant that it was part of a coalition government along with the Danish Social Democrats from 1992-2001 until the Danish Liberal Party and the Conservative Party gained power (Radikale Venstre, 2015a). In 2011, the Social Liberal Party achieved its best election result since 1973 with 9.5 per cent of the votes (Folketinget, 2013b), and this position gave them a strong hand in the subsequent formation of the three party centre-left coalition government.

Having described the case parties and the coalition government, the next chapter contains the first empirical analysis namely the analysis for political value content in the party programmes and party leader speeches before and after the case parties’ entry into the coalition government.
8. Exploring for political value content

The first part of the analysis aims to explore which political values the three case parties communicate in their party programmes and in their party leader speeches before and after government entry. The questions explored in the analysis are:

RQ1) Is there a change in the political value content in party leader speeches made before and after coalition government entry?

RQ2) Is the coherence between the political value content in party programmes and party leader speeches greater before coalition government entry than after?

However, to be able to systematically analyse the data set for political values, the concept of political values first of all needed to be operationalised. Thus, the chapter starts with an introduction to the developed Political Value Taxonomy.

8.1. The Political Value Taxonomy

The developed Political Value Taxonomy (see table 8-2, p. 111) represents the operationalisation of the concept of political values and is the analytical instrument applied in the identification of political values in the data set. The taxonomy is the aggregated “result” of the political values and sub-features identified in the Danish political party programmes through the inductive approach and the rhetorical analysis described in section 6.4.1. The political values were identified on sentence level through goal-oriented statements explicitly expressing the goals and political values of the party (Thompson and Hunston, 2000) and by identifying statements expressing evaluative markers of emotivity and necessity regarding the state of the world (Bednarek, 2010).

The final taxonomy lists a total of 18 political values as well as the various sub-features attached to each value. The reason for including both the political value labels as well the content or sub-features of the values is that political parties often promote the same values (e.g. freedom and equality) but interpret them quite differently (e.g. Bonotti, 2010; Rokeach, 1973). In the texts, the values will therefore be expressed via different semantic markers.
The distinction between means and ends is important to consider in the context of political parties as these may agree on the desired end-goals of society (e.g. an equal and environmentally sustainable society), but disagree as to the means with which to achieve these goals. However, this distinction is only partially reflected in the taxonomy as I concur with Schwartz (1992) that values can express both motivations for means and ends. Thus, I only make a clear-cut distinction between means and ends in the overall value labels which arguably reflect what Rokeach (1973) would categorise as terminal values. In the sub-features of the values, I do not distinguish between end-goals and actions and both are included under the same value label. One example is the value of environmental sustainability. Here the sub-features include both a healthy environment (5A) which is a desired end-state under environmental sustainability and abstinence in consumption (5B) which represents a means to reach environmental sustainability.

From the inductive analysis of the party programmes it became clear that parties across the ideological scale share a great deal of political values such as democracy, equality and freedom. Other values are promoted by a majority of the parties e.g. peace and security and environmental sustainability expressed by all parties save one (LA), and others still by smaller groups of parties e.g. strong state (RGA, SPP, SD), weak state (LA, CP, LP) and sovereignty (RGA and DPP). An overview of the identified political values is found in table 8-1 below. The values marked with an asterisk represent the political values which are promoted by all parties in their party programme.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overview of political values</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Democracy*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Equality*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Peace and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Economic sustainability/responsibility*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Strong state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Weak state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Welfare society*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8-1: Overview of political values
The analysis showed that each party promotes their own set of values, interpret the values in their own way and emphasise different sub-features of even shared political values. Thus, it is the total combination of political values as well as the sub-features emphasised by the party that constitute the party’s unique ideological identity. For example, for both SPP and RGA equality includes the sub-feature of *equal distribution of power and the means of production*, (sub-feature 2B) while for DPP, equality mainly concerns ensuring equal access to a *well-functioning social and healthcare system* (sub-feature 2A). Other sub-features are shared by most if not all parties such as *freedom of speech* which is a sub-feature of the overall political value label of freedom. The inclusion of sub-features acknowledges that parties may change their value interpretation over time as argued by Gioia et al. (2004) and may therefore change their sub-feature focus in their political texts.

Table 8-2 below shows the complete taxonomy followed by an elaboration of the challenges of creating the taxonomy.
## Political Value Taxonomy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Values</th>
<th>Sub-features of the values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Democracy</td>
<td>1A) Extended democracy (e.g. workplace etc.); 1B) Active citizens; 1C) Direct democracy; 1D) Informed citizens; 1E) Transparency and debate in decision-making processes; 1F) Respecting the Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Equality</td>
<td>2A) Equal opportunities in life; 2B) Equal distribution of power and means of production; 2C) Limited distance between rich and poor; 2D) Equal worth; 2E) Openness and trust towards other cultures; 2F) Social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Freedom</td>
<td>3A) Basic democratic freedom rights; 3B) Freedom of choice; 3C) Freedom from oppression; 3D) Freedom of expression; 3E) Private ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Peace and global security</td>
<td>4A) A stable world free from conflict, terror and war; 4B) No militarisation; 4C) Disarmament; 4D) Non-violence; 4E) Global security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Environmental sustainability</td>
<td>5A) A healthy environment; 5B) Abstinence in consumption; 5C) Green transformation of society; 5D) Animal welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Economic sustainability</td>
<td>6A) Growth and financial prosperity; 6B) Responsible financial policies and behavior; 6C) Creating jobs; 6D) Good conditions for companies; 6E) Efficiency in public sector; 6F) Cooperation between public/private; 6G) Prosperity of the strong benefiting the weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Strong state</td>
<td>7A) State exercising control; 7B) Large public sector; 7C) Curtailing market forces; 7D) High taxes; 7E) State ownership of central resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Weak state</td>
<td>8A) Limited state intervention and bureaucracy; 8B) Free trade and market forces; 8C) Increased private sector and smaller public sector; 8D) Low taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Welfare society</td>
<td>9A) A well-functioning welfare system; 9B) Prioritising weakest groups; 9C) Meeting the needs and rights of citizens; 9D) Welfare system built on trust; 9E) A full, well-functioning and flexible labour market; 9F) Quality of life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Personal responsibility</td>
<td>10A) Self-reliance and contribution; 10B) Respecting and fulfilling rights and duties in society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Solidarity/Unity</td>
<td>11A) Living together as a united people; 11B) Selflessness/Responsibility towards one another; 11C) International solidarity; 11D) Human units based on specific interests, groups, classes, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Sovereignty</td>
<td>12A) Against transnational federations (e.g. the European Union); 12B) The independence of the nation-state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. International outlook</td>
<td>13A) Pro-transnational federations (e.g. pro-EU and a united Europe); 13B) Cooperation with other international organisations; 13C) Active foreign politics; 13D) Regional cooperation; 13E) An open society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. National security/safety</td>
<td>14A) An effective national defence; 14B) A safe society protected from outside threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Patriotism/nationalism</td>
<td>15A) Protecting national culture and values; 15B) Curbing immigration; 15C) Protecting access to citizenship; 15D) Prioritizing national citizens and national minorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Traditional values/morality</td>
<td>16A) Family as center of society (&quot;the near&quot;); 16B) Christianity as foundation of society; 16C) Deference/loyalty to head of state e.g. Monarch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Justice/Law and order</td>
<td>17A) Society built on law and order; 17B) Link between crime and punishment; 17C) Protecting the legal/human rights of citizens; 17D) International justice/international legal rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Enlightenment and development</td>
<td>18A) A well-functioning (state) school system; 18B) Education, research and development; 18C) Promoting new technologies; 18D) A rich and diverse cultural life</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8-2: The Political Value Taxonomy
8.1.1. Challenges of creating the taxonomy

8.1.1.1. Same values different interpretations

The notion that parties often have different value interpretations invariably made the development of the taxonomy more challenging as these different interpretations had to be aggregated into a final concise and operational taxonomy.

Freedom

Freedom is a value which is shared by all parties but interpreted differently (see Rokeach, 1973). In the Danish party programmes, all parties promote freedom and some sub-features are shared amongst parties such as basic freedom rights (3A) (e.g. freedom of speech, freedom of religion etc.) and the freedom to be who you are (3E) (freedom of expression). However, freedom also includes the right to dispose over one’s own resources i.e. private ownership and the right to reap the benefits from own efforts (see table 8-2) as some parties e.g. the Liberal Alliance and the Liberal Party emphasise these sub-features in their party programmes:

*We believe in the freedom to dispose over one's own resources. Private ownership and freedom of contractual freedom is the foundation for human endeavor/entrepreneurship. By strengthening private ownership we create progression and dynamism in society.* (LA 2013, Appendix 7, p. 2)

*Freedom also means that man has the right to reap the benefits from his own endeavors. Private ownership is a foundation in a free society.* (LP 2006, Appendix 8, p. 5)

This specific sub-feature of freedom is not explicitly shared by a party such as the RGA nor is it endorsed wholeheartedly by the SPP who argues that:

*…the socialist market economy is characterised by different kinds of common ownership of the most important means of production. There will, however, also be some level of private ownership.* (SPP 2003, Appendix 2, p. 3).

Equality

The value of equality also represents conflicting interpretations. For parties on the left-side of the ideological spectrum, a central part of equality is the sub-feature of limited distance between rich and
poor (2C). However, this sub-feature is not shared by right-wing parties. The Liberal Alliance explicitly disregards the notion of economic equality in their party programme. The following quotes from the party programmes show the differences in the interpretation of equality:

*SPP rejects a society with large differences in wealth and income, because this means that opportunities and quality of life are unequally distributed.* (SPP 2012, Appendix 4, p. 3)

*...while the inequality between rich and poor must be evened out* (RGA 2003, Appendix 1, p. 20)

*We believe that a prerequisite of democracy is that the financial and social distance between people is not too great* (SLP 1997, Appendix 6, p.1)

*Rather than aim for material equality we can all benefit from growth, wealth and prosperity in Denmark. Liberal reforms are completely necessary. They are the only way we can make Denmark a winning nation and safeguard the welfare in the long run* (LA 2013, Appendix 7, p. 1)

The first three quotes connote the same meaning (limited distance between rich and poor) and were all aggregated into the same sub-feature in the final taxonomy (2C). In contrast, the last quote explicitly disregards this particular sub-feature of equality. The overall goal expressed in the quote from Liberal Alliance is to ensure growth (*growth, prosperity, winner nation*) and welfare. Thus, the quote reflects the political value of economic sustainability and the sub-features of 6A (growth and prosperity) and 6G (the prosperity of the wealthy benefitting the weak).

The two sub-features of equal distribution of power and means of production (2B) and social justice (2F) are in essence both concerned with creating a society with a fair distribution of wealth and privileges. However, 2B specifically concerns the notion of common ownership to the means of production and the erosion of existing power structures, which are features not covered by 2F which is more concerned with just distribution of other privileges e.g. financial. This meant that I needed to create two distinct sub-features.

**Other political values with different interpretations**

Examples of other values which are also subject to different interpretations are values such as international outlook and environmental sustainability.
International outlook is promoted by all parties who all agree that it entails the sub-features of international cooperation and the recognition of Denmark as part of a globalised world:

*Denmark is not an island but part of an increasingly integrated world. Hunger, poverty, wars and natural disasters demand our solidarity with those who are affected. Danish society must be ready to contribute in the world where it is necessary. Our international aid work, our peacekeeping and peace-creating military participation, our immigration policies must always reflect humanism and solidarity* (SD 2004, Appendix 5, p. 8)

*Environmental problems demand a united international effort where the EU is a natural focus for safeguarding the environment in our part of the world and for obtaining a better international negotiation position with the aim of achieving effective global environmental improvements* (LP 2006, Appendix 8, p. 29)

For most Danish parties, the value of international outlook includes the sub-feature of participating in international federations such as the EU (13B), however, for a select few it does not. This means that although RGA and DPP promote some sub-features of international outlook, these two parties do not include the existence of international federations such as the EU in their specific value interpretation. Rather, they promote *sovereignty* as a separate and contrasting political value:

*… a Danish withdrawal from the EU is only a partial goal in the creation of another Europe where solidarity, equality, democracy and ecology are the fundamental principles and with a fundamentally different international cooperation in a world without aggressive superpowers* (RGA 2003, Appendix 1, p.11)

*The Danish People’s Party wants a friendly and dynamic cooperation with all democratic and freedom-loving nations in the world, but we will not accept that Denmark surrenders sovereignty. Thus, the Danish People’s Party is against the European Union* (DPP 2002, Appendix 10, p. 2)

The value of environmental sustainability is another example of a value which the parties interpret differently. For SPP, for example, environmental sustainability is about “a green transformation” of the economy (5C) (SPP, 2003, Appendix 2, p. 19), whereas most other parties are less radical in their interpretation of the value and mainly refer to protecting the environment for future generations (5A) and being abstinent in energy consumption (5B).
8.1.1.2. Interrelated values

Another key challenge of creating the taxonomy was that political parties may see different political values as interrelated (Schwartz et al., 2010). This inevitably complicates the design of a taxonomy with clearly defined and mutually exclusive categories (see McDonald and Gandz, 1991: 225). In the party programmes, there are several examples of how some parties see certain values as being interrelated with others:

*People must have the freedom to create a life according to their own dreams and capabilities. But freedom is only real if it is for all. Therefore, we must ensure freedom for all through unity* (SD 2004, Appendix 5, p. 5)

In this quote it is clear that for SD, equality is a prerequisite of freedom and must be ensured through solidarity/unity. Thus, the party sees these three separate values as mutually intertwined and interdependent.

In order to deal with this challenge in creating the taxonomy, it is necessary to acknowledge that although certain concepts are interrelated they are not identical and are still individual values. Subsequently, although freedom, equality and solidarity are for some parties highly intertwined, they still represent three distinct political values with their own set of sub-features which is reflected in the taxonomy.

In the taxonomy, there are also examples of values which could have been differently arranged. This is most clearly the case for the value of 11C (international solidarity) which could logically also have been categorised as a sub-feature of international outlook. Here I simply had to choose between the two overall values labels and opted for the value of solidarity. However, in practice, the two values are often coded under both international outlook and solidarity as they are indeed highly intertwined:

*We cannot close our eyes when developing countries are locked in a role as supplier of raw materials without any real opportunities for developing for the benefit of the general public. Or when poverty hits so hard that even children are forced into factory halls and where the wage for the long working days are just about enough to pay for a meal and a bed. That’s why we must take part in the world.* (SPP 2010, Appendix 13, p. 9)
8.1.1.3. Political values versus ideologies

In the party programmes, parties may refer to specific political ideologies such as socialism and liberalism. This is not surprising given nature of the genre as the core political document of the party (Hansen, 2008). However, as discussed in section 4.2.1, an ideology does not reflect a political value in itself, but represents a set of values and serves to organise a group's (political) value system (van Dijk, 2006). This means that although the parties may fight for “democratic socialism” (Appendices 1, 3 and 5) and may thereby express the ideology as a goal via goal-oriented sentences, the ideologies of the parties have not been categorised as individual political values in the taxonomy as they are seen to structure and give meaning to the total value system of the party. This is evident in the following examples:

*With a starting point in the democratic socialism which builds on the respect for man and the will to create equal opportunities, the Social Democrats along with the workers’ movement for more than 130 years been a driving force for the change and development of Denmark.* (SD 2004, Appendix 5, p. 4)

*SPP works consistently towards democratic socialism. Not as a final recipe for how society should be structured. But as a continuous movement towards more democracy, more sustainability and environmental responsibility, more solidarity and social justice and a more flexible international cooperation.* (SPP 2003, Appendix 2, p. 26)

*A liberal democracy is founded on each citizen having the opportunity for influencing the running of society through free elections for democratically elected assemblies and direct referendums on important questions.* (LP 2013, Appendix 8, p. 6)

In the first two quotes, the notion of democratic socialism is equated with the values of equality (*the will to create equal opportunities*), democracy, sustainability, solidarity, social justice and international cooperation. Combined these values constitute the socialist ideology for the party.

The last quote equates a liberal democracy and liberalism with the idea that everyone is able to participate in the governing of society through elections. This reflects the values of active citizens taking part in democracy (1B) and giving people the opportunity to choose and influence their own life (3B).
8.1.2. Summing up

The Political Value Taxonomy formed the basis of the first two phases of the data analysis where the data set were coded for political values against the framework of the taxonomy. The first phase consisted of establishing the parties’ ideological identities by coding for political values in the party programmes of the data set, the second phase consisted of coding the political speeches for political values to explore what values and sub-features are communicated in speeches before and after government entry and how the values cohere with those communicated in the party programmes. Applying the same framework in both analyses enabled me to compare the value content of the speeches to that of the party programmes.

In the following, I will present an example of how I analysed the data for political values and how I reached my findings. The example provided is the 2003 SPP party programme (Appendix 2). The exemplary analysis is followed by a presentation of the political value content in the total data set and finally by a discussion of the findings.

8.2. An exemplary analysis of political values content

The 2003 SPP party programme (Appendix 2) is a long and intricate document divided into five overall sections:

- **Introduction:** SF is a socialist and green party
- **Strategy:** Democratic socialism
- **Analysis:** An unequal society in an unequal world
- **Main strategic tasks:** A political change of course
- **Closing:** A new society in a new century

Overall, the 2003 SPP party programme is dedicated to the vision of a socialist society. Throughout the programme, the party characterises itself as a “socialist and green party” (Appendix 2, p. 1) and explicitly states that it is working towards a socialist society. The party also argues that it is ready for government participation stating that a ”government with SPP participation requires a strong SPP and a coalition agreement based on social and ecological responsibility” (Appendix 2, p. 5).

For SPP, socialism is achieved by a “…deep reaching reform process where freedom, equality, solidarity and ecological responsibility becomes the foundation for the development of society” (Appendix 2, p. 14). Here, the party explicitly lists the generic values which it associates with socialism namely freedom,
equality, solidarity as well as environmental sustainability. This statement is also an example of how the party couples the "old" political values of freedom, equality and solidarity with the "new" and more post-materialistic value of environmental sustainability (see Inglehart, 1997, 2008). The quote below illustrates the party’s key visions of an ideal society through the expression of political values:

…democratic rights for all, for everyone to be able to unfold themselves freely and have the opportunity of realising their potential within the framework of the unities, and for a sustainable society for current and future generations (Appendix 2, p. 2)

This quote reflects the core political values of democracy ("democratic rights"), equality ("everyone"), freedom (sub-feature 3D “unfold themselves freely” and 3B “realising their potential”), solidarity/unity (unites), and sustainability (a sustainable society) thereby in essence reflecting the party’s vision of the good life. Table 8-3 below shows the predominant political values and sub-features identified in the party programme followed by a brief introduction to and exemplification of each value:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political values</th>
<th>% covered</th>
<th>Key sub-features of the values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>29 %</td>
<td>2B (Equal distribution); 2A (Equal opportunities); 2D (Equal worth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>1A (Extended democracy); Democracy generic; 1E (Transparency/openness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International outlook</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>13E (Part of a global world); 13A (Pro-transnational fed’s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare society</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>9E (Labour market); 9 (Welfare society generic); 9A (Welfare system)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong state</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>7C (Curbing capitalism); 7A (State regulation of the market)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>11B (Selflessness); 11A (United people)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental sust.</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>5A (A healthy environment); 5C (Green solutions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>3B (Freedom of choice); 3D (Freedom of expression)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8-3: Core political values and sub-features in the 2003 SPP party programme
8.2.1. Equality (and freedom)

Equality is by far the most dominant value in the programme:

…we are facing such great challenges that a new social and environmental development is necessary for the civilisation to survive and for creating decent living standards for all. The big difference between rich and poor in the world is a ticking bomb for us all (Appendix 2, p. 1)

In this quote, it becomes clear that the value of equality and the sub-features of 2A (equal opportunities) ("for all") and 2C (limited distance between rich and poor) ("the big difference between rich and poor is a ticking bomb") are central to the party. It is also evident that the party believes that solving the environmental problems is part of ensuring equality ("environmental development (…) necessary (..) for creating decent living standards for all").

The party has a broad view on equality as it stresses all of the sub-features of the value in the programme. For SPP, equality thereby encompasses not only equal opportunities (2A), but also limited distance between rich and poor (2C), equal worth (2D), and the notion of social justice (2F).

However, the most dominant sub-feature is 2B (equal distribution of power and common ownership to means of production). To achieve this particular feature of equality, the party argues for a change in the types of ownership:

*SPP wants to change of the conditions of ownership so that employee ownership becomes the dominant form of ownership, and democratic employee control becomes the dominant form of management in companies businesses* (Appendix 2, p. 14)

This quote also expresses the value of democracy and the specific sub-feature of 1A (extended democracy) where people get more control over their workplace.

The party also argues for a socialist market economy which is characterised by "different kinds of common ownership and control over the most important means of production and the financial sector". (Appendix 2, p. 3)

Apart from 2B, 2A (equal opportunities) is the most dominant sub-feature of the value in the programme and is often combined with freedom:
As long as inequality flourishes as it does in contemporary society, freedom remains an abstract concept for large parts of the population. Formal freedom is only real when everyone is ensured equal opportunities for making their dreams come true. (Appendix 2, p. 9)

In this example, it is clear that the party emphasises equal opportunities (2A) for realising your dreams in life (sub-feature 3B of freedom). Here, the value of equality was identified by the semantic markers of “everyone”, while the sub-feature of 2A was identified via the specific reference to “equal opportunities”. Also by including the term inequality the party refers to the opposite of what the party aspires to achieve i.e. equality. Freedom is identified via the semantic marker of the overall value label “freedom”, while the sub-feature of 3B (freedom of choice) is identified via reference to “making dreams come true”.

Another example of the interrelatedness of these two central values is found in the example below:

*SPP wants a society where people have the greatest possible freedom to create the life they want, and where diversity is seen as a strength. That’s why SPP wants to fight discrimination due to sex, ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation.* (Appendix 2, p. 18)

In this quote, the party again emphasises the ability to realise one’s dreams (3B) as a key sub-feature of freedom for the party (“create the life they want”). In this case, this sub-feature is coupled with the sub-feature of freedom of expression (3D) due to the semantic marker of “diversity”. The sub-feature of equal worth (2D) is also identified in the quote via the semantic markers of “fight discrimination etc.” Thereby it is clear that the sub-features of 3D and 2D are closely related to the party as in order to achieve freedom of expression, society must accept all ways of life and respect people’s differences while promoting equality between sexes, sexual orientations etc.

### 8.2.2. Democracy

The notion of democracy also pervades large parts of the party programme as the key aspiration of the party is to achieve "democratic socialism"; an expression repeated throughout the programme:

*SPP works consistently towards democratic socialism. Not as a final recipe for how society should be structured. But as a continuous movement towards more democracy, more sustainability and
environmental responsibility, more solidarity and social justice and a more flexible international cooperation (Appendix 2, p. 24)

As is evident from the quote, the notion of democratic socialism encompasses various values such as democracy, environmental sustainability, solidarity, equality (through 2F social justice) and international outlook (through 13B international cooperation). When promoting specific sub-features of democracy, the party refers mostly to extended democracy in workplaces etc. giving people more influence on their everyday life (1A):

This development means that new management tools are being used. Individual wage systems coupled with more opportunities for employee influence over the near work life are becoming increasingly important (Appendix 2, p. 7)

Openness and transparency in political institutions (1E) is also a key sub-feature of democracy emphasised by the party which is evident in the following quote:

SPP wants to develop a political style where parties take part in a much more open and continuous dialogue with the people (Appendix 2, p. 4)

8.2.3. International outlook

Throughout the programme it is evident that SPP is highly internationally focused. The main sub-feature of international outlook is 13E (the nation as part of a global world) as the party’s goals and aspirations extend beyond national borders:

Modern socialism is an international movement. That is why SPP works for human rights, for global equality and democratisation of international conditions/relations, and for everyone to be free from political, economic, social, gender-based, ethnical, religious and other kinds of oppression (Appendix 2, p. 3)

Here we see how party refers to international outlook via the semantic markers of “international” and “global”. This particular quote was also coded under justice/law and order (sub-feature 17C - “international human rights”), the overall value of democracy (1 - “democratisation”), freedom (sub-feature 3C - “free from oppression”) and the overall value of equality ( “everyone”)
The party also promotes cooperation with international organisations such as the UN (sub-feature 13B).

Thus, it is a central part of SPP’s democratic strategy that democratic decision fora are established, e.g. on a European and global level, which can regulate the market. SPP will cooperate with progressive political forces in other countries to force this line through (Appendix 2, p. 16)

In this quote, the party refers to the value of international outlook through the semantic markers of “European”, “global” and “other countries” and to the sub-feature of 13B via the specific reference to “cooperate with (…) in other countries”. Also, democracy is a key value in the quote via references to “democratic strategy”, “democratic decisions” as well as strong state (7C – curtailing market forces) via the semantic marker of “regulate the market”. Although the EU is seen as a key part of the party’s international strategy, the party argues against the “establishment of a federal European state” (Appendix 2, p. 23). This means that 13A (pro-transnational federations) is not a dominant sub-feature of the value of international outlook in the programme.

8.2.4. Welfare society

The most dominant sub-feature of the welfare society in the programme is the existence of a full and well-functioning labour market (9E). This is referred to mainly in terms of the “workers’ movement” and unions which the party sees as central actors in this connection:

In the workers’ movement SPP members work towards making it into a social reform movement placing greater demands for a socially and environmentally sustainable working life for all, also the unemployed – and where a central demand is a foundational change of society into a socialist society (Appendix 2, p. 4)

Here we see how the party specifically refers to “socially and environmentally sustainable working life for all” (sub-feature 9E). This quote thereby also expressed equality (“for all”) and the sub-feature of 2A (equal opportunities”) as everyone shares the right to a sustainable working life.

Another key feature is a well-functioning welfare system (9A) which is seen in the following example:

The vision of a modern society with renewed welfare requires a well-functioning public sector. It is a misunderstanding that the public sector is developed by making users pay, through outsourcing or other market economic principles in the welfare areas – on the contrary (Appendix 2, p. 17)
Here we see how the party refers to the welfare society both through references to a “well-functioning public sector” (9A), but also by linking it to the value of strong state expressed through the rejection of “making users pay”, “outsourcing” and “other market economic principles” in the public sector.

Throughout the programme, the party emphasises the connection between welfare society and strong state stressing that “the notion of welfare is in many ways opposite the notion of the market” (Appendix 2, p. 9) and promoting “free and equal access to treatment” (Appendix 2, p. 18). The welfare state is thereby connected to both equality (equal opportunities 2A) and strong state (large public sector 7B).

8.2.5. Strong state

A central theme of the party programme is curbing capitalism (7C) and moving society in a more socialist direction. The programme contains several passages devoted to this topic:

*SPP wants a foundational change in society. Society’s structure and mechanisms must be changed gradually as well as more radically so that democracy, freedom, social justice, and sustainability are the central principles for the structure and development of society. This requires a revolutionary process where a majority of people gradually abolish capitalism* (Appendix 2, p. 3)

From this quote, we see that the party views capitalism as something to be fought actively (“revolutionary process (…) gradually abolish capitalism”) and which is in direct opposition to the values of democracy, freedom, social justice and sustainability.

8.2.6. Solidarity/unity

The party stresses solidarity/unity as central in the development of society in which people work and fight together towards the common good, and obtaining a society in which everyone can live in freedom and diversity:

*The workers movement – which SPP is a left-wing part of – has from the beginning emphasised a common struggle towards giving the individual the opportunity for contributing towards the unity and towards creating a society which gives everyone a real opportunity for a free and diverse way of life.* (Appendix 2, p. 1)
In this quote, the party emphasises solidarity/unity through the generic semantic marker of “unity”, but also by referring to a “common struggle” expressing the sub-feature of unified people (11A). Again we see how other values are also at play namely equality (“everyone”), freedom (“free”) the sub-feature of freedom of expression (3D) “diverse way of life” and also personal responsibility “individual (…) contributing towards the unity”.

8.2.7. Environmental sustainability

Although environmental sustainability is not one of the most dominant values in the programme, it represents a key part of the party’s identity as the party defines itself as “green” (Appendix 2, p. 1). The party argues for a “green economy with red responsibility” (Appendix 2, p. 19) and also calls for a green transformation of society:

*The connection between the global environmental problems and the global inequality carries with it a radical demand for an ecological transformation and a new growth model in the rich part of the world. And it calls for a responsible global environmental effort.* (Appendix 2, p. 19)

Here, it is evident that SPP sees a strong interrelatedness between environmental sustainability (“environmental problems”, responsible (…) environmental effort), economic sustainability (“growth model” reflecting the sub-feature of 6A), and equality (“inequality”). Also, the quote reflects the party’s international focus through the semantic markers of “global” (repeated three times) and “rich part of the world”. The quote reflects sub-feature 5C of environmental sustainability through the semantic marker of “ecological transformation (…) in the rich part of the world”.

8.2.8. Summing up the communicated ideological identity of SPP in the 2003 programme

Overall, the 2003 SPP party programmes reflects a party with strong socialist roots and which fights for a society in which everyone are equal both socially and financially. The party is strongly opposed to the idea of capitalism in its current form and emphasises the value of strong state and a transformation of society towards more democracy, equality and environmental sustainability. The notion of democratising society and businesses through common ownership and employee control is a key value for the party, as is spreading out the socialist movement internationally through workers’ movements and international cooperation. Freedom and the ability to evolve and realise your dreams and potentials
are also paramount values for the party. Other key values are the welfare society, environmental sustainability and solidarity.

This concludes the analysis of the 2003 SPP party programme. The next section presents the total findings of the analysis for political value content in the party programmes and the speeches.

8.3. Presentation of findings in the analysis for content

Overall, the analyses for value content in the party programmes and the party leader speeches show that there are significant differences as to the political value focus of the party programmes versus the speeches. However, there is no clear pattern as to whether the coherence between the value content in party programmes and speeches is greater before government entry than after.

There are also fewer differences than expected between the political value content of the speeches before and after government entry. In connection with the specific sub-features of the values, most sub-features emphasised in the speeches are similar to those of the party programmes however with a few notable exceptions (see section 8.3.4.5).

Before elaborating on these general trends in the analysis, I will briefly outline the communicated ideological identity of the three coalition parties as established in their party programmes through their political values. These political values form the basis of the subsequent comparison of the political value content in the programmes and the party leader speeches.

8.3.1. The political values in the three SPP programmes

8.3.1.1. The 2003 SPP party programme (Appendix 2)

As discussed in the exemplary analysis (section 8.2), the 2003 SPP party programme has a strong focus on equality, democracy and international outlook – as well as on the welfare society, strong state, solidarity, environmental sustainability and freedom. Overall, the party fights for democratic socialism and is strongly opposed to capitalism and the growing difference between rich and poor.

8.3.1.2. The 2009 SPP reform programme (Appendix 3)

The 2009 SPP Reform Programme (Appendix 3) is not strictly a party programme, but rather a document in which SPP’s executive committee outlines its visions for what the party would do if it came
into power. It is thereby similar to the genre of an election manifesto as it puts the party’s dreams of
government “into words” (Politiken, 26/4 – 2009). The title of the programme is “SPP’s reform
programme for Denmark – from climate threat and economic crisis to new green and social growth”. The programme was approved at the 2009 party conference.

The programme is divided into five overall sections:

- *From climate threat to green future*
- *Sustainable economic growth – what we must live off in the future*
- *Welfare is the way – not the obstacle!*
- *Health and prevention*
- *New life for democracy*

Each section includes a series of visions and the programme ends with a short conclusion summing up the “new course” for Denmark.

The title of the 2009 SPP programme reflects two political values i.e. environmental sustainability (climate threat and green growth) and economic sustainability (economic crisis and growth). Social growth is a broader term and may refer to the values of equality, welfare state or solidarity.

In terms of political value content, the 2009 reform programme contains more concrete suggestions for what the party would do if and when it gained power. The values of welfare society and environmental sustainability are the most important values in the programme – most specifically ensuring and developing the welfare system (sub-feature 9A) and creating jobs (sub-feature 9E).

Although equality is a primary value in the 2009 reform programme, the programme contains no references to the dominant sub-feature of 2B (equal distribution of power). Rather, ensuring equal opportunities (2A) is the main goal of the party.

In the programme, the party makes no reference to socialism, but lists its core values as being democracy, equality, united future, global outlook and solidarity. These core value labels reflect the key political values identified in the party programme which are summarised in table 8-4 (p. 128).
8.3.1.3. The 2012 SPP party programme (Appendix 4)

SPP’s latest party programme (Appendix 4) was approved at the party’s annual conference in April 2012 approximately seven months after the party’s entry into the coalition government in October 2011. The party programme is less than one third of the length of the 2003 party programme and is divided into five overall sections:

- Free people in strong unities
- A sustainable society
- Democratisation of the economy
- International solidarity – global responsibility
- An active and ambitious people’s party

In many ways, the 2012 programme represents an ideological return to the party programme of 2003 compared to the 2009 reform programme. The notion of socialism is again present throughout, and the goal of the party is to create: “a socialist society which on a sustainable foundation creates the greatest possible welfare, prosperity, freedom and the most opportunities for everyone” (Appendix 4, p. 1).

In the programme, it is clear that SPP still defines itself in socialist terms reminiscent of the 2003 party programme. Throughout the programme, we find references to the value of strong state via the sub-features of curbing capitalism (7C) as well as state intervention (7A) and state ownership (7E). There are, however, significantly fewer descriptive passages relating to the notion of capitalism which was a key feature of the 2003 party programme.

Summing up, the values of the party programme largely reflect those of the 2003 programme although with a slightly different value priority. Democracy has become the most dominant value followed by solidarity and equality. Environmental sustainability and strong state have also become relatively more important in the 2012 programme. The welfare society is less dominant in 2012 than 2003, while economic sustainability is more important in 2012 than in 2003, but less so than in 2009. Table 8-4 shows an overview of the core political values and sub-features expressed in the three SPP party programmes.
### Core political values and sub-features of the SPP Party Programmes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equality (29%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Welfare society (33%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Democracy (32%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Solidarity (27%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2B (Equal distribution)</td>
<td>9A (Welfare system)</td>
<td>1A (Extended democracy)</td>
<td>11A (United people)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2A (Equal opportunities)</td>
<td>9E (Labour market)</td>
<td>1B (Active citizens)</td>
<td>11 (Solidarity generic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2D (Equal worth)</td>
<td>9B (Weakest groups)</td>
<td>1C (Direct democracy)</td>
<td>11B (Selflessness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy (20%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Environmental sust. (20%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Equality (19%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Equality (25%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1A (Extended democracy)</td>
<td>5C (Green solutions)</td>
<td>2A (Equal distribution)</td>
<td>2B (Equal distribution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (Democracy)</td>
<td>5A (Healthy environment)</td>
<td>2A (Equal opportunities)</td>
<td>2A (Equal opportunities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1E (Transparency/openness)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2D (Equal worth)</td>
<td>2D (Equal worth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Int'l outlook (20%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Equality (19%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13B (Int'l cooperation)</td>
<td>2A (Equal opportunities)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11E (Part of a global world)</td>
<td>2D (Equal worth)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Welfare society (18%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Democracy (17%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Environmental sust. (22%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9E (Labour market)</td>
<td>1A (Extended democracy)</td>
<td>5A (Health environment)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 (Welfare society generic)</td>
<td>1E (Transparency/openness)</td>
<td>5 (Environmental sust. generic)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9A (Welfare system)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5C (Green solutions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strong state (17%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Economic sust. (16%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Int'l outlook (21%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7C (Curbing capitalism)</td>
<td>6A (Growth and prosperity)</td>
<td>13E (Part of a global world)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7A (State control)</td>
<td>6D (Good conditions for co’s)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7B (State ownership)</td>
<td>6B (Financial responsibility)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Solidarity (16%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Int'l outlook (15%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Strong state (20%)</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11B (Selflessness)</td>
<td>13E (Part of a global world)</td>
<td>7A (State control)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11A (United people)</td>
<td>13B (Int’l cooperation)</td>
<td>7C (Curbing capitalism)</td>
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<td>7E (State ownership )</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental sust. (14%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Solidarity (14%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Freedom (18%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5A (A healthy environment)</td>
<td>11A (United people)</td>
<td>3B (Freedom of choice)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5C (Green solutions)</td>
<td>11C (International solidarity)</td>
<td>3A (Basic freedom rights)</td>
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<td><strong>Freedom (14%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>E and D (13%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Welfare society (12%)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>3B (Freedom of choice)</td>
<td>18B (Education, R and D)</td>
<td>9D (Decentralisation and trust)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3D (Freedom of expression)</td>
<td>18A (School system)</td>
<td>9A (Welfare system)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strong state (10%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Economic sust. (10%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7B (Large public sector)</td>
<td>6A (Growth)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7A (State control)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7C (Curbing capitalism)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Justice/law and order (6%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17C (Legal rights of citizens)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 8-4: Core political values and sub-features of the SPP party programmes

### 8.3.2. The political values in the SD party programme

The SD party programme is entitled “Hånden på Hjertet” (“Hand on your heart”) and was formulated in 2004 with a revised introduction from 2011 (Appendix 5, p.1).

The programme includes a foreword in which the party secretary welcomes the reader and offers a brief description of the party. Then follows a total of 12 sections each devoted to a specific topic with titles such as “Socialdemocratic Values”; “Freedom”; “Equality”; “We believe in Denmark”; and “Part of Europe”.

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The programme reflects a party which fights for equality, freedom and solidarity in a democratic and international world. The party positions itself as the founder of the welfare society, but argues that people also have a personal responsibility and that not everything can or should be solved by the state. In connection with globalisation and having an international outlook, the party emphasises that Danish values must be safe-guarded. The main political values and sub-features of the party identified in the programme are seen in table 8-5:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political values</th>
<th>Key sub-features of the values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equality (34%)</td>
<td>2A (Equal opportunities); 2D (Equal worth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity (27%)</td>
<td>11A (United people); 11B (Selflessness); 11C (International solidarity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (27%)</td>
<td>Democracy – generic; 1B (Active citizens); 1E (Openness/transparency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom (25%)</td>
<td>3B (Freedom of choice); Freedom generic; 3A (Basic freedom rights)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International outlook (25%)</td>
<td>13E (Part of a global world); 13A (Pro-transnational fed’s); 13B (International cooperation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare society (16%)</td>
<td>9A (Welfare system); 9E (Labour market); 9F (Quality of life)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism/Patriotism (9%)</td>
<td>15A (Protecting Danish values)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal responsibility (8%)</td>
<td>10B (Fulfilling rights and duties); 10A (Self-reliance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice/law and order (7%)</td>
<td>17C (Legal rights of citizens) and 17D (International justice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic sustainability (6%)</td>
<td>6A (Economic growth)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8-5: Core political values and sub-features of the 2004 SD party programme

8.3.3. The political values in the SLP party programme

The SLP party programme (Appendix 6) was formulated in 1997 and contains five overall sections:

1) Man and unity
2) Sustainability
The programme reflects an internationally-oriented party with a strong focus on democracy, environmental and economic sustainability – the latter two which are seen as highly interrelated. Freedom (often coupled with personal responsibility), equality and solidarity are also key values as are welfare society and enlightenment and development. According to the party, the key goal of the welfare society is to enable people to take care of themselves while the weakest must be taken care of. Table 8-6 shows a summary of the key political values and sub-features identified in the programme:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political values</th>
<th>Key sub-features of the values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (26%)</td>
<td>1E (Transparency/openness); 1D (Access to information); 1B (Active citizens)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental sust. (21%)</td>
<td>5A (Healthy environment); 5C (Green solutions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International outlook (18%)</td>
<td>13B (International cooperation), 13A (pro-transnational fed’s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic sustainability (15%)</td>
<td>6A (Growth/prosperity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom (15%)</td>
<td>3B (Freedom of choice); 3A (Basic freedom rights); 3D (Freedom of expression)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality (15%)</td>
<td>2A (Equal opportunities); 2D (Equal worth); 2E (Openness/trust)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity (14%)</td>
<td>11A (United people); 11C (International solidarity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare society (12%)</td>
<td>9E (Labour market); 9A (Welfare system); 9B (Weakest groups); 9C (citizen needs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E and D (11%)</td>
<td>18B (Education, R and D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace/global security (8%)</td>
<td>4E (Global security); 4A (Peace)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice/law and order (8%)</td>
<td>17C (Legal rights of citizens)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal respons. (6%)</td>
<td>10A (Self-reliance)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8-6: Core political values and sub-features of the 1997 SLP Party Programme
8.3.4. Political value focus in party programmes and party leader speeches

The party programmes and party leader speeches in the data set vary significantly in terms of political values focus. The party leaders tend to leave out certain central political values in their political speeches, include other more peripheral values and change their sub-feature focus. Other values which are central in the party programmes are largely maintained in the speeches. There is no general pattern across the parties regarding whether or not the values of the speeches are more or less coherent with the values of the party programmes before or after government entry. Table 8-7 (p. 133), table 8-9 (p. 138) and table 8-11 (p. 142) show the core political values in SPP, SD and SLP respectively.

8.3.4.1. The value focus of SPP in party programmes versus speeches

A key difference in the political value focus of SPP is the value of strong state which the party emphasises strongly in both their 2003 and 2012 party programmes albeit more peripherally in the 2009 programme. In all speeches save for the 2008 and 2009 speech, strong state plays a much more peripheral role. It is largely absent in speeches made within the coalition government (2012 and 2013), but also the two years leading up to it (2010 and 2011).

The value of democracy is also largely absent from the party leader speeches despite being a dominant value in all three party programmes. Freedom is another value which is largely absent from the speeches despite being emphasised in the 2003 and 2012 party programmes.

The value of environmental sustainability also played a dominant role in the party programmes especially in 2009 and 2012. However, although relatively dominant in the 2008 and 2009 speeches the value is largely absent from the 2010 speech and only briefly mentioned in the 2011 speech. In 2012 and 2013, however, the value increases in importance and in 2013 it is, for the first time, more important than economic sustainability. This means that environmental sustainability becomes relatively more important with the context of the coalition.

Other values such as international outlook and solidarity were also dominant in the party programmes but are much more peripheral in the party leader speeches (see table 8-7, p. 133).

Equality is an example of a value which was dominant in the programmes and continues to be so in the party leader speeches although not to quite the same extent. The most dominant value in the 2003
programme, it also played a key role in the 2009 and 2012 programmes. Although not as dominant as in the party programmes, the value is nevertheless still emphasised in the speeches particularly in 2011, 2012 and 2013. Thus, this value – like environmental sustainability – increases in relative importance after government entry.

Examples of peripheral values from the party programmes which become dominant values in the speeches are most notably the values of economic sustainability and the welfare society. As is evident from table 8-7, the value of the welfare society is the most dominant political value in all SPP party leader speeches both before and after coalition government entry. This value played only a peripheral role in the 2003 and 2012 programmes, albeit it was more dominant in the 2009 reform programme.

The value of economic sustainability was hardly present in the party 2003 and 2012 programmes, but – like the welfare society – also played a more dominant role in the 2009 programme. However, this value is the second most dominant value in the 2008, 2009 and 2010 speeches. In the remaining speeches, it is still dominant although not to quite the same degree. Overall, this value becomes less dominant in speeches made within the coalition government.

In sum, the SPP speeches show some changes in political value focus before and after government entry. The welfare society is the dominant value in all party leader speeches. However, economic sustainability is more important before government entry than after, while equality becomes more dominant after government entry. After being omitted in 2010 and 2011, environmental sustainability returns as a central value in 2012 and 2013 – after government entry.

Table 8-7 shows an overview of the political values expressed by the SPP in the party leader speeches:
Regarding the question of whether the party coherence between the party programmes is greater before or after government entry, this is somewhat inconclusive.

Compared to the 2003 programme, the 2008 speech has an overall different value focus although some values are maintained. Values which are emphasised in both genres are the welfare society, environmental sustainability, democracy and equality. The speech places little emphasis on strong state and international outlook which were both central in the 2003 party programme. In contrast, the party leader emphasised economic sustainability which played an insignificant role in the programme.
8.3.4.3. **Value label coherence between the 2009 SPP programme and the 2009, 2010 and 2011 speeches**

In relation to the coherence between the 2009 programme and the 2009-2011 speeches, both genres are dominated by the value of the welfare society which indicates coherence. Economic sustainability and equality are also key values in both genres.

However, the value of environmental sustainability which was highly dominant in the programme is only emphasised in 2009. In 2010 it is hardly present, whereas it is rather peripheral in 2011. Democracy also played a central role in the programme, but is more peripheral in the speeches.

8.3.4.4. **Value label coherence between the 2012 programmes and the 2012 and 2013 speeches**

Overall, the answer to whether there is coherence between the 2012 programme and the 2012 and 2013 speeches is mixed as some values are similar and other are not. The speeches do not emphasise democracy which was the most dominant value in the party programme nor do they focus on international outlook or strong state which were both emphasised in the party programme.

Rather, the focus in the speeches is on the welfare society and to some extent economic sustainability which both played peripheral roles in the party programme.

However, both genres emphasise the values of equality, solidarity and environmental sustainability.

8.3.4.5. **The sub-features of the SPP values**

Taking a look at the specific sub-features of the most central values across the party leader speeches, we see that the party leader communicates many of the same sub-features in the party leader speeches made before and after coalition government entry (see table 8-8 below). Also the party leader communicates largely the same sub-features as the ones in the party programmes although with a few notable exceptions in connection with the values of equality (omission of sub-feature 2B) and democracy (omission of sub-feature 1A).
In connection with the value of welfare society, the sub-features of a full labour market (9E) and a well-functioning welfare system (9A) are emphasised in all party leader speeches. These were also dominant sub-features in all three party programmes although the welfare society as such differed in importance in the three programmes from being the most dominant value in 2009 to being significantly more peripheral in 2012 (see table 8-4, p. 128). The sub-feature of quality of life (9F) is emphasised in the 2009, 2011 and 2012 speeches, but did not play a central part in any of the party programmes.

The value of economic sustainability, which was a peripheral value in the 2003 and 2012 programmes, played a more central role in the 2009 programme and is a dominant value in all party leader speeches. The sub-features of growth (6A) and financial responsibility (6B) are emphasised in all speeches.
whereas creating jobs (6C) is emphasised in all speeches except for 2008. The sub-feature of public/private partnerships (6F) is only highlighted in 2008, while creating good conditions for companies, a key feature of the 2009 programme, only features in the 2010 speech.

Equality is expressed via various sub-features. The most common is equal opportunities (2A) which is emphasised in all speeches save for 2008 and was also a dominant sub-feature of all three party programmes. Equal worth (2D) was emphasised in all party programmes, but is only highlighted in the 2008 and 2012 speeches. The sub-feature of equal distribution of power and means of production (2B) was by far the most dominant sub-feature of equality in the 2003 and 2012 programmes. However, this sub-feature does not appear in any of the party leader speeches which emphasise another and related aspect of equality namely social justice (2F) (see section 8.1.1.1. for an explanation of the difference between the two values). This sub-feature was not emphasised in any of the programmes, but is a dominant sub-feature of equality in the 2009, 2011, 2012 and 2013 speeches.

The value of environmental sustainability is expressed via the sub-features of a healthy world (5A) and creating green solutions (5C). This coheres with the sub-features emphasised in the party programmes although the value as such is not as central in the speeches as it was in the 2009 and 2012 programmes.

Solidarity is primarily expressed through the sub-feature of united people (11A) which is the key sub-feature in all party leader speeches except 2012 where selflessness (11B) is emphasised.

Finally, international outlook is expressed via reference to the sub-features of the nation being party of the global world (13E) which is dominant in the speeches from 2010-2013. The sub-feature of international cooperation (13B) is only emphasised in 2009, while active foreign politics is highlighted in 2011. In all party programmes, 13E was the dominant sub-feature of international outlook.

8.3.4.6. The value focus of SD in party programmes versus speeches

SD also downplays central values of the party programme in its political speeches most notably the values of democracy, freedom and international outlook. All of these are dominant in the party programme (see table 8-5, p. 129), but play much more peripheral roles in the party leader speeches both before and after government entry (see table 8-9, p. 138). Freedom plays a minor role in 2008 and 2009, but it is then largely absent in the remaining speeches. Democracy is only emphasised in the 2010 speech while international outlook is only emphasised in the 2011 speech.
The value of nationalism/patriotism and the sub-feature of protecting the Danish values (15A) is also absent from the SD party leader speeches apart from one example in 2011 (Appendix 20). The value of personal responsibility also plays a relatively minor role in the party leader speeches although it is present in all speeches most notably in 2012 (Appendix 21).

The values of equality and solidarity are dominant values in the party programme and are still present in all party leader speeches, however to varying degrees. Equality is never as dominant as it was in the party programme, nor is solidarity apart from the 2011 speech (Appendix 20).

Examples of political values which are significantly more dominant in the party leader speeches than in the party programmes are welfare society and economic sustainability. Although the welfare society is emphasised in the party programme, it is much less dominant than other values such as equality and democracy (see table 8-5, p. 129). In the speeches, however, the welfare society is the most dominant value in 2008, 2009, 2012 and 2013, and it is also one of the most dominant values in 2010 and 2011. The value of economic sustainability was only a peripheral in the party programme. However, the value is dominant in all the SD party leader speeches both before and after government entry. In the 2010 and 2011 speeches, economic sustainability is the most dominant value most significantly in 2010 (see table 8-9, p.138).

8.3.4.7. Value level coherence between the SD party programme and the speeches

Overall, there are no clear patterns in the development in political value focus in the SD party leader speeches before and after government entry and how this compares to the party programme. The party leader tends to focus on largely the same political values before and after government entry with only relatively minor changes e.g. in connection with the welfare society and economic sustainability. In 2008 and 2009, the welfare state is the most dominant value and again in 2012 and 2013. In 2010 and 2011, the party leader focuses on economic sustainability which remains a highly dominant value in 2012 and 2013. The value of solidarity becomes dominant in 2010 as well as 2011, and is also a key value in the 2012 and 2013 speeches after the party’s entry into government. Enlightenment and development is also present in all speeches but is increasingly important in 2013. Finally, equality is also present in all speeches, albeit to different degrees. Table 8-9 below shows the total distribution of political values in the SD party leader speeches:
Table 8-9: Core political values in SD speeches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011 (after coalition gov.)</th>
<th>2012 (after coalition gov.)</th>
<th>2013 (after coalition gov.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare society</td>
<td>(43%)</td>
<td>Welfare society</td>
<td>Economic sust.</td>
<td>Economic sust.</td>
<td>Welfare society</td>
<td>Welfare society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic sust.</td>
<td>(28%)</td>
<td>Economic sust.</td>
<td>Solidarity/unity</td>
<td>Solidarity/unity</td>
<td>Economic sust.</td>
<td>Economic sust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>(12%)</td>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>Welfare society</td>
<td>Welfare society</td>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>E and D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental sust.</td>
<td>(11%)</td>
<td>E and D</td>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>E and D</td>
<td>Solidarity/unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong state</td>
<td>(9%)</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>E and D</td>
<td>Int'l outlook</td>
<td>Solidarity/unity</td>
<td>Justice/law and order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E and D</td>
<td>(9%)</td>
<td>Solidarity/unity</td>
<td>E and D</td>
<td>E and D</td>
<td>Personal resp.</td>
<td>Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity/unity</td>
<td>(8%)</td>
<td>Environmental sust.</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>(6%)</td>
<td>Strong state</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.3.4.8. The sub-features of the SD values

If we zoom in on the most dominant political values across the SD speeches and the sub-features applied to express the values, we see that the party leader also communicates many of the same sub-features before and after government entry.

In relation to welfare society which is one of the most dominant values of the speeches (see table 8-9), the most commonly expressed sub-features are a full and well-functioning labour market (9E) and a well-functioning welfare system (9A). Both of these sub-features are emphasised in all party leader speeches (see table 8-10, p. 140) which corresponds well with the party programme which also focused on these specific sub-features. Quality of life (9F) was another dominant sub-feature in the party programme and one which is emphasised in the 2008, 2009 and 2012 speech. Prioritising the weakest groups (9B) is also highlighted in half the party leader speeches namely in 2008, 2011 and 2012.
Economic sustainability, a peripheral value in the party programme, is one of the most dominant values of the party leader speeches. In all speeches, the sub-features emphasised are growth (6A) and financial responsibility (6B). The other sub-features are not as dominant throughout the speeches e.g. creating jobs (6C) is only emphasised in 2010, 2011 and 2012, while 6D (good conditions for companies) is only highlighted in 2010, 2011 and 2013 i.e. mainly after government entry.

Equality was the most dominant value in the party programme and also features in all the party leader speeches although to varying degrees (see table 8-9, p. 138). The sub-features used to express this value are primarily equal opportunities (2A) which is emphasised in all speeches; equal worth (2D) which is highlighted in all speeches except 2009 and 2013; and social justice (2F) which is emphasised in all speeches except 2011 and 2012. In the party programme, the most dominant sub-features of equality in were equal opportunities (2A) (by far) and equal worth (2D).

Solidarity/unity was another core value in the party programme, and one which also features in all the party leader speeches. Here, the sub-feature used to express the values is primarily united people (11A) which is emphasised in all the speeches. Selflessness (11B) is emphasised in all speeches except for 2011 and 2013. These two sub-features were also the most important ones in the party programme.

The final core value of the speeches, namely enlightenment and development was not one of the most central values in the party programme, however, it is emphasised in all party leader speeches except for 2011. The sub-feature focus is on education, research and development (18B) in all speeches, while the school system (18A) is emphasised in 2009, 2012, and 2013. Table 8-10 below shows the core political values and sub-features of the SD party leader speeches:
### Core political values and sub-features in the SD speeches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Welfare society</strong></td>
<td>9A (Welfare system)</td>
<td>9E (Labour market)</td>
<td>9F (Quality of life)</td>
<td>9A (Welfare system)</td>
<td>9E (Labour market)</td>
<td>9B (Weakest groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9B (Weakest groups)</td>
<td>9E (Labour market)</td>
<td>9A (Welfare system)</td>
<td>9B (Weakest groups)</td>
<td>9A (Welfare system)</td>
<td>9F (Quality of life)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic sustainability</strong></td>
<td>6B (Financial respons.)</td>
<td>6A (Growth)</td>
<td>6A (Growth)</td>
<td>6B (Financial resp.)</td>
<td>6A (Growth)</td>
<td>6B (Financial respons.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6B (Financial respons.)</td>
<td>(6D, 6F, 6C, 6E)</td>
<td>(6D, 6F, 6C)</td>
<td>(6C (Creating jobs), (6E)</td>
<td>(6B (Financial respons.)</td>
<td>(6A (Growth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equality</strong></td>
<td>2A (Equal opp.)</td>
<td>2D (Equal worth)</td>
<td>2F (Social justice)</td>
<td>2D (Equal worth)</td>
<td>2A (Equal opportunities)</td>
<td>2A (Equal opp.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2F (Social justice)</td>
<td>2A (Equal opp.)</td>
<td>2C (Rich/poor)</td>
<td>2A (Equal opp.)</td>
<td>2D (Equal worth)</td>
<td>2F (Social justice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2C (Rich/poor)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2E, 2C)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Solidarity</strong></td>
<td>11A (United people)</td>
<td>11A (United people)</td>
<td>11A (United people)</td>
<td>11B (Selflessness)</td>
<td>11B (Selflessness)</td>
<td>11A (United people)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11B (Selflessness)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>E and D</strong></td>
<td>18B (Education, R&amp;D)</td>
<td>18B (Education, R&amp;D)</td>
<td>18B (Education, R&amp;D)</td>
<td>18B (Education, R&amp;D)</td>
<td>18B (Education, R&amp;D)</td>
<td>18B (Education, R&amp;D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18A (School system)</td>
<td>(18A)</td>
<td>(18A)</td>
<td>(18A)</td>
<td>(18A)</td>
<td>(18A)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 8-10: Core political values and sub-features in the SD speeches**

#### 8.3.4.9. The value focus of SLP in party programmes versus speeches

For SLP, the most dominant value in the party programme was by far democracy followed by environmental sustainability (see table 8-6, p. 130). However, both values are played down significantly in the party leader speeches both before and after government entry and are never the most dominant values.

Democracy only plays a dominant role in the 2011 speech, but it is largely omitted in 2012 while the rest of the SLP party leader speeches contain references to democracy to rather varying degrees.

Environmental sustainability is also represented in the speeches to varying degrees despite its central role in the party programme. In the 2008 and 2013 speeches, environmental sustainability is hardly mentioned, while the value plays a somewhat peripheral role in the remaining speeches.
Another key value in the SLP party programme is international outlook. This is emphasised in the 2008, 2010 and 2011 speeches, but plays a minor role in the 2009 speech and is largely omitted from the 2012 speech after government entry. However it returns as a core value in 2013. Freedom also played a central role in the party programme, but is also largely omitted from the party leader speeches apart from the 2011 speech.

The value of economic sustainability played an important role in the party programme, and it is emphasised even more in most of the party leader speeches apart from 2011 and 2013.

The welfare society and enlightenment and development are examples of values which are more dominant in the party leader speeches than in the party programme. The welfare society is the most dominant value in the 2008, 2012 and 2013 speeches and also plays a dominant role in the three remaining speeches. Thus, this value becomes more dominant within the coalition government. Enlightenment and development plays a role in all the party leader speeches apart from 2008 and is the second most dominant value in 2013. Table 8-11 below shows the total distribution of political values in the SLP party leader speeches:
Table 8-11: Core political values of the SLP speeches

8.3.4.10. Value label coherence between the SLP party programme and speeches

Whether or not the SLP party programme and the speeches are more coherent before or after government entry is difficult to answer. Summing up the party’s value focus before and after government entry, SLP attaches more importance to the values of the welfare society, E and D and personal responsibility after government entry. In contrast, the value of international outlook becomes less dominant in the 2012 speech but returns in 2013 within the coalition government while economic sustainability remains a dominant value in 2012 but is significantly less in focus in the 2013 speech.
8.3.4.11. The sub-features of the SLP values

If we take a closer look at the sub-features communicated by the SLP party leader we see that she refers to many of the same sub-features when expressing the key political values in her speeches both before and after government entry. Table 8-12 below shows a summary of the main political values expressed throughout the speeches as well as the main sub-features used to express the values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core political values and sub-features of the SLP party leader speeches</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Welfare society</strong></td>
<td>9E (Labour market)</td>
<td>9D (Needs of citizens)</td>
<td>9A (Welfare system)</td>
<td>9A (Welfare state)</td>
<td>9E (Labour market)</td>
<td>9A (Welfare system)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9B (Weakest groups)</td>
<td>9A (Welfare system)</td>
<td>9D (Needs of citizens)</td>
<td>9E (Labour market)</td>
<td>9E (Labour market)</td>
<td>9E (Labour market)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 (Generic)</td>
<td>9E (Labour market)</td>
<td>9A (Welfare state)</td>
<td>9E (Labour market)</td>
<td>9E (Labour market)</td>
<td>9E (Labour market)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic sustainability</strong></td>
<td>6A (Growth)</td>
<td>6B (Financial respons.)</td>
<td>6B (Financial respons.)</td>
<td>6A (Growth)</td>
<td>6A (Growth)</td>
<td>6A (Growth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6C (Creating jobs)</td>
<td>6A (Growth)</td>
<td>6E (Efficiency)</td>
<td>6A (Growth)</td>
<td>6C (Creating jobs)</td>
<td>6B (Financial respons.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6B (Financial respons.)</td>
<td>6A (Growth)</td>
<td>6E (Efficiency)</td>
<td>6A (Growth)</td>
<td>6C (Creating jobs)</td>
<td>6B (Financial respons.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equality</strong></td>
<td>2A (Equal opp.)</td>
<td>2E (Openness/trust)</td>
<td>2E (Openness/trust)</td>
<td>2A (Equal opp.)</td>
<td>2A (Equal opp.)</td>
<td>2A (Equal opp.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2D (Equal worth)</td>
<td>2D (Equal worth)</td>
<td>2D (Equal worth)</td>
<td>2C (Rich/poor)</td>
<td>2C (Rich/poor)</td>
<td>2A (Equal opp.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy</strong></td>
<td>1E (Transparency)</td>
<td>1B (Active citizens)</td>
<td>1E (Transparency)</td>
<td>1 (Generic)</td>
<td>1B (Active citizens)</td>
<td>11B (Selflessness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1B (Active citizens)</td>
<td>1C (Direct democracy)</td>
<td>1B (Active citizens)</td>
<td>1 (Generic)</td>
<td>1B (Active citizens)</td>
<td>11B (Selflessness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Solidarity</strong></td>
<td>11A (United people)</td>
<td>11C (Int’l solidarity)</td>
<td>11A (United people)</td>
<td>11A (United people)</td>
<td>11A (United people)</td>
<td>11B (Selflessness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11C (Int’l solidarity)</td>
<td>11B (Selflessness)</td>
<td>11C (Int’l solidarity)</td>
<td>11A (United people)</td>
<td>11B (Selflessness)</td>
<td>11C (Int’l solidarity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International outlook</strong></td>
<td>13A (pro-transn. fed’s)</td>
<td>13E (Part of global world)</td>
<td>13E (Part of global world)</td>
<td>13E (Part of global world)</td>
<td>13E (Part of global world)</td>
<td>13E (Part of global world)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13C (Active foreign pol.)</td>
<td>13E (Part of global world)</td>
<td>13E (Part of global world)</td>
<td>13E (Part of global world)</td>
<td>13E (Part of global world)</td>
<td>13E (Part of global world)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13C (Active foreign pol.)</td>
<td>13E (Part of global world)</td>
<td>13E (Part of global world)</td>
<td>13E (Part of global world)</td>
<td>13E (Part of global world)</td>
<td>13E (Part of global world)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8-12: Key political values and sub-features of the SLP party leader speeches

From table 8-12, it is evident that e.g. in the case of the welfare society, the party leader focuses on the labour market (9E) in all speeches but one (2011). This is in contrast to the party programme, where this particular feature did not feature to any great extent. The other sub-features of welfare society are dominant to varying degrees throughout the speeches.
In the case of economic sustainability, growth (6A) and financial responsibility (6B) are recurring sub-features again with the exception of the 2011 speech where financial responsibility is not a key sub-feature. In the party programme, the focus was on the sub-feature of growth (6A).

The value of equality is expressed mainly via the sub-features of equal opportunities (2A), equal worth (2D) and openness and trust (2E). These are the same key sub-features as in the party programme. However, no sub-feature is dominant in all speeches and **neither 2D nor 2E feature to any great extent in speeches following the formation of the coalition.** Here, 2A (2012 and 2013) and 2C (2012) are dominant sub-features.

The value of democracy, which was the most dominant value in the party programme, is present in all party leader speeches save for the 2012 speech and to rather varying degrees (see table 8-11, p. 142). In most speeches, the focus is on the sub-feature of active citizens (1B) (2008, 2009, 2010 and 2013). This sub-feature was also dominant in the party programme along with transparency in political decision-making (1E) and informed citizens (1D). The former is also dominant in the 2008, 2010 and 2012 speeches, whereas **1D is not present in any of the speeches.** In contrast, the sub-feature of direct democracy (1C) is dominant in the 2009 speech.

The value of solidarity is also present in all party leader speeches, but to varying degrees (see table 8-11). In the party programme, the key sub-features were united people (11A) and international solidarity (11C) whereas selflessness (11B) played a more minor role. In the speeches, however, 11B is a dominant sub-feature in 2009, 2011 and 2013. The sub-feature of 11C is emphasised in connection with solidarity in all speeches made before the coalition government formation, whereas **it is not dominant in the 2012 or 2013 speeches.** 11A is dominant in 2008, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The value of international outlook was also a dominant value in the party programme, however it is less dominant in the speeches (see table 8-11). Although it is present in all speeches save for 2012, it is emphasised to rather varying degrees. The sub-features used to express the value also differ across the speeches. In the party programme, the most dominant sub-features were international cooperation (13B) and pro-transnational federations (13A). However, these two sub-features are not as dominant in the speeches as 13A is only emphasised in the 2008 speech and 13B only in 2011. The sub-feature of active foreign politics (13C) is emphasised in two speeches namely 2008 and 2011 although it was not emphasised in the party programme. In most speeches, the primary sub-feature of international outlook
is the nation as part of the global world (13E) which is present in the 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2013 speeches.

8.1. Summary of findings for content

In the following, I will briefly sum up the findings of the analysis for political value content in order to answer RQ1 and RQ2.

**RQ1) Is there a change in the political value focus in party leader speeches made before and after coalition government entry?**

On an overall level, the differences between the political values emphasised before and after government entry are not as significant as expected. Most key values and sub-features of the party leader speeches are emphasised both before and after government entry e.g. the welfare society (sub-features 9A and 9E), equality (sub-features (2A, 2D and 2F) and economic sustainability (sub-features 6A and 6B). However, there are some slight changes in value focus after coalition government entry:

- For SPP, environmental sustainability, one of the core values from the party programmes, becomes more important in speeches made within the coalition government. Equality is also slightly more emphasised after coalition government entry, while economic sustainability becomes slightly less important in 2012 and 2013.

- For SD, enlightenment and development becomes more important within the coalition government otherwise the party expresses more or less the same values before and after government entry.

- For SLP, the welfare society, personal responsibility and enlightenment and development become more important after government entry. In contrast, international outlook becomes less dominant in 2012 after government entry as does economic sustainability in 2013. On sub-feature level, the sub-feature of 2E, which is a key part of the party’s ideological identity, is not expressed to any great extent after coalition government entry.

- For all parties, the core value of economic sustainability becomes slightly less dominant in speeches given after the party’s entry into the coalition government (with the exception of the 2011 SD speech) (see table 8-7 (p. 133), table 8-9 (p. 138) and table 8-11 (p. 142).
RQ2) **Is the coherence between the political values in party programmes and party leader speeches greater before coalition government entry than after?**

On an overall level, however, there are significant differences as to the political value content communicated in the party programmes and in the party leader speeches. This may in a large part be due to the differences in genre as the party programme represents the party’s overall idea of the good life and ideal society while party leader speech reflects the actual political reality in which the parties operate (see Finlayson and Martin, 2008).

In the party programmes, we see how parties express their overall goals for society and often incorporate all of the party’s core values into describing an ideal world or good life (Stoker, 2006):

*All people must therefore have the freedom and the opportunity to realise the life they want while respecting the freedom of others, society and nature. SPP fights oppression and inequality based in economy, education, religion, culture, gender, sexuality or handicap. Everyone must be ensured equal rights and opportunities. (SPP, 2012)*

A clear difference between the idealism of the programmes and the reality of political life reflected in the speeches is seen in the examples below. The first quote is taken from the SD party programme while the second quote is taken from the 2013 SD party leader speech. They both concern the value of the welfare society:

*Our welfare is built on everyone having access to basic rights just by being a citizen in society. We wish to maintain this principle of the basic welfare offerings such as free and equal access to schools, education and healthcare. These are such vital welfare offerings that we do not want money to be a deciding factor. But if we do not re-prioritise for the benefit of the weakest groups the consequence will be that those who are most in need of help will be the losers in the struggle for resources (SD, Appendix 5, pp. 7-8)*

*But welfare demands that we have the money for it. (...) That’s why we have made a plan for the Danish economy which goes beyond simply the next year. Yes, it actually goes as far as 2020. Our plan ensures that in the next years to come we have the possibility for 9,000 more employees in the public sector. That we can afford to spend 22 billion DKK more than we do today. Money which we’ll spend on*
education. *On taking care of the elderly. And on maintaining the free and equal access to healthcare* (SD 2013, Appendix 22, p. 11)

In the first quote, we see SD’s ideal version of the welfare society – a society in which we all have access to basic social welfare such as free education, health service etc. Although the party recognises that we may need to rethink how we distribute the resources in society, there is no clear indication of how this should be done. However, in the last quote taken from the 2013 SD party leader speech, the party leader offers a concrete suggestion as to how the party will ensure the welfare society. Here, a well-functioning welfare system is combined with the value of economic sustainability more specifically financial responsibility (6B) which is a reflection of how politics is real life is often based on what’s possible and not on what is ideal (e.g. Stoker, 2006).

However, the overall answer to RQ2 is inconclusive as there are no clear patterns as to whether the coherence between the two genres is greater before or after government entry. Some values are slightly more emphasised in speeches made after government entry, while others become less dominant.

In the case of SD, there are no significant differences as to the value focus before and after government entry – only enlightenment and development becomes more important after government entry – and thus the coherence between the party programme and the speeches remains largely unchanged. Some of the party’s central values in the party programme (e.g. international outlook, democracy and freedom) are peripheral values in almost all speeches both before and after government entry.

For SLP, the answer is also inconclusive. Although the party’s value focus changes after government entry it does so with the omission of some central values from the party programmes and the re-introduction of others meaning that the coherences between the two genres simply shifts from certain values to others. First of all, the party leader largely omits the values of international outlook (2012) and environmental sustainability (2013) in speeches made after coalition government entry. However, in these speeches she also re-introduces the value of personal responsibility which was largely absent from the speeches made before the coalition government and places more emphasis of enlightenment and development, which was also a central value in the party programme.

In the case of SPP, it is also difficult to provide a clear answer to RQ3, as the party had has three different party programmes within this period. Overall, all the SPP party leader speeches communicate
similar values (e.g. welfare society, economic sustainability and equality) to the 2009 reform programme while leaving out central values and sub-features from the 2003 and 2012 programmes (e.g. strong state, freedom). This means that the 2009 reform programme is the one which is most reflected in the party leader speeches made within the period of the programme (2009, 2010, 2011) although these speeches also downplays certain values of the programme such as environmental sustainability (see table 8-7, p. 133).

As the only one of the three programmes, the 2009 programme does not include references to the sub-feature of 2B, which dominated the 2003 and 2012 programmes but was completely omitted in all party leader speeches. The value of strong state was present in the 2009 and 2010 speeches, which cohered well with the 2003 programme and the 2009 programmes; however this value is largely omitted from the speeches made within the coalition government which means that it does not cohere with the 2012 programme which emphasised this value. The 2012 programme also downplays the values of the welfare society and economic sustainability focusing on values such as democracy, solidarity and equality instead (see table 8-4, p. 128). Thus, the 2012 and 2013 speeches only partly reflect the values of the 2012 programme as the speeches emphasise the welfare society, equality, and environmental sustainability (core values of the 2012 programme) but make no reference to sub-feature 2B, and only very few references to other core values of the programme namely democracy, strong state or freedom.
9. Exploring for form of expression

Having established what political values the parties communicate in their party programmes and in party leader conference speeches made before and after government entry, the next step is to explore how the party leaders express and strategically apply the political values in speeches made before and after government entry. The two research questions explored in this part of the analysis were:

RQ3) Is there a change in the rhetorical focus of party leaders when they express the party’s political values in speeches made before and after coalition government entry?

RQ4) Is there a change in the strategic use of descriptive value statements about the party and explicit references to the party’s political values in speeches made before and after coalition government entry?

9.1. The Political Value Expression Framework

To be able to systematically identify the rhetorical strategies applied by party leaders when expressing the party’s political values in their speeches, I developed my second analytical tool namely the Political Values Communication Framework (table 9-1, p. 150). This framework was developed on the basis of my empirical observations when coding the party leader speeches for content (see figure 6-4, p. 90).

In this process, I noted that party leaders employ a rather consistent set of rhetorical strategies when communicating their political values: via reference to the goals, explicit values or actions of the organisation; via descriptive statements about the party; via evaluative statements about the state of the world/societal factors; or via references to the shortcomings of their opponents. These rhetorical strategies largely cohere with Bednarek’s (2010) evaluative parameters of emotivity and necessity as well as Thompson and Hunston’s (2000) goal-oriented sentences as well as the positive self-representation and negative other-presentation of van Dijk’s (2006) ideological square. The developed framework is thus inspired by these theories while being based on my empirical findings.

Overall, the rhetorical strategies applied by the party leaders fall under three overall rhetorical foci when are then further sub-divided as seen in the Value Expression Framework (table 9-1) below.
### Political Value Expression Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political values expressed via</th>
<th>Party and/or government identity (past, present or future)</th>
<th>Party and/or government actions</th>
<th>Party leader (present or past)</th>
<th>Society/the state of the world</th>
<th>External competitor focus (other representation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal organisational focus (self-representation)</strong></td>
<td>Explicitly expressed core values (incl. the term “values”): e.g. “our values are freedom and equality”</td>
<td>Description of the organisation: e.g. “We are Denmark’s green party”</td>
<td>Goals, aims, beliefs and priorities: e.g. “We work towards freedom”, “we believe in a world of peace”, “we want to ensure that…” etc. (goal-oriented-sentences)</td>
<td><strong>Evaluation of society/state of the world (how things are)</strong> (Positive and negative emotivity)</td>
<td>Goals, aims, beliefs and priorities: “Venstre believes that if we just…”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External societal focus (evaluation)</strong></td>
<td>Party and/or government identity (past, present or future)</td>
<td>Past actions</td>
<td>Actions (Past, present, and future)</td>
<td>Necessary steps on societal level (how things should be) (Necessity)</td>
<td><strong>Specific actions (past, present, future)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External competitor focus (other representation)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Goals, aims, beliefs and priorities:</strong> “Venstre believes that if we just…”</td>
<td>Specific actions (past, present, future)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Lack of actions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political opponents</strong></td>
<td>Values, actions and personal anecdotes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Table 9-1: The Political Value Expression Framework |

#### 9.1.1. Overlap between the foci

Most often, the strategies can be coded under one category. However, at times the different rhetorical foci overlap and a specific sentence or paragraph will belong to more than one rhetorical focus. In practice, this affects the percentages when quantifying the findings for form (see section 6.5). The
following examples are taken from different speeches in the data set which best serve to illustrate the specific types of overlaps.

9.1.1.1. *Overlap between internal and external foci*

Often the party leader refers to the state of the world and combines it with the party’s goals and ambitions:

*But for the last five years, the right-wing has controlled Europe. It has created the financial crisis, increasing unemployment and a growing climate threat. We want to turn this development around.* (SPP 2009, Appendix 12, p. 12)

Other examples show how a reference to what needs to be done on a societal level is coupled with a description of the party:

*We know that a democratic regulation of the market is necessary if we want to avoid capitalism running amok. That’s why we are socialists.* (SPP 2009, Appendix 12, p. 3)

9.1.1.2. *Overlap between the internal categories*

At times, some sentences may belong to more than one category within the same overall focus. For example, a party’s goals and aspirations may be expressed through a description of the party:

*But SPP is still, in terms of attitudes, the Danish party which desperately wants social justice, a strong welfare and which has ambitions for the climate and the environment which extends far into the future for the benefit of the generations to come.* (SPP 2013, Appendix 16, p. 2)

Also, there are examples of goals and aspirations combined with values:

*A hope of a new start for Denmark where values such as responsibility, social security and unity are the founding elements.* (SPP 2009, Appendix 12, p. 5)

Goals and aspirations may also overlap with specific actions:

*We will use our strength for an ambitious effort for the climate – with a transition to sustainable energy and better public transport.* (SPP 2009, Appendix 12, p. 14)
9.1.1.3. Overlap between the external societal types of foci

Often we see how descriptive statements of society lead to a focus on what society needs to do. This supports Bednarek’s (2010) argument that emotivity and necessity are often highly intertwined which is evident in the following examples (necessity marked in bold):

*We have witnessed the brutal poisoned gas killings of men and women, young and old by the Syrian regime. The international community had to act. Because history has taught us that letting injustice and darkness take roots comes at a price. And that we cannot look away when a regime murders its own population.* (SD 2013, Appendix 22, p. 2)

9.2. An exemplary analysis of the form of expression in party leader speeches

The following section provides an exemplary analysis of the 2010 SD party leader speech. This analysis serves to show how I reached the findings of the party leaders’ use of rhetorical strategies via the Political Value Expression Framework and also elaborates on the different strategies applied. Thereby the section also serves to explain the framework in greater detail. In cases where analysed speech does not contain examples of specific strategies, I will use examples from other speeches.

9.2.1. An internal organisational focus

When the party leader refers to political values via an internal organisational focus he or she refers to either the party/government identity; the party or government’s actions, or to him or herself as a representative of the party. These main strategies can be further divided into more specific rhetorical strategies which are explained and exemplified in the following.

9.2.1.1. Party/government identity

Referring to the party or government identity can be done via either explicit references to the party’s values, defining or descriptive statements about the party or goal-oriented statements.

**Explicit references to values**

The most explicit expressions of the party’s or coalition government’s political values include the specific term “values” coupled with the party name or personal pronouns (e.g. our) sometimes followed by a description of the values:
A Social Democrat is someone who supports our values of prosperity and justice for ordinary people. Who supports our value that rights and duties go hand in hand (SD 2010, Appendix 19, p. 16)

In this quote, the party leader refers to the personal pronoun “our” and adds the term “values” followed by a description of the values. Thus, she explicitly links the values of equality (“social justice”, “ordinary people”) as well as personal responsibility (“duties”) and welfare society (“prosperity and rights”) to the party.

Defining/descriptive statements about the party

The party leader also expresses the party’s or coalition government’s political values by providing defining or descriptive statements about the party. These statements do not include the term values, but the party name or personal pronoun followed description or definition of the party:

The first and biggest task for a new S-led government is without a doubt to get Danish economy back on track. We have done it before. And it is a task we are proud to take on. Because if not us who then?

There is no Danish party which is more aware of the need for a strong and healthy economy (SD 2010, Appendix 19, p. 2)

In this quote, the party leader defines the party as dedicated to ensuring economic growth and prosperity (sub-feature 6A) through reference to the party’s awareness of the need for a “strong and healthy economy”. She also differentiates the party from others by stating that no other Danish party is as aware of this as SD.

Goal-oriented sentences

The party leader also refers to the party’s or coalition government’s political values via reference to its goals, opinions or specific priorities. Semantic markers are goal-oriented verbs as well as the personal pronoun “we” as referring to the party, or the party name or reference to the coalition government:

We not only want the best hospitals and treatment in the world. We also want a completely free and equal access to health. We want safety in the streets and children out of prison. We want a well-balanced Denmark where we put an end to the ghettos and where each part of the country is just as important. (SD 2010, Appendix 19, pp. 1-2)
This quote shows SD as a party working to achieve several values through the use of verbs indicating goals e.g. “want”. First of all, the party is working towards the welfare society with a focus on health, hospitals and treatment - a well-functioning welfare system (sub-feature 9A). Equality is also emphasised via “free and equal access” (sub-feature 2A concerning equal opportunities), while justice/law and order is expressed in the statement “children out of prison” reflecting sub-feature 17C (protecting the human/legal rights of citizens). Finally, the value of solidarity/unity and the sub-feature of 11A (a united country) is expressed by the reference to a well-balanced country, the eradication of ghettos dividing the population, and in the idea that all parts of the country must carry equal weight.

Other sentences express the values and goals of the party through other semantic markers such as “we are ready to prioritise”, “we believe in” or “we will safeguard”.

Together with the regions we will safeguard the jewel of the welfare society: the free and equal access to healthcare. (SD 2010, Appendix 19, p. 9)

In this quote we see how the party leader by using the verb “safeguard” emphasises that the welfare society is a value for which the party is ready to fight. More specifically, safeguarding the healthcare system (9A) is a goal for the party.

9.2.1.2. Actions of the party

The party leaders also express their political values through references to specific political actions either past, present or future. Here the party or government is often rhetorically linked to the action by the use of personal pronouns (we, the government, and the party name):

It is ambitious. But it is doable. That is, if we pay for it. That’s why we want to increase the levy on a packet of cigarettes by 10 kroner. And every penny will go towards ensuring the best cancer treatment in the world. (SD 2010, Appendix 19, p. 10)

In this quote, the political values expressed are strong state and the sub-feature of exercising control (7A). The party leader expresses the value through reference to a future action namely the intention of increasing the levies on specific products. The quote also reflects the value of welfare and sub-feature 9A (“a well-functioning welfare system”) through references to ensuring the “best cancer treatment in the world”.

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9.2.1.3. The party leader

At times, the party leader will refer to his or her own political values and in this way transfer these values to the party:

*I think we need to dismiss the old-fashioned image of Danish politics; that Danish politics is divided between the left and the workers’ movement on one side, and the right and the business community on the other. That the state and the market are each other’s opposites.* (SD 2010, Appendix 19, p. 12)

In this quote, the party leader offers her own opinion of how to ensure economic sustainability namely through private public partnerships (sub-feature 6F).

In other cases, the party leader refers to his or hers own personal history and values thereby equating these values to the values of the party:

*I became a Social Democrat because our values are the same which I experienced at the dinner table in my home in Ishøj. None of my parents would dream of voting for our party, but they filled me with dreams which I’ll share with you today. That is a respect for the diversity of each of us, and a deep belief that all people have the potential for greatness. In my home, nothing was impossible for me or my siblings. And in our party, nothing is impossible for the individual.* (SD 2010, Appendix 19, p. 17)

In this case, the party leader explicitly refers to the notion of values (and thus this quote overlaps with the explicit expression of values), but in other cases the values are expressed more implicitly as in the example below:

*I am standing here today, because I realised 30 years ago that some people are discriminated because of their gender and skin colour. Because I experienced a right-wing government of the 80s which didn’t care about the young and unemployed and which failed to take care of people.* (SD 2010, Appendix 19, p. 16-17)

Here, the party leader refers to the value of equality through the term “discrimination” which refers to a lack of equal worth (sub-feature 2D). The value of the welfare society (or a lack thereof) is expressed by reference to the “unemployed “reflecting the lack of a full labour market (9E) and the “young and unemployed” which connotes a weak group in society the government should have taken care of (sub-
By referring to these two values as key reasons for joining the Social Democrats, the party leader thereby transfers her own values to those of the party.

9.2.2. External societal focus (evaluative statements)

The second main rhetorical strategy applied by party leaders in their party leader conference speeches is expressing the party’s political values via an external societal focus. This either includes descriptive statements of the state of the world through evaluative parameter of emotivity; statements concerning what needs to be done on societal level through the evaluative parameter of necessity (see Bednarek, 2010), or through the inclusion of real-life anecdotes. These types of evaluative statements often express political values more implicitly than statements with an internal organisational focus.

9.2.2.1. Descriptive statements about society

Political values may be expressed via descriptive statements about the state of the world. Here, the party leader refers to political values through the parameter of emotivity and how positive or negative something appears. In order to identify the political values in these descriptive statements, we need to look for semantic markers in the text which may indicate negativity or positivity e.g. via a choice of words. Declarative verbs expressing such as “is” serves to express the descriptive statements as facts although they are simply a reflection of the party’s value system (Bednarek, 2010; Hamilton, 1987)

Sentences describing the state of the world are expressed either via reference to the past (how things were), the present (how things are) or the future (how things could be). The examples below illustrate the different temporal foci and the negative or positive markers (marked in bold):

*The economic upswing before the financial crisis became a sedative. The government took the credit for the progress. But the reality was that the progress was based on a bubble of overspending financed by loans. It was the layers of fat and not the muscle mass which grew in the first decade of the 21st century.* (SD 2010, Appendix 19, p. 12) (The past) (negative evaluation)

*Economic growth has been replaced by recession. The time ahead demands hard work, difficult solutions and shared deprivation.* (SD 2010, Appendix 19, p. 3) (The present and the future)

*In two years, Denmark has lost almost 200,000 work places. This means that every tenth job in the private sector has disappeared. The long-term unemployment has tripled. The same goes for the number*
of foreclosures. The number of families which are evicted has increased by 30 per cent. Before the crisis, 200 companies went bankrupt each month. Now it is 600. (SD 2010, Appendix 19, p. 3) (The present)

When the personal pronoun “we” is applied it does not refer to the party itself, but rather to people as a group (e.g. Danes). This is evident in the quote below:

But when the economy is back on track, we face a new shared challenge (the future). The work force is getting older and older (the present). There are less people to pay for welfare (the present). We have heard about the so-called demographic challenge as long as we remember (the past). (SD 2010, Appendix 19, p. 6)

9.2.2.2. Statements expressing societal need

The party leader also expresses the party’s political values by implicitly referring to what needs to be done on a societal level. Expressing values via evaluations of necessity entails the use of “modal verbs, nouns, adjectives, or adverbs and other linguistic items as expressing the writer’s evaluation of what is (not) necessary.” (Bednarek, 2010: 25). Statements of necessity often include the personal pronoun “we”, but this refers to society and not the party or government. Also, the pronoun Danes or the Danes (“danskerne”) is frequently used in these types of statements.

But we cannot do it alone. We must help each other. Denmark is a small country which is strongest when we cooperate. When we create a unity where everybody feels obliged to contribute and feels a sense of responsibility. (SD 2010, Appendix 19, p. 6)

In this example, the modal verb “must” indicates that the party leader argues that there is a need for people to stand together.

9.2.2.3. Real-life anecdotes

At times, the party leader expresses the party’s political values through references to real-life stories. By referring to real-life people and events, the party leader attempts to offer proof for his or her claims and the political values promoted.

There are no examples of real-life anecdotes in the 2010 SD speech so to illustrate the strategy, I have included an example from the 2013 SD speech:
Monday, I went to Horsens. Here the local businesses, education institutions, job centres and unemployment benefit funds are all gathered under one roof. This way, it is possible to match the unemployed with the most suited job or type of education. It sounds simple and straightforward. And it works. Hundreds of jobs in less than a year. (SD 2013, Appendix 22, p. 8)

Here, the party leader uses a real-life anecdote to express the value of economic sustainability via a specific reference to the sub-feature of public/private partnerships (6F).

9.2.3. External competitor focus

The final main rhetorical strategy applied by party leaders is the external competitor focus. Here, the party leaders make implicit references to their own political values by referring to their political opponents. This is most often done with reference to the actions – or lack of actions – of the political opponents, but also at times by referring to the values of the opponent parties or specific politicians.

9.2.3.1. Actions/lack of actions

Often the party leader will express their own political values by emphasising the actions of the opposition:

*But no one can deny that if it hadn’t been for the unfinanced VKO-tax cuts of 2003 and 2007, the balance in the budget would be different. Without the tax cuts the councils wouldn’t be facing huge spending cuts. School teachers, daycare workers, nurses and health care workers could have kept their jobs.* (SD 2010, Appendix 19, p. 3)

In this quote, the party leader emphasises the unfinanced tax cuts of the incumbent government. By doing so, she promotes the values of economic sustainability, strong state and welfare. However, just as often the party leader refers to a lack of action in the opposition:

*And what is the government’s plan for creating new prosperity? It seems like a bad joke: But no, the only plan the government has presented is even more tax cuts for the banks and the big corporations.* (SD 2010, Appendix 19, p. 4)

In the example above, the party leader refers implicitly to the value of financial responsibility by emphasising the lack of financial responsibility in the incumbent government which simply failed to act.
9.2.3.2. The values of the opposition

At times the party leaders emphasise their own party values by referring to the values of the opposition. This is done through implicit rather than explicit references to values. The below example is taken from Appendix 25.

*We have a vice-Prime Minister who in all honesty believes that Islamism is a greater threat to our democracy that the economic crisis and the world’s climate changes.* (SLP 2010, Appendix 25, p.10)

Here, the party leader refers to the value of nationalism/patriotism (sub-feature 15A of protecting Danish values) and juxtaposes this to the values of democracy, economic and environmental sustainability which to her are values far more important.

9.3. Presentation of findings in the analysis for form of expression

Overall, the analysis for form of expression shows that the party leaders’ overall rhetorical focus when expressing their political values changes when parties enter into a coalition government.

In all party leader speeches given before the parties’ entry into the coalition government, the party leaders mainly express their political values via an external focus (see tables 9-2, 9-3 and 9-4 below). However, after the parties’ coalition government entry, the external focus decreases significantly and the party leaders mainly express their political values through an internal organisational focus.

This change is most significant in the case of SLP which had a particularly strong external focus in speeches given before the party’s entry into the coalition and whose internal focus increases the most (see table 9-4). However, SPP also changes its rhetorical focus in the speeches, but mainly due to the decreased focus on external factors which means that the internal organisational focus becomes relatively more important although it only increases slightly (see table 9-2).

Compared to SLP and SD, the findings for the SD party leader speeches are less conclusive as the focus of the SD party leader is internal and external in the 2011 speech, internal in the 2012 speech and external in the 2013 speech (see table 9-3).
### Table 9-2: The rhetorical focus of the SPP party leader speeches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>External focus (49%)</td>
<td>External focus (49%)</td>
<td>External focus (60%)</td>
<td>Internal org. focus (45%)</td>
<td>Internal org. focus (47%)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(Societal focus (49%))</td>
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<td>(Competitor focus (8%))</td>
<td>(Competitor focus (11%))</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internal org. focus (44%)</td>
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<td>Internal org. focus (37%)</td>
<td>Internal org. focus (40%)</td>
<td>Internal org. focus (33%)</td>
<td>Internal org. focus (32%)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Table 9-3: Rhetorical focus of the SD party leader speeches

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<tbody>
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<td>External focus (47%)</td>
<td>External focus (54%)</td>
<td>Internal org. focus (47%)</td>
<td>Internal org. focus (54%)</td>
<td>External focus (48%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Societal focus (51%))</td>
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<td>(Societal focus (36%))</td>
<td>(Societal focus (47%))</td>
<td>(Societal focus (37%))</td>
<td>(Societal focus (37%))</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Competitor focus (19%))</td>
<td>(Competitor focus (16%))</td>
<td>(Competitor focus (18%))</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Internal org. focus (35%)</td>
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<td>(Societal focus (36%))</td>
<td>(Societal focus (47%))</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Competitor focus (11%))</td>
<td>(Competitor focus (11%))</td>
<td>(Competitor focus (11%))</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 9-2: The rhetorical focus of the SPP party leader speeches

Table 9-3: Rhetorical focus of the SD party leader speeches
In the following, I will elaborate on the general trends in the findings for form thereby answering RQ3. I will start off by commenting on the external focus followed by on the internal organisational focus. When describing the development in the use of descriptive statements of the parties and explicit expressions of values, I will also comment on how these two forms of expression are used strategically in the speeches thereby answering RQ4.

9.3.1. **External focus**

When communicating their political values through an external focus, the party leaders tend to express their political values via references to the state of the world by use of evaluative sentences expressing either emotivity (positive or negative) or by use of sentences stating necessity and what needs to be done on a societal level. These two strategies remain largely evenly distributed against each other before and after government entry. The last external societal strategy, real-life anecdotes, is less commonly used although it is present in speeches both before and after government entry. Referring to external competitors is a widely used strategy for all party leaders especially before government entry. However, for SPP and SLP the references to external competitors decrease rather notably after government entry (see tables 9-2, 9-3 and 9-4).
In terms of external focus, the SLP speeches reveal the most changes before and after government entry as the party leader’s use of both societal and competitor-focused external strategies decreases significantly after government entry (see table 9-4). Indeed, the SLP party leader makes almost no references to the party’s political competitors after entry into the coalition. The SPP party leader speeches also reveal a decrease in external societal focus, while references to the external competition remain largely the same (see table 9-2). For SD, the use of both strategies remains largely constant before and after government entry (see table 9-3).

9.3.1.1. **External competitor focus**

Overall, the party leaders focus less on external competitors when expressing their values within the coalition government. This is especially significant for SLP and SPP who both limit their use of references to the political competitors significantly.

For all party leaders, references to external competitors are thus most predominant in speeches made before the coalition government where they often refer to the wrong-doings or lack of actions of the incumbent government. Often these references are linked to the values of economic sustainability, equality and welfare.

*But that doesn’t change that the government bears the brunt of responsibility for the historically poor shape and lousy future of the Danish economy. Time and time again, the Liberals and the Conservatives have ignored the advice from economists and experts. The government has acted purposefully irresponsibly.* (SLP 2010, Appendix 25, p.2)

*The Danish People’s Party has accused SPP for throwing light on the fire, for deliberately provoking a conflict. To that I must say: It is the Danish People’s Party that has let down public servants and who has for years given tax reductions to the wealthiest and to companies…and thereby has let down the core troops of Danish welfare.* (SPP 2008, Appendix 11, pp. 10-11)

But also at times through statements juxtaposing the party’s values to those of the opposition parties:

*Tiredness with the VKO-government with all its bloc-politics, inequality and liberalism has turned into a growing hope of change. A hope of a new start for Denmark where values such as responsibility, social security and unity are the founding elements.* (SPP 2009, Appendix 12, p. 5)

*After government entry, the party leaders refer significantly less to the past behaviour and actions of the*
opposition, but when they do, they often do so in order to justify and explain own actions and values:

*We are removing all superfluous bureaucracy in the public sector – for example we have dropped the Lib/Con. government’s extremely bureaucratic variety of free choice in the home help system* (SPP 2013, Appendix 16, p. 4)

*And maybe most important of all…This government has defused the ticking bomb placed by the Liberals under our universal welfare system with overpayment of the private hospitals and tax exemption for private health insurances* (SPP 2013, Appendix 16, p. 5)

The decreased focus on external competitors suggests that parties in power are more likely to focus on their own actions rather than those of the opposition. Indeed, one of the jobs of opposition parties is “to oppose government policy” (Sitter, 2007: 25); a task which inevitably disappears when the party assumes power and needs to legitimise and account for its own actions and policies (e.g. Martin and Vanberg, 2008).

**9.3.2. Internal organisational focus**

Both the SPP and SD party leader speeches show a general increase in internal organisational focus in speeches made after entry into the coalition government while the SD speeches reveal a more varied picture. Overall, the most often used strategies are references to actions (mainly future actions before to coalition and past actions within the coalition) and goal-oriented sentences. The speeches contain relatively few explicit references to values both before and after government entry, while descriptive statements about the party are used to a varying degree by the three parties both before and after government entry. Tables 9-5, 9-6 and 9-7 below show the distribution of internal organisational strategies:
### Table 9-5: The internal organisational focus of the SPP speeches

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party leader (17%)</td>
<td>Actions (16%)</td>
<td>Party leader (19%)</td>
<td>Actions (20%)</td>
<td>Party goals (19%)</td>
<td>Actions (22%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Past actions 4%)</td>
<td>(Past actions 4%)</td>
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<td>(Past actions 6%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Past actions 16%)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Party description (13%)</td>
<td>Party goals (12%)</td>
<td>Party goals (12%)</td>
<td>Party goals (18%)</td>
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<td>(Past actions 0%)</td>
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<td>(Past actions 0%)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Actions (5%)</td>
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<td>Party description (2%)</td>
<td>Explicit values (1%)</td>
<td>Gov. goals (4%)</td>
<td>Party description (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Party leader (0%)</td>
<td>Explicit values (0%)</td>
<td>Party leader (0%)</td>
<td>Party leader (2%)</td>
<td>Explicit values (3%)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gov. description (0%)</td>
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### Table 9-6: The internal organisational focus of the SD speeches

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party goals (18%)</td>
<td>Party goals (15%)</td>
<td>Party goals (16%)</td>
<td>Gov. goals (22%)</td>
<td>Actions (24%)</td>
<td>Actions (18%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Past actions 2%)</td>
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<td>(Past actions 1%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Past actions 10%)</td>
<td>(Past actions 6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions (12%)</td>
<td>Actions (13%)</td>
<td>Actions (14%)</td>
<td>Actions (16%)</td>
<td>Party goals (17%)</td>
<td>Party goals (12%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Past actions 1%)</td>
<td>(Past actions 1%)</td>
<td>(Past actions 1%)</td>
<td>(Past actions 2%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party description (9%)</td>
<td>Party leader (11%)</td>
<td>Party descriptions (4%)</td>
<td>Party goals (9%)</td>
<td>Party description (8%)</td>
<td>Party description (5%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party leader (4%)</td>
<td>Party description (2%)</td>
<td>Party leader (5%)</td>
<td>Party description (5%)</td>
<td>Gov. goals (7%)</td>
<td>Party leader (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov. description (2%)</td>
<td>Explicit values (3%)</td>
<td>Gov. description (2%)</td>
<td>Party leader (4%)</td>
<td>Party leader (7%)</td>
<td>Gov. goals (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit values (0%)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Explicit values (0%) | Gov. description (2%) | Explicit values (1%) | Explicit values (0%) | | |

Explicit values (1%) | | | | | |

Gov. description (0%) | | | | | |
On the whole, the party leaders increase their use of references to party actions after government entry. Also, the party leaders focus more on future actions in speeches given before the parties’ entry into the coalition and more on past actions in speeches made within the coalition – this is most significant in the case of SPP and SLP’s 2013 speeches. Here, the focus is on the long list of political steps taken by the coalition government.

*We have removed the start help and the ceiling on welfare benefits for the benefit of those who have the least. We have torn down the border posts. We have made sure that asylum families with children have the opportunity to live outside the asylum centers. We have – despite financially difficult times – carried through active finance politics and ensure that less people than it would have been have lost their jobs during the crisis”*(SLP 2013, Appendix 16, p.3)

The difference between the two types is evident in the two examples below. The first one is taken from a speech made before government entry and the second one after:

### Table 9-7: The internal organisational focus of the SLP speeches

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Party goals (17%)</td>
<td>Party goals (9%)</td>
<td>Party goals (15%)</td>
<td>Actions (21%) (Past actions 18%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions (16%) (Past actions 5%)</td>
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<td>Actions (7%) (Past actions 1%)</td>
<td>Actions (6%) (Past actions 0%)</td>
<td>Actions (13%) (Past actions 7%)</td>
<td>Party goals (19%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party leader (3%)</td>
<td>Party leader (4%)</td>
<td>Party leader (4%)</td>
<td>Party description (4%)</td>
<td>Gov. goals (7%)</td>
<td>Party leader (8%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party description (0%)</td>
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<td>Party description (1%)</td>
<td>Explicit values (0%)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit values (1%)</td>
<td>Party description (2%)</td>
<td>Gov. description (1%)</td>
<td>Party leader (0%)</td>
<td>Party description (1%)</td>
<td>Gov. goals (2%)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Explicit values (1%)</td>
<td>Explicit values (0%)</td>
<td>Explicit values (1%)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
We must also rebuild at home. No matter where you stand on the question of gini coefficients and other technical measures of who have and who haven’t got – we must put an end to poverty here (…) the method is simple: remove the start-help, the ceiling on welfare benefits and the 450-hour rule while making it more attractive to work by way of an increased tax reduction on work. It isn’t even that expensive. It’s a question of will. (SLP 2011, Appendix 26, p. 4)

Things are connected. That’s how it is. Because poverty makes us all poorer. And if we are not able to improve conditions for those who have the least, we all miss out on the opportunity of a stronger and better society (…) The government has already abolished the start-help and the ceiling on welfare benefits (SLP 2012, Appendix 27, p. 5)

9.3.2.2. Goal-oriented sentences

The party leaders all make wide use of the goal-oriented sentences in the party leader speeches both before and after government entry. The strategy entails both very explicit references with verbs connoting goals and aims, but also less explicit references such as the one below.

*We think that it is fair to expect that Danish citizens have the same rights in Denmark than in any other EU-country when it comes to the possibility of living with the one they love* (RV 2010, Appendix 25, p. 7)

In all speeches made after coalition government entry (except for SD 2011), the party leaders refer mainly to the goals of the party not the coalition government. This is most pronounced in the 2013 speeches.

9.3.2.3. Description of the parties

SPP and SD use the most descriptive statements in their party leader speeches, while for SLP it is a rarely used strategy. When exploring the strategic function of the party leaders’ use of descriptive statements it becomes clear that they serve to express the party’s values with four different strategic foci: Defining the party identity, differentiating the party, indicating organisational stability, or indicating shared member identity (see table 9-8 below).

All descriptive statements serve to indicate the party’s identity, however, the other three functions are used to different degrees by the party before and after government entry. Table 9-8 shows the
distribution of the values in the party leader speeches with the X in brackets indicating the number of occurrences of the specific strategy in each speech.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic function of descriptive value statements about parties</th>
<th>SPP</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>SLP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>All speeches</td>
<td>All speeches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differentiating the party</td>
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<td>2008 (XX)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009 (X)</td>
<td>2011 (X)</td>
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<td>2010 (XX)</td>
<td>2013 (X)</td>
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<td>2012 (XX)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2013 (X)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Indicating organisational stability</td>
<td>2011 (X)</td>
<td>2008 (XX)</td>
<td>2012 (X)</td>
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<td>2012 (X)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2013 (XXXX)</td>
<td>2013 (XX)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indicating shared member identity</td>
<td></td>
<td>2012 (X)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9-8: Strategic function of descriptive value statements about parties

SPP’s strategic use of party descriptions

SPP uses the strategy of expressing values through party description extensively in 2008 and 2009 and again in 2012 and 2013. In 2008 and 2009, the years surrounding the PEC with SD (Christiansen et al., 2014), the party leader defines the party and differentiates the party from others via the values of economic sustainability, equality and environmental sustainability (differentiating markers marked in bold):

*I think that the Nakskov experiences show that SPP is deeply financially responsible. I think that the experiences from Nakskov shows that SPP better than anyone else can combine the public and the private and thereby create the foundation for what we have to live off in the future”*(SD 2008, Appendix 11, p. 5)

*Today, SPP is more than any other party, a party which dares take the necessary decisions to ensure that we decrease inequality”*(SD 2008, Appendix 11, p. 11)
We were the first party to take the environmental problems seriously. And we are the first party which dares say that the solution to the financial crisis and the climate crisis are connected (SPP 2009, Appendix 12, p. 11).

In 2009, the party also defines itself in terms of the value justice/law and order:

*SPP’s legal policy is not right wing or soft. SPP’s legal policy is common sense* (SD 2009, Appendix 12, p. 8)

In the 2010 SPP speech, there is less focus on descriptive statements. However, when used the party leader describes and differentiates the party from others through the values of welfare, education and development as well as economic sustainability. In this speech, references to environmental sustainability are omitted (differentiation marked in bold):

And we must remember that we have (that trust) because they trust that we are the ones who can ensure that the hospitals are working, that all young people get an education and that we create new jobs and economic prosperity (SPP 2010, Appendix 13, p. 2)

*SPP must be the party to formulate the business policy of the future. And we must be the ones who most clearly formulate what Denmark must live off in the future. We must dare to point out the winners and bank on them* (SPP 2010, Appendix 13, p. 8)

In the SPP 2011 speech, the party leader only makes one descriptive statement about the party and here he expresses both differentiation and organisational stability in relation to environmental sustainability although this value is not a core value in the speech (here differentiation is marked in bold and organisational stability underlined):

“SPP has always been a green party and we were interested in the state of the climate long before any one else felt the water rise under their feet or the ice melt at our Greenlandic friends in the North” (SPP 2011, Appendix 14, p. 6)

*After government entry*

In speeches made after entry into the coalition government, the SPP party leaders use party descriptions to define the party in terms of its core identity, it central commitments and core concerns, but also to indicate organisational stability.
In 2012, the party leader returns to the core value of environmental sustainability and continuously emphasises that SPP is Denmark’s green party and differs from other parties in this respect. Thereby the two strategic functions applied are defining the party and differentiating it from others (differentiation marked in bold):

**SPP is Denmark’s green party. No two ways about it.** (SPP 2012, Appendix 15, p. 3)

*It is not a small task, but it is a task which our party is particularly willing to take on. As Denmark’s green party.* (SPP 2012, Appendix 15, p. 4)

In 2012, the party leader also defines the party in terms of being a “workers” party (something which was not emphasised in any of the speeches made before government entry) and attempts to communicate organisational stability (underlined):

*The bottom line is that SPP is a people’s party where everybody is welcome. And we are a worker’s party fighting for ordinary wage earners. That is the core of SPP. Today and tomorrow. And part of being a worker’s party means to take care of the ill and the elderly, and those who are not able to work or haven’t got a job. We are proud that our party has contributed to building the Danish welfare society and we will at any time fight for people’s right to a safe and dignified old age and a safety net which catches the ones who stumble on the road of life.”* (SPP 2012, Appendix 15, p. 9)

The main value in this quote is welfare society (taking care of the ill, the welfare society, safety net, etc.).

In the 2013 speech, the party leader defines SPP as a people’s party which fights for equality (e.g. justice, poverty, social isolation) and solidarity/unity (unity, putting aside self-interest). In this connection, the party leader also emphasises the organisational stability of the party (underlined below):

**SPP is a party for the people. We always have been…that is our strength…and we must stay that way—SPP is a people’s party, a people’s party which fights for justice. And which understands the mechanisms which create poverty, social isolation, desperation and insecurity. (…) That is a true people’s party. Where self-interest and class-interest are combined with the desire for unity and putting aside self-interest for the benefit of unity. That’s solidarity. That’s a people’s party. That is SPP.** (SPP 2013, Appendix 16, p. 11)
Throughout the 2013 speech, the party leader makes various references to the organisational stability of the party (underlined below) while also attempting to differentiate the party from others (marked in bold). Again, the differentiating values are equality (social justice), welfare (a strong welfare), environmental sustainability (ambitions for the climate) and solidarity/unity (for the benefit of generations to come):

"But SPP is still, in terms of attitudes, the Danish party who desperately wants social justice, a strong welfare and which has ambitions for the climate and the environment which extends far into the future for the benefit of the generations to come" (SPP 2013, Appendix 16, p. 2)

The party leader also refers to the party’s socialist ideology, but again links the past to the present thereby connoting organisational stability (underlined)

A socialist starting point, yes of course, because SPP is Denmark’s modern socialist party. But also a starting point in reality. In that way, SPP is where SPP has always been (SPP 2013, Appendix 16, p. 18)

For me there is a straight attitudinal line from Aksel, Gert to Holger and me: a deepfelt engagement in a more just and socially balanced society with a strong welfare model which strenghtens us all. A deeply serious approach to the challenges we’re facing in relation to the limited resources of the planet and our climate and environmental problems. And a burning engagement in the world around us - both concerning social conditions, democracy, material conditions and resources, the effect on the environmental and climate challenges on our fellow men around the globe. That is the SPP which I joined way back when and that is the SPP I want to lead (SPP 2013, Appendix 16, p. 5)

In the quote above, the party leader seeks to define the party in terms of the values of welfare society (e.g. strong welfare), environmental sustainability (e.g. climate and environmental problems), equality (e.g. strengthens us all, socially just), international outlook (the world around us, fellow men around the globe) and democracy (democracy(. These were all core values of the party programmes.

The different value focus in the descriptions of SPP seems to be clearly linked to the specific contextual position in which the party is at the time. In 2008 and 2009, SPP was getting ready to enter into government and needed to show financial responsibility and a tough response to crime (see Christiansen et al. 2014). Thus, the party leader focused on economic sustainability, although combining it with environmental sustainability and justice/law and order. However, once having entered the coalition
government, as the party was heavily criticised both internally and externally for moving too far away from its core values (e.g. Østergaard, 2012), the party leader sought to define the party through the values emphasised in the party programmes e.g. equality, solidarity, welfare society and environmental sustainability.

SD's strategic use of party descriptions

Throughout the SD party leader speeches, the party leader continuously refer to SD as a party ready for responsibility and used to having the responsibility of running the country. She makes various references to responsibility through references to the party’s past actions and past leaders and thus mainly applies the strategies of organisational stability and differentiation as is seen in the quotes below. Here markers of organisational stability are in bold, while markers of differentiation are underlined:

But have the Social Democrats become afraid of change? **Do they no longer dare to take responsibility for the necessary reforms?** My answer is clear: do not tell me that Thorvald Stauning, Jens Otto Krags and Poul Nyrup’s party is not ready for reforms. The Social Democrats are Denmark’s strongest reform party. **75 years ago.** Stauning was the driving force behind the Kanslergade Agreement\(^\text{10}\). An agreement which started major reforms and lifted hundreds of thousands of Danes out of poverty (SD 2008, Appendix 17, p. 6)

15 years ago, Poul Nyrup and his generation of social democratic leaders – Svend, Mogens and Ritt – once again showed that it is **us – us Social Democrats** – who lead the way when society is creaking at the seams (SD 2008, Appendix 17, p. 7)

In the two quotes above, the party leader refers to the value of the welfare society (Kanslergadeforliget), equality (lifting people out of poverty) and unity/solidarity (creaking at the seams).

In the 2010 speech – the last speech before the 2011 general election - the party leader refers to what it means to be a Social Democrat thereby referring to values to describe the party and create a shared member identity:

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\(^{10}\) The Kanslergade Agreement was an agreement made in 1933 between three major Danish political parties (SLP, SD and LP). It was spurred on by the global financial crisis and introduced the state as an active initiator of the socio-political development e.g. by initiating public projects which created jobs and turnover. Together with the Social Reform, the Kanslergade Agreement is seen as the beginning of the Danish welfare state (Danmarkshistorien, 2015b)
But let’s make it clear what it means to be a Social Democrat. Because it is not that hard. A Social Democrat is someone who defends our values of prosperity and justice for ordinary people. Who supports our values of rights and duties going hand in hand like flow and ebb. Who acknowledges that the opportunities are unequally distributed and feel a deep duty to change this injustice. A Social Democrat is someone who believes in the special and fantastic in every single human being. Who believes that a strong unity can create more freedom for the individual. Who will fight day in and day out for the right of every person to create his own destiny. And simply because the core of being a social democrat is values and attitudes we are so different as human beings (SD 2010, Appendix 19, p. 16)

In the quote above, the values applied to define the party are equality (prosperity and justice for ordinary people, unequally distributed, every single human being), personal responsibility (duties), welfare society (rights), freedom (freedom, right to create own destiny), and solidarity/unity (strong unity)

In the 2011, which is the first speech made in the context of the coalition, the party leader defines and differentiates the party through the values of solidarity/unity (unity) and equality (equal opportunities) which were also core values in the part programme:

Now is the time to show that SD is the stream in Danish society which works to increase unity and create opportunities for all (SD 2011, Appendix 20, p. 1)

As we saw with SPP, the SD party leader also tries to define and differentiate the party (marked in bold) as a "worker’s party". Here the values in focus are welfare society (increasing work force, creating jobs) and economic sustainability (creating jobs):

So when the government has a goal of increasing the work force it is also a goal of creating tens of thousands of new jobs in Denmark for ordinary wage earners. See, that’s how a real workers party thinks. (SD 2011, Appendix 20, p. 8)

After the party’s entry into the coalition, the party leader also refers to the history of the party and relates it to progress and justice seen in the quote below. Both of these terms are rather generic, progress may reflect the value of welfare society while justice most likely refers to the notion of social justice (2F) under equality:
We get up early in the morning to the seemingly timeless and endless debate about what the Social Democratic project is despite the fact that every day for the past 140 years we have fought for progress and justice for ordinary people. How hard can it be? And we go to bed every night knowing that we can —quoting Poul Nyrup — always do it a bit better. That’s how it is for me and that’s how it is for all of us in this room and in this country. That’s how it was for the Social Democrats in the 1990’s. When we had to keep Denmark together in the 1970s and when the foundation for the welfare society was being developed. There’s only one thing worse for a Social Democrat than having the responsibility. (SD 2012, Appendix 21, p. 9)

The above quote serves several functions. First of all, it serves to define the party, but it also connotes organisational stability via reference to the history of the party and the notion that the core goals of the party have always been the same (progress and justice). By referring to “all of us in this room”, the party leader also attempts to create a feeling of shared member identity.

In the 2013 speech, there are again various examples of how the SD party leader explicitly refers to the party’s history in order to connote organisational stability (marked in bold). Again, the values expressed are equality (justice) while it may also connote a well-functioning welfare system by emphasising the rights of citizens:

But we are not afraid of change. We are optimists by heart and full of confidence in the future. And that’s how it’s always been. Just take our election poster from 1939. A nice little black and white thing. The message is simple and clear: Freedom, peace, work. And you can even see a steam whiste and a smoking chimney. The future and workplaces of 1939. And that’s still how it is. We like a smoking gun. It means growth and jobs. In 2013 it just needs a small filter. So that the smoke is white not black. (SD 2013, Appendix 22, p. 5)

In the quote above, the values used to define the party are freedom, peace and work (sub-feature 9E of the welfare society). The party leader also refers to the notion of environmental sustainability by referring to the “small filter” placed on the chimney.

The final example of the 2013 speech reflects how the party leader explicitly differentiates the party from the opposition by referring to the values of solidarity/unity, equality (2F - just distribution of wealth) and welfare through security (9A – well-functioning welfare system)
The train fund says something about who the Liberals are. And it says something about who the Social Democrats are. We’re a party that takes responsibility for all of Denmark. We want a just distribution of our wealth. We believe that we are responsible for each other. We are ready to embrace change and shape the future with our solidarity and security intact. (SD 2013, Appendix 22, p. 14)

SLP’s strategic use of party descriptions

The SLP party leader makes rather few references to political values through party descriptions. Not until 2012, that is after the party’s entry into the coalition, does the party leader refer to the party’s history and through this reference connote enduring political values and organisational stability (marked in bold):

Today I am proud and humbly grateful of being allowed to lead a party which stands by its attitudes and knows its roots. The Social Liberal party was founded three years before King Frederik 8. rolled into the station in Vejen. I- C Christensen who was on the train, was the leader of the Liberal Party which we broke from in 1905. Back then we wanted to ensure and protect the liberal freedom rights while wanting the state to take a bigger social responsibility and ensure better conditions for those who had the least. We are still fighting for that today. (SLP 2012, Appendix 27, p. 1)

In this quote, the values emphasised are freedom (“liberal freedom rights”), welfare society (“better conditions”), solidarity/unity (“social responsibility”) and strong state (“the state to take bigger responsibility”).

9.3.2.4. Explicit values

Overall, the party leaders make rather few explicit references to the values of the parties before and after government entry. However, the party leaders use the strategy to varying degrees.

The party with the most explicit references to the party’s values is SPP. Here, the values are mainly explicitly expressed in 2009, 2011, 2012 and 2013 - that is both before and after government entry. The SD party leader only refers to the explicit party values in 2010 and 2012 both before and after government entry. In 2011, the party leaders only refer to the values of the coalition government and not of the party itself. The SLP party leader refers very briefly to values in the 2010, 2012 and 2013 speeches; primarily within the context of the coalition government.
If we take a closer look at the different examples of explicit value expressions it becomes clear that they serve seven strategic functions in the texts seen in table 9-9 below. These functions extend upon the functions of the party descriptions as four of the functions are shared, while three are new (these are marked in italics in table 9-9). In the table, the number of occurrences for each function is marked with an X in brackets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic function of explicit references to values in speeches</th>
<th>SPP</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>SLP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defining the party’s identity</strong></td>
<td>ALL speeches</td>
<td>ALL speeches</td>
<td>ALL speeches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Differentiating the party</strong></td>
<td>2009 (XXX)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2012 (X)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicating organisational stability</strong></td>
<td>2009 (X)</td>
<td>2012 (X)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Indicating shared member identity</strong></td>
<td>2009 (X)</td>
<td>2013 (X)</td>
<td>2010 (XX)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Emphasising values as core aspect of politics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2008 (X)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equating party’s values with national values</strong></td>
<td>2011 (X)</td>
<td>2012 (X)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2013 (X)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicating difference btw left and right</strong></td>
<td>2009 (XXX)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 9-9: Strategic functions of explicit values in speeches

SPP primarily applies values to differentiate the party, to indicate a difference between left and right (2009) and to equate the party’s values with the national values. The values most often referred to are equality, welfare, solidarity and freedom (see table 9-10, p. 176-177). The value of environmental sustainability is only explicitly mentioned once. In 2009, the party leader makes numerous references to “responsibility” which in itself is a rather vague term. It may refer to financial responsibility (the value of economic sustainability), social responsibility (the value of solidarity/unity) or environmental sustainability. However, as the context of the text deals with the global financial crisis and the financial irresponsibility of the incumbent government, it is likely that it refers to financial responsibility although it is not explicitly specified.
SD refers mainly applies explicit references to the party’s values to indicate a shared member identity. Here, the main values referred to are equality, welfare society, personal responsibility and freedom.

SLP refers mainly to the party’s values to define the party but also refers to the value concept in general as a key part of politics (see table 9-10). The values linked to the party are economic and environmental sustainability, equality, E and D, welfare, democracy and personal responsibility.

For all three parties, it is noticeable that some values used to define and differentiate the party are not otherwise prominent values in the speeches, e.g. freedom for SPP and SD. This value was much more dominant in the party programmes, but is in the speeches still linked to the parties’ identity.

Tables 9-10, 9-11 and 9-12 on the following pages zoom in on the different examples of explicit values in the speeches with an indication of the strategic functions of the explicit references.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quote</th>
<th>Political values and sub-features</th>
<th>Strategic function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2008 | “We divide on freedom values and gender equality” (Appendix 11, p. 6) | • Freedom  
• Equality (2D) | • Defining the party |
| 2009 | “The age of greed is over. The age of liberalism is over. Now there’s a demand for completely different values than those of the right wing parties. I’m talking about values such as responsibility, social security and unity. The values of the left-wing parties. Our values” (Appendix 12, p. 3) | • Strong state (7C)  
• Solidarity/unity  
• Welfare society (9A)  
• Economic sustainability (6B) | • Indicating difference btw left and right  
• Indicating shared member identity  
• Differentiating the party |
| 2011 | “Equality (2D, 2F) | • Equality  
• Strong state (7C)  
• Economic sustainability (6B)  
• Welfare society (9A)  
• Solidarity/unity | • Defining the party  
• Indicating organisational stability |
| 2011 | “The age of greed and liberalism is over. Now our values will propel society forward: responsibility, social security and unity” (Appendix 12, p. 14) | • Strong state (7C)  
• Economic sustainability (6B)  
• Welfare society (9A)  
• Solidarity/unity | • Defining the party  
• Indicating difference btw left and right  
• Differentiating the party |
| 2011 | “But we don’t believe that the answer is to copy other countries where there is less unity, where | • Welfare society (9A)  
• Equality (2C) | • Defining the party  
• Equating party’s
there is a great difference between rich and poor and where decent welfare is only for those who have the money. Instead we want to carry on building on the strong Danish values as security, equality and unity” (Appendix 14, p. 8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Quote</th>
<th>Political values and sub-features</th>
<th>Strategic function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>“SPP is Denmark’s green party (...) Nature, the environment and the climate are to SPP values which we must safeguard. For our own sake and for our children’s.” (Appendix 15, p. 3)</td>
<td>• Environmental sustainability • Democracy (1D) • Equality (2D, 2E, 2F) • Freedom (3D) • Peace</td>
<td>• Defining the party • Defining the party’s values with national values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>“I am not talking about miracles or a Denmark’s which sets the global agenda – forget it. But I am talking about our way of thinking – our values, about openness, listening to other points of view, our insistence on human rights, gender equality, social justice, peaceful solutions, tolerance” (Appendix 15, p.7)</td>
<td>• Freedom • Equality • Solidarity/unity</td>
<td>• Defining the party • Equating party’s values with national values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“The fifth biggest challenge has to do with values. We must consistently promote and defend core values such as freedom of speech, freedom of mind and the core democratic principles. We must be a nation who wants to be part of the world (...) However, sometimes members of the diverse group of DPP pop up to challenge these strong Danish values” (Appendix 16, p. 16-17)</td>
<td>• Freedom (3A, 3D) • Democracy • International outlook (13E)</td>
<td>• Defining the party • Equating party’s values with national values</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9-10: Explicit values in the SPP speeches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Quote</th>
<th>Political values and sub-features</th>
<th>Strategic function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>That way we can ensure that the broadest shoulders still carry the heaviest load. It’s not so difficult. It’s all about values. (Appendix 18, p. 9) “We are passionate about our values. We are passionate about taking responsibility and bringing Denmark forward” (SD 2008, Appendix 17, p. 14)</td>
<td>• Welfare society (9B)</td>
<td>• Defining the party • Emphasising values as core aspect of politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>“But let’s make it clear what it means to be a Social Democrat. Because it is not that hard. A Social Democrat is someone who defends our values of prosperity and justice for ordinary people. Who supports our values of rights and duties going hand in hand like flow and ebb (...)” And because the core of being a Social Democrat is all about values and attitudes, we are so different as human beings” (Appendix 19, p. 16)</td>
<td>• Equality (2F) • Welfare society • Personal responsibility (10A)</td>
<td>• Defining the party • Indicating shared member identity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“I became a Social Democrat because our values are the same which I experienced at the dinner table in my home in Ishøj. None of my parents would dream of voting for our party, but they filled me with dreams which I’ll share with you today. That is a respect for the diversity of each of us, and a deep belief that all people have the potential for greatness. In my home, nothing was impossible for me or my siblings. And in our party, nothing is impossible for the individual” (Appendix 19, p. 17)

2012 “Our values are clear and unshakable. Every single person is entitled to being met with dignity and not condensation.” (Appendix 21, p. 22)

Table 9-11: Explicit values in the SD speeches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SLP</th>
<th>Quote</th>
<th>Political values and sub-features</th>
<th>Strategic function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2008 | “There are both clear values and strong solutions in our idea of a new, active foreign politics. A foreign politics which builds on the core principle of striving towards a world of right, not of force” (Appendix 23, p. 9) | • International outlook (13C)  
• Peace (4A)  
• Justice/law and order (17C)                                                                 | • Defining the party  
• Emphasising values as core aspect of politics                                            |
| 2009 | “We stand for a responsible economy. We have chosen a reform path: the economy, the green and the climate, the school and the asylum policies. It is value-based politics through and through”” (Appendix 24, p. 9) | • Economic sustainability (6B)  
• Environmental sustainability  
• Enlightenment and education (18A)                                                                 | • Defining the party  
• Emphasising values as core aspect of politics                                            |
| 2010 | “Politically we prioritise a responsible economy, a dignified immigration policy, and a good school. And we show our values: we believe, we trust, we listen, and we cooperate. Because problems are solved in cooperation with others” (Appendix 25, pp. 1 and 12) | • Economic sustainability(6B)  
• Equality (2E)  
• Welfare (9A)  
• Enlightenment and development (18A)  
• Democracy (1E)                                                                 | Defining the party |
| 2013 | “It is a core Social Liberal value to be able to take care of oneself, but also of one another” (Appendix 28, p. 9)                                                                 | • Personal responsibility (10A)  
• Solidarity/unity (11B)                                                                                                                                                   | Defining the party |

Table 9-12: Explicit values in the SLP speeches

9.4. Summary of findings for form

In the following I will briefly sum up the findings in the analysis for form of expression and provide an answer to RQ3 and RQ4.
RQ3) Is there a change in the rhetorical focus of party leaders when they express the party’s political values in speeches made before and after coalition government entry?

Overall, the SPP and SLP party leaders change their rhetorical focus significantly when expressing the parties’ political values within the coalition government. Both of these parties have a much more internal organisational focus in speeches made within the coalition government whereas they have an external focus in speeches made before the coalition government. After government entry, both SPP and SLP have a greater emphasis on actions and less focus on the external competitors. The rhetorical focus of SD changes less significantly although the party leader also shows a tendency for more internal organisational focus and more focus on actions within the coalition government. Goal-oriented sentences are equally important for all parties both before and after government entry.

On the whole, there are rather few references to explicit values in the speeches, and these are mostly made by SPP in 2009, 2011, 2012 and 2013 – that is both before and after government entry. SD expresses explicit values in 2010 and 2012 both before and after the coalition government. SLP makes very few references to values and both before and after government entry. Descriptive statements are mainly used by SPP and SD – however both before and after government entry.

RQ4) Is there a change in the strategic use of descriptive value statements about the party and explicit references to the party’s political values in speeches made before and after coalition government entry?

The use of descriptive statements are seen to serve four overall functions in the texts:

- Defining the party identity,
- Differentiating the party from others;
- Indicating organisational stability
- Indicating shared member identity.

As established, it is mostly SD and SPP that express their values via descriptive statements about the party. Before government entry, the main purpose for SPP of expressing the party’s values via descriptive statements was to define the party and differentiate it from others, however after government entry the main function changes to expressing organisational stability. For SD, organisational stability is a strategy used both before and after government entry, however especially in 2013. SLP uses relatively few party descriptions and mainly to define the party (before government entry) and to indicate organisational stability after government entry. Thus, it may be concluded that
within the coalition government, the main strategic function of describing the party through values is organisational stability.

In their speeches, the party leaders make relatively few references to explicit values relying mostly on references to actions and goal-oriented sentences. However, some explicit references are made by all parties. SD focuses mostly on explicit values in 2010 and slightly in 2012, while SLP mainly refers to explicit values before government entry with one exception in 2013. SPP, however, has a strong focus on explicit values in 2009, 2012 and 2013 – that is both before and after government entry. The explicit values serve seven overall functions in the texts (marked in italics below) adding three to the functions of the descriptive statements:

1) Defining the party identity
2) Differentiating the party
3) Indicating organisational stability
4) Indicating shared member identity
5) *Indicating values as key factor in politics*
6) *Equating party’s values with national values*
7) *Indicating difference btw left and right*

References to explicit values are used so sporadically that it is difficult to observe an overall pattern in usage before and after government entry. However, if we combine the two types of value statements (descriptions and explicit references to values) (see table 9-13 below), we see that within the coalition government, the most predominant strategic function for all parties is indicating organisational stability, followed by differentiating the party. Table 9-13 below shows the combined strategic functions of the statements (with the number of occurrences in each speech marked with an X).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combined strategic functions of descriptive value statements and explicit references to values in speeches</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Main function:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Defining the party</strong></td>
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<td>Explicit values</td>
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<td>SD</td>
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<td>SLP</td>
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<td>SPP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Explicit values</td>
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<tr>
<td>Descriptions</td>
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<td>All references (13)</td>
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<td>All references (14)</td>
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<td>All references (1)</td>
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<td>Differentiating the party</td>
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<td>Indicating organisational stability</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Emphasising values as core aspect of politics</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Equating party's values with national values</strong></td>
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<td>2009 (X)</td>
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<td><strong>Indicating difference btw left and right</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>2009 (XXX)</td>
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Table 9-13: Combined strategic functions of descriptive value statements and explicit references to values in speeches
Part IV
Discussion and conclusion
This section includes two chapters namely the discussion of the findings and conclusion of the dissertation.

**Chapter 10** presents a discussion of the combined findings for content and form placing them within the theoretical framework of the dissertation. Here, I also discuss the overall implications of the study and presents a critical view upon the concept of strategic communication in the context of a political party.

**Chapter 11** presents the final conclusion of the dissertation. In this chapter, I also reflect upon the contributions of the study, its overall theoretical and methodological implications and limitations. Finally, I present suggestions for areas of future research.
10. Discussion of the findings

This chapter discusses the main findings identified in the analysis and places them within the perspective of the theoretical framework presented in the dissertation. Finally, it presents the overall implications of the study.

The core assumption explored in the dissertation was that when parties enter into coalition governments they change the communication of their political values significantly in terms of value content leading to inconsistent party identities while the party leaders will concurrently attempt to communicate consistency in the political value offering through strategic references to the party’s values. This assumption has been explored through two separate analyses – one which explored for the political value focus in both genres (content) and one which explored for the rhetorical strategies applied by the coalition government party leaders when they expressed the party’s political values in the speeches (the form of expression).

As established, the analyses only partly confirm the overall assumption of the dissertation as the main change when parties enter into government is found in the rhetorical strategies of the party leaders and the strategic use of values and descriptive statements within the coalition government. Parties have a much more internal focus in the speeches made after government entry and focus more on actions and on expressing organisational stability. In contrast, the changes in political value content in speeches given before and after government entry is not as significant as expected as the main values represented in the texts are present both before and after government entry (see tables 8-7, p. 133, 8-9, p. 138 and 8-11, p. 142). While some changes do take place (see section 10.2), the main differences in terms of political value content are thus found between the two genres of the data set.

The following discussion takes a starting point in the findings of both analyses which will now be synthesised under three main headings:

1) Political value content in party programmes and speeches
2) Political value focus before and after government entry
3) Form of expression before and after government entry
10.1. Political value content in party programmes and speeches

The analysis showed that there is a significant discrepancy between the value focus of the party’s programmes and the party leader speeches. While this is so for all parties, it is especially the case for SPP (see tables 8-3, p. 118 and 8-7, p. 133). The following section discusses these differences from three overall perspectives; the role of context and the party leader; the powerful group versus the rank-and-file members; and the “moderating” effect which may be incurred by parties entering into coalition governments.

10.1.1. The role of context and the party leader

Compared to the party programmes which serve to express the party’s long-lasting vision of the ideal society (Hansen, 2008), the party leader speeches are more ephemeral in nature and reflect the political values relevant in a particular context (Finlayson and Martin, 2008). Indeed, party leader speeches are always held in specific contexts and are “created for very particular occasions, in response to recent events or in order to address a very specific group of people” (Finlayson and Martin, 2008: 449; see also Sauer, 2002). The differences between the political values communicated in the party programmes and the speeches may therefore in large part be a result of the contextual reality in which the speeches where given.

Party leaders face various communicative challenges one of them being to “lead people, make decisions and act as the forerunners and bear their responsibility for the functionality of the democracy.” (Almonkaris and Isotalus, 2012: 248). Thus, apart from stating the overall and trans-situational values of the party, party leaders often express the party’s values through references to recent events in society thereby emphasising the situational context of the speech. Today, with fewer perceived differences between the parties, the role of the party leader in establishing the party identity is increasingly significant, and the party leader often personifies the party and gives it a human face e.g. in times of crisis (e.g. Almonkari and Isotalus, 2012; Karvonen, 2009; McAllister, 2007; Wallace et al., 1993). As argued by Wallace et al. (1993) crisis involve “threats to important values or even national survival” (1993: 95) which indicates that party leaders may face the challenge of weighing up the party’s political values against current events and specific responses to these events. In a similar vein, Finlayson and Martin (2008) argue another key task of the party leader speeches is to invite people to trust them in “uncertain conditions” and getting people to see situations in a specific way (2008: 450).
In terms of communicative purposes, the party leader speeches are thus a complex genre. First of all, the party leader must seek to establish shared values between sender and receiver (March and Olsen, 1984) and must also affirm and reaffirm the party’s culture and identity by emphasising that the party has stayed true to its values (Finlayson and Martin, 2008; Martin and Vanberg, 2008). Furthermore, it is a central task of the party leader to communicate to the constituents that the party as such is responding responsibly to the events in society while adhering to the party’s political values – even in times of crisis. The following examples show how the party leaders link the party’s values to current events in society:


*Today it is 60 days ago that the latest terror attack hit us all. This time in Norway. The person responsible was Norwegian. An insider. An attack on democracy – even on the next generation. On democratically engaged youngsters. With a cruelty as unbearable as the attack against the twin towers. And the response was unity and agreement on democracy and openness about diversity* (SLP 2011, Appendix 26, p. 2) (Values of: Peace and security; unity; democracy, equality)

*The past year has not been an ordinary year. A global crisis has caused insecurity all over the world. Also Danish worker are feeling the consequences of the crisis. Many have lost their jobs, and many, many more feel the insecurity which comes with being in the risk zone. (...) the invisible hand of the market was there to solve all the problems – yes sometimes you got the impression that the market was some kind of God. All the things belonging to all of us were to be reduced. The public sector was to be cut down. Privatization and outsourcing were the trend. More had to be private – in health care, care for the elderly, yes – all over it seemed (...) Also in this case, the right wing was wrong.* (SPP 2009, Appendix 12, p. 1) (Values of: Economic sustainability; unity; welfare society; strong state)

*We have witnessed men and women, children and old, being brutally being killed by poisonous gas by the Syrian regime. The international community had to act. Because history has taught us that letting injustice and darkness take roots has its price. And that we cannot look away when a regime murders its own population.* (SD 2013, Appendix 22, p. 2) (Values of: Peace and security; international outlook)

In the examples above, the political values of the party are expressed through reference to specific events, more specifically the terror act in Norway July 2011; the international financial crisis which began in 2008; and the Syrian crisis in 2013. It is also evident in the quotes how the party leaders directly link the events to specific political values. Thus, in their speeches, political party leaders may...
use references to specific events strategically in order to position the party’ political values. By revealing how the party leaders apply the party’s political values in the context of reality and respond to events in society through their value focus, the speeches serve to reflect the party’s “ideology in action” and the strategic choices of the party leader (Finlayson and Martin, 2008: 448). As politics essentially involves concepts that may be interpreted in different ways and thus contested (Finlayson and Martin, 2008), the party leader speech will always represent a particular version of reality and specific value interpretations and value focus. In sum, when it comes to responding to external societal events the party leader functions as the interpreter of specific societal events and links them to the party’s values through his or her specific strategic and rhetorical choices with the aim of communicating responsibility while justifying the party’s political values.

One example of this is found in the specific societal event of the economic crisis which dominates all party led speeches. This crisis, which began in 2008 and gradually worsened (The Economist, 2013), is reflected in all the party leader speeches both before and after government entry and often serves as argumentation for the parties’ actions and political value focus:

*Right now we are seeing a global economic crisis which has thrown millions of people into unemployment. Which forces people out of their homes. Which suddenly threatens to destroy the safe everyday life of many ordinary hardworking families. Fortunately, Denmark still has a strong public sector and a strong welfare society which can soften the blow of some of the serious consequences.* (SPP 2009, Appendix 12, p. 2)

*Growth is decreasing, prosperity is decreasing, employment is decreasing, the workforce is decreasing, our competitiveness is decreasing, productivity is decreasing, exports are decreasing, the share of young people getting an education is constantly decreasing. This is bad. The only things increasing are unemployment and debt. This is just as bad. (…) We want to carry through a growth initiative of 25 million DKK over two years – 10 million the first year. The growth initiative contains investments aimed directly at research, education and an improved effort for the climate. It strengthens Denmark for the time after the crisis. Such an initiative requires financing. The Social Liberal Party wants to finance the growth initiative through reforms of the early retirement pay, unemployment benefit and taxes* (SLP 2009, Appendix 24, p. 3)
In these two quotes we see, how the economic crisis is seen as a threat to the values of the party. In the first quote it threatens the “safe everyday life of ordinary people” (sub-feature 9F – quality of life). Here, the same overall value of the welfare society is also depicted as part of the solution to the effects of the crisis. The second quote depicts the economic crisis as a threat to economic sustainability (6A – economic growth), the welfare society (9E – full labour market), and E and D (18B – Education, R and D).

In a large part, the primary political values of the speeches namely the welfare society and economic sustainability (see tables 8-7, p. 133, 8-9, p. 138 and 8-11, p. 142) may thus be spurred on by the financial crisis. These two values also dominant in speeches given before coalition government entry, and thus they do not seem to be brought on by the party entering into government. In all speeches, the party leaders are thus highly focused on the day-to-day business of running a country – ensuring growth and welfare - rather promoting than the more idealistic goals such as freedom and democracy which were emphasised in the party programmes (see tables 8-4, p. 128, 8-5, p. 129 and 8-6, p. 130). In other words, the party leader may use communication strategically to argue for and justify the specific political steps taken as well as to link the party’s values to specific events in society such as the economic crisis. Specific events may be rhetorically depicted as a threat to the party’s core values while other values may be depicted as the solution. By rhetorically bringing societal events into focus, the party leaders thus provide the background setting for the political values, the political actions and the party’s deliberations with the events functioning as the argumentation for both values and actions.

With this in mind, the different political value focus of the two genres may also be seen as a manifest reflection of the two sides of politics namely the grand values of the parties and the more practical allocation of the resources in society (e.g. Stoker, 2006). While the party programmes in the data set reflect the party’s ideal society, the practical realities of everyday life is evident in the party leader speeches through the overall focus of the values of welfare society and economic sustainability.

These two values essentially concerns people’s lives, and in the speeches the party leaders all focus on creating, maintaining and even renewing the welfare system and ensuring a full and well-functioning labour market (9E) in the middle of a global financial crisis. Ensuring growth (6A) by being financial responsible (6B) and creating jobs (6C) are key sub-features in this process although these two features were hardly present in the SPP and SD party programmes.
That parties change their value focus due to a change of contextual factors supports Buckler and Dolowitz’s (2009) notion that “acts of renewal are, in their nature, and in view of the motives generally behind them, circumstantial and temporally specific, responses to particular political problems” (2009: 13). However, while adapting the communication to specific circumstances may be a condition of political communication per se and also represents a key feature of the notion of a more flexible and adaptive approach to communication (see van Ruler, 2015), the context-dependence and adaptive nature of the party leader speeches challenges the party leader’s strategic communication efforts as a key aim here is to communicate a consistent ideological identity in all contexts and situations (Christensen et al., 2008: 96). By adapting the communication to the situation at hand, peripheral values may be emphasised while the party leader omits other central values or focuses on other sub-features of these values which may lead to an inconsistent communicated ideological identity. In sum, this reflects the central communicative challenge faced by political parties; the dichotomy between having to adapt the political content in response to the societal events at hand, and having to communicate a clear and consistent identity regardless of the specific context.

From a political perspective, the emphasis on these two particular values may also suggest a return to the materialist values of old-politics (e.g. Borre, 1995) (e.g. the economy, creating jobs, distributing resources) rather than the more post-materialist values such as environmental sustainability and e.g. gender equality (sub-feature 2D of equal worth) (Inglehart, 1997). In other words, with the economic crisis taking hold of the world, the party leaders tend to focus on ensuring jobs and financial security for people thus responding to some of the basic needs emphasised in Maslow’s pyramid of needs (see figure 4-2 p. 52). This again illustrates how party leaders through their communicative choices may omit certain values and highlight others as a response to the specific situational context in which the speech was given. While this may also be seen as an example of how parties adapt to the society in which they are embedded, it may also – from the perspective of strategic communication – lead to an unclear and inconsistent communicated ideological identity as some core values are simply not rhetorically positioned as part of the party’s identity in specific societal contexts such as the financial crisis.

10.1.2. “Powerful group” versus “rank-and-file” members

The difference between the value content of the party programmes and the speeches also reflect possible disagreements on the party’s identity between the party elite and the rank-and-file party members.
emphasised by Rodrigues and Child (2008). As mentioned in section 5.2.1, party programmes are often approved at the annual conventions by members from all levels of the party, while the party leader speeches by nature reflect the communicated ideological identity as interpreted by the party’s “powerful group” (Rodrigues and Child, 2008: 886) e.g. the party leader, speech writer or spin doctor (Finlayson and Martin, 2008). This means that the values emphasised in the speeches may not necessarily cohere with the values emphasised in the party programme and that the value interpretation communicated by the party elite may not necessarily be shared all members of the organisation reflecting a lack of internal ideological cohesion (Jahn and Oberst, 2012).

This tension is most notable in the case of SPP who shows the most significant discrepancy between the value focus of the party programme and the speeches (see table 8-4 p. 128 and table 8-8, p. 135). Indeed, there is also a discrepancy within the three SPP programmes as they have a different value and sub-feature focus (see table 8-4). This also indicates that there may be internal conflicts as to what constitutes the party’s ideological identity and also how the party’s core values are interpreted in different member levels of the party. In other words, the omission of central values and sub-features in the 2009 reform programme and the party leader speeches suggests that certain discrepancies exists between the party elite, who were the drivers behind the reform programme aiming for government participation, and also the sender of the speeches, and the party’s more ideologically “founded” members – its believers (see Panebianco, 1988). This is most pronounced in connection with the sub-feature of equality of common ownership (2B) which dominates the 2003 and 2012 programme, but is omitted from the 2009 reform programme and all the party leader speeches.

The different value interpretations displayed by the SPP texts suggests that the differences in value interpretations are not just found in between parties as noted by Bonotti (2011), but also on intra-party level (Strömbäck, 2011: 70). It may also be a reflection of the notion of adaptive instability emphasised by Gioia et al. (2004) as the party elite seemed to have redefined the interpretation of central value labels such as equality which may no longer include the notion of common ownership or equal power distribution in society. From a communicative perspective, SPP’s change of value interpretation may again be linked to the notion of flexible communication which is emphasised by e.g. van Ruler (2015). By being less focused on communicating a consistent ideological identity with a more flexible approach to communication allowing for the omission of central values and sub-features, the party is in a sense merely fulfilling one of the aims of political rhetoric namely adapting their communication to the
specific situation at hand to achieve the best result (e.g. Charteris-Black, 2014). As the party was aiming for government participation, it most likely needed to tone down central aspects of its ideological identity to become government-material (Christiansen et al., 2014; see also section 10.1.3). However, from the perspective of strategic communication this may conflict with the central purpose of communicating a clear and consistent identity across genres and situations especially when other members of the party have not changed their interpretation of the value.

In relation to the lack of consistency in the communicated political party offering, it is particularly noticeable that the SPP 2012 programme in many ways returns to the ideological core of the 2003 programme and that the political value changes introduced in the reform programme (e.g. more focus on economic sustainability, the omission of sub-feature 2B, etc.) are hardly visible in the 2012 party programme. This indicates that although the party elite may have re-defined the value of equality, it remains the same to the majority of the members of the party who approved the 2012 party programme at the party conference held in April 2012 - that is after the party’s entry into the coalition government. This again indicates a gap between the parliamentary party and the rank-and-file members who may be more concerned with the party’s “traditional goals” (Martin and Vanberg, 2008: 503).

### 10.1.3. “Moderating” effect – getting ready for government

The change of sub-feature focus in the SPP party leader speeches also supports the claim that fringe parties who enter into government may “moderate” their policy principles in order to accommodate their coalition partners (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2013; see section 3.3.3.1). Although not characterised as an “extreme” party, SPP has traditionally been located towards the left of the political spectrum and had, until 2011, never before participated in government. Thus, the party needed to position itself as a party ready for government which was spurred along by the Pre-election coalition formed with SD in August 2009 (Christiansen et al., 2014). Here, the two parties presented their formal cooperation through a joint taxation policy paper which was superseded by other joint policy proposals (Christiansen et al., 2014) such as the May 2010 “Fair Løsning – sammen gennem krisen” (A fair solution – together through the crisis); a united economic plan for getting through the crisis and ensuring the future of the welfare society (Sæhl, 2010).

In connection with the “moderating” effect, it is worth noting how the sub-feature of 2B was also absent from the party leader speeches given before the formation of the coalition government (see table 8-7, p.
This suggests that this particular sub-feature of equality may have been abandoned along with the party’s government ambitions. While this is most likely related to the formation of the pre-election coalition with SD, it also shows that the “moderating” effect occurred even before the party’s actual government entry as the party attempted to position themselves as ready for government participation. In the speeches leading up to the 2011 general election, it is clear that the party leader aimed to position the party as part of a future center-left government. Throughout the 2009 speech, the party leader repeats the statement “That’s why we need SF in government” (Appendix 12) offering various reasons for the rank-and-file members to support the idea of SPP in government. In the 2010 speech, the party leader also explicitly refers to SPP in a future government:

*We are now facing the next big step. We are ready to carry our politics through. As a completely decisive part of a new centre-left government. The challenges that await us are enormous.* (SPP 2010, Appendix 13, p. 2)

In the years leading up to the coalition government formation, the party leader specifically seeks to establish the party as government ready through a focus on the value of economic sustainability. This is particularly evident in the 2009 programme as well as in the 2008, 2009 and 2010 speeches where the SPP party leader attempts to establish the party as financially responsible and explicitly links this to the party’s ambition of government participation:

*There has been a myth that SPP does not dare to take responsibility. We shot that myth down last year when we so clearly stated that SPP wants to be part of a future government. Then there’s a myth that SPP are less financially responsible. And despite our support for the resurrection of the economy in the 1990s and despite the fact that our finance political proposal are amongst the strictest both friends and enemies in Danish politics have had an interest in keeping that myth alive. But it is rubbish.* (SPP 2008, Appendix 11, p. 1-2)

As established, the 2009 reform programme does not contain references to 2B which suggests that common ownership is not something which the party planned on pursuing in a future government. The 2009 programme does however contain references to the value of strong state:
A societal bank must ensure loans for companies and entrepreneurs. To get a loan requires a healthy economy, environmental consideration and adherences to the employee rights (SPP party programme 2009, Appendix 3, p. 13)

In the 2009 and 2010 speeches, the SPP party leader still promotes the value of strong state through references to a large public sector (7B) and the curbing of capitalism (7C). He even explicitly juxtaposes the two competing ideologies of liberalism and socialism (see section 10.3.2.2.). However, his omission of the key sub-feature of 2B and the references to the class system and distribution of power and common ownership means that the party leader presents a changed interpretation of socialism. Thereby he arguably present a significant break from the party’s more ideological past as reflected in the 2003 party programme.

Although the 2012 programme in many ways marks a return to the party’s core values, it contains no references to classes or the class system which was mentioned repeatedly in the 2003 programme (Appendix 2, pp. 7-8). Thus, it is evident that the 2012 party programme has significantly toned down its ideological rhetoric although it still refers explicitly to the notion of socialism.

The toning down of the socialist ideology and the specific markers of socialism may be seen as a communicative example of the ideological convergence between parties which involves fewer ideological differences between parties (e.g. Green, 2007; Kirchheimer, 1966; Whiteley et al., 2005).. However, it may also, as discussed in section 10.1.3. above, be a reflection of how the party is simply adapting their communication to the situation at hand; being a party ready for government who needs to be less explicit about its “extreme” ideological viewpoints (see Taggart and Szczepanski, 2013).

From the perspective of strategic communication, the toning down of core values may have a detrimental effect on the party’s communicated ideological identity. Not only do values represent the raison d’etre of the party, they also serve as “key heuristic cues “ for voters who “once they have learned them, do not then have to relearn them over time” (Smith and French, 2009: 212-213). If parties in their communication forgo references to their core political values, it may lead to unclear and weakened communicated ideological identities. This in turn may lead to confusion for both internal and external stakeholders who may be unsure as to what the party stands for and what differentiates it from others in terms of political values.
10.2. Value focus before and after government entry

As established in the analysis for content, the differences between political value content before and after government entry are not as significant as expected. This is rather surprising as these two contexts represent two different sides of political life – being in opposition and being in power.

It would be natural to assume that there would be great differences as to the political value focus of speeches made within these two contexts as speeches made before government entry are made at a time when the party is not bound by a coalition agreement but work on a more individual basis. Here, the party is – in theory – free to express the political values of its party programme without considering the political values of its coalition government partners. In contrast speeches made after coalition government entry demand a more unified approach as the parties need to consider the values of the coalition government as such (Timmermans, 2006). However, there are only a few significant differences between the value focus before and after government entry, as the main values of the speeches – namely the welfare state and economic sustainability – were dominant both before and after government entry. This may in large part be due to the 2009 PEC between SPP and SD (see Christiansen et. al. 2014), but may also be caused by contextual factors (see section 10.1.1.). However, despite an overall similar value focus in the speeches before and after government entry, there are some overall changes which will be discussed in the following.

10.2.1. Return to core values in the context of the coalition

The analysis for political value content reveals that parties may at times return to their core values after entering into the coalition government although this is not a dominant strategy. One example of a value which becomes more central after government entry is found in SPP and the value of environmental sustainability which plays a key role in both the 2009 reform programme and the 2012 party programme. Although the value, in terms of coverage, is not a dominant in the 2003 programme (see table 8-4, p. 128), the value is emphasised as the SPP is referred to as a “A green and socialist party” (Appendix 2, p. 1).

However, in the speeches leading up to the formation of the coalition government (2010 and 2011), the value of environmental sustainability plays a very peripheral role only to be reemphasised in the 2012 and 2013 speeches. This re-emphasis may be seen as part of the party leaders’ effort to communicate to
the party’s constituents that the party still has the same value focus despite being part of the coalition government, and it may also be an attempt to position the party against the other two parties of the coalition government. As the party was severely criticised for selling out of its core values from the very outset of the coalition government (Ringberg, 2011), the party leaders may seek to reinforce the party’s core values within the context of the coalition. In 2012, the first speech after the formation of the coalition government, the SPP party leader continuously refers to the party being “Denmark’s green party” (SPP 2012, Appendix 15, p. 3). In 2013, the new party leader, Anette Vilhelmsen, also continuously stresses environmental sustainability as one of the key values of the party:

*For the first time in our party’s history, we are inside the very control room taking responsibility for difficult decisions while we are influencing the development of society in a more just, solidary and green direction.* (SPP 2013, Appendix 16, p. 1)

Returning to certain core values within a coalition government falls in line with the notion that although the member parties need to present a unified coalition with a common focus (e.g. Timmermans, 2009), they are still individual parties in a “mutual competition for votes” (Strøm and Müller, 1999: 257). Thus, even parties within a coalition government need to position themselves against the others and seek to remain “distinct” within a unified coalition both in order to present a clear identity towards the electorate and to maximise “intra-party cohesion” (Boston and Bullock, 2009: 351). This last point indicates that the return to core political values may also reflect the party leader’s attempt to convince the rank-and-file members and the party’s believers that the party is still true to its core values within the confines of the coalition (Martin and Vanberg, 2008) (see also section 10.3.2.3.).

The value of equality also becomes slightly more dominant in speeches given within the coalition (see table 8-4, p. 128) while the SPP party leaders also marks a return to the party’s ideological foundation in speeches given within the coalition:

*In my time as party leader we have together changed SPP to a modern socialist party which not only dares to critiques inequality, arrogant use of power and injustice, but also has the courage and the will to take on responsibility for leading the country* (SPP 2012, Appendix 15, p. 14)

The focus of SPP as a socialist party reflects an overall differentiating strategy which will be further unfolded in section 10.3.2.2.
10.2.2. Toning down core values

In the party leader speeches there are also examples of how a party tones down values that were dominant in the party programme as well as in speeches leading up to the coalition government.

For all parties, the value of economic sustainability becomes slightly less dominant in speeches given after the party’s entry into the coalition government (with the exception of the 2011 SD speech) (see tables 8-7, p. 133, table 8-9, p. 138 and table 8-11, p. 142). The most noticeable change takes place in SLP where the party leader tones down the value of economic sustainability significantly in the 2013 speech (see table 8-11, p. 142) and in this speech places more emphasis on the welfare state, E&D, equality, democracy and solidarity). Possible explanations for toning down the value of economic sustainability could be the situational context of the speech and an attempt to humanise the party leader. Several times in the speech the party leader emphasises that a strong economy is not a goal in itself:

*Have we in the middle of all the talk on work force and 2020-plans neglected to tell people that there is a purpose that goes beyond the bottom line? A purpose which does not first and foremost have to do with the structural balance and economic projections. To me creating the opportunity for people to get jobs is more than a financial goal. To me there is no kind of welfare which can match being able to take of oneself and one's own* (SLP 2013, Appendix 28, p. 7)

This admission from the party leader may again be linked to the situational context of the speech. It was held in September 2013, following a year dominated by heavy debates on the so-called “Dagpengereform” (Unemployment benefit reform) which limited the rights to unemployment benefits (Albæk, 2012). In 2010, the SLP along with the then Lib/Con coalition and DPP had agreed on a reform which reduced the period in which a person is allowed to receive unemployment benefits by half. The SPP and SD voted against. After the formation of the new coalition government, the reform was maintained due to SLP’s refusal to change it (Albæk, 2012). This effectively meant that a considerable number of people stood to lose their income in 2013. When confronted with this in August 2012, the party leader’s comment was simply “that’s how it is” which by many voters was perceived as a cynical and arrogant comment not acknowledging the seriousness of the issue (Rømer, 2012). In the 2013 speech, the party leader thus also attempts to emphasise that there is a higher purpose with the economic reforms:
“We do not make reforms for the sake of reforms, but because they can bring us to a better place. Both for us as people and for Denmark. Our economic policies must create both jobs and ensure that we are enough people to do the work which creates prosperity and thereby the foundation for welfare” (SLP 2013, Appendix 28, p.3)

For SLP, the decreased focus on economic sustainability may therefore be seen as an attempt to humanise the party leader and the party itself. Thus, it reflects the idea that while the practical side of politics may revolve around the distribution of resources, the party leader acknowledges that politics is still very much concerned with values pertaining to the ideal society in more ways than the distributional (e.g. Stoker, 2006). As political values take an outset in personal values and people’s idea of the good life (Schwartz et al. 2010), economic aspects can only ever represent one side of political argumentation and may arguably not stand alone which is reflected in the quote above.

That the shared core value of the party leader speeches i.e. economic sustainability becomes relatively less important in all party leader speeches made within the context of the coalition may be linked to the notion that once part of a coalition government, parties must seek to remain distinct and may therefore need to define and differentiate themselves via more specific party values in order to ensure electoral viability and internal cohesion (Boston and Bullock, 2009). This point is discussed in section 10.3.2. which focuses on the party leaders’ strategic use of political values in the speeches (e.g. to indicate organisational stability).

The toning down of the party’s core value of economic sustainability is again an example of how party leaders may adapt their communication to the situational context (see van Ruler, 2015). Here, however, the party leader does not omit the value of economic sustainability, but rather argues for a change in how people view the party’s overall purpose of the value. SLP, she argues, does not see the value of economic sustainability as a goal in itself, but as means to achieve other values such as welfare society. From a communicative perspective, the toning down of the value thereby represents an attempt to emphasise that the party’s core concerns extend beyond the “bottom line”. Thus, the party leader applies communication strategically to reflect that the party’s core concerns is the welfare of people rather than economic results.
10.3. Form of expression before and after government entry

10.3.1. More internal organisational focus after government entry

Overall, the analysis for form of expression showed that the party leaders communicate their political values through a more internal organisational focus after government entry (see tables 9-2, p. 160, 9-3, p. 160 and 9-4, p. 161). This is both reflected in an increased focus on past values and a reduced focus on external competitors within the coalition government. Also the strategic functions of the use of explicit values and descriptive statements focus more on organisational stability within the context of the coalition government.

10.3.1.1. Actions

As mentioned in section 9.3.2.1., all party leaders increase their references to past actions in speeches made within the coalition government. This is especially evident in the 2012 and 2013 SPP speeches and in the 2013 SLP speech which both contain long listings of what the government has carried through so far.

Particularly in the case of SPP, it is evident that the party leader refers to the past actions of the coalition government to justify that these actions do not contradict the party’s values. This is seen in the quote below which serves to express that through the government’s various actions the overall value of equality is being honoured by the party and indeed also realised:

While Lars Løkke and Pia Kjærsgaard prioritised those who had private health insurance, we say no to an a and a b team. That’s why we have put an end to the tax financing of private health insurances. We have removed user’s payment for infertile couples. We have stopped the overpayment of the private hospitals (SPP 2013, Appendix 16, p. 15)

The justification strategy applied by the SPP party leader coheres well with Martin and Vanberg’s (2008) claim that coalition party leaders must justify their actions to the constituents and convince them that the decisions taken do not go against the party’s core values. It also supports Sowinska’s (2013) finding that that political actors use references to values to legitimise political actions.

References to actions may also be used to argue for parties’ government participation. Again, this is especially noticeable in the case of the first time government member, SPP, who suffered a serious loss
of voter support in the first few years in government and was also ravaged by internal debates whether government participation was even worth it (Østergaard, 2012). This debate is addressed by the party leader in the 2013 speech through a reference to the actions made possible by government participation:

_Because has it been worth it? Has the realisation of what SPP has wanted and fought for so long been worth the cost? I think it has. Every day, SPP carry through good things in government. Everyday, we contribute to carrying out politics which slowly but surely make Denmark a better place. For the first time in our party's history we are in the very control room taking responsibility for difficult decisions while we influence the development of society making it more just, solidary and green_ (SPP, 2013, Appendix 16, p. 1).

By emphasising references to the party’s own actions, it is evident that the party leaders attempt to create a link between the communicated values of the parties i.e. what the party argues that it stands for and its actual behavior. From the perspective of strategic communication, the party leaders are here seeking to communicate to the constituents that the party is staying true to the values even within coalition government (see Martin and Vanberg, 2008). Thus, the main aim of referring to the actions of the party seems to be to communicate a clear and consistent party identity within the context of the coalition. However, this is a risky strategy as it only works if the party members agree with the party leaders that the actions really do support the values. This is further unfolded in section 10.3.2.3.

### 10.3.2. Strategic use of descriptive statements and explicit values

Overall, the party leader speeches made both before and after coalition government entry contain fewer explicit references to political values and fewer descriptive statements about the party than expected considering that the party leader conference speech is “fundamental to the ongoing affirmation and reaffirmation of party culture and identity.” (Finlayson and Martin, 2008: 448). However, the empirical analysis also uncovered that although they may not be the most dominant rhetorical strategies of the speeches compared to references to actions and party goals, they all serve clear strategic functions in the text.

As mentioned, all descriptive statements and explicit references to values serve the main function of defining the party. However, apart from this function, they also serve one or more of six strategic functions in the text. The following sections discuss the different functions from a theoretical perspective and attempt to link the situational aspects of the speeches to the strategic use of the values.
In the discussion, I draw on examples from both explicit value expressions and more descriptive statements about the party and focus on what I believe to be the most relevant strategic functions from the perspective of this dissertation.

The specific focus on socialism is further discussed in section 10.3.2.2. below as it also forms part of the party’s differentiating strategy.

10.3.2.1. Values differentiating the party

Apart from defining the party, the most dominant strategic function of using values is to differentiate the party from others. This is hardly surprising given that a party’s core values function as a key part of the party’s unique ideological identity (e.g. Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009) and that parties build reputations for defending particular values (Petersen et al., 2010: 533). Below the semantic markers for differentiating are marked in bold:

15 years ago, Poul Nyrup and his generation of social democratic leaders – Svend, Mogens and Ritt – once again showed that it is us – us Social Democrats – who lead the way when society is creaking at the seams (SD 2008, Appendix 17, p. 7)

Explicitly emphasising the party’s ideological identity in order to differentiate the party from others supports Buckler and Dolowitz’s (2009) notion that a party’s ideological identity and political values “play a significant part in the development of rhetorical strategies in the context of party competition” (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009: 13). Thereby the values which the party leaders highlight through the differentiation strategy reveals how the party elite would like to position the party against others (see Baines et al. 2013). SPP in particular applies the differentiating strategy throughout the speeches (see tables 9-10, p. 176-177 and 9-13, p. 181) and although the party leader also describes the party as the main defenders of equality and welfare, the overall differentiating factor is the value of environmental sustainability (semantic markers in bold):

We were the first party to take the environmental problems seriously. And we are the first party which dares say that the solution to the financial crisis and the climate crisis are connected (SPP 2009, Appendix 12, p. 11).
“SPP has always been a green party and we were interested in the state of the climate long before anyone else felt the water rise under their feet or the ice melt at our Greenlandic friends in the North” (SPP 2011, Appendix 14, p. 6)

It is not a small task, but it is a task which our party is particularly willing to take on. As Denmark’s green party. (SPP 2012, Appendix 15, p. 4)

The focus on the value of environmental sustainability in the party descriptions does not cohere with the overall value focus of the speeches as environmental sustainability is never the most dominant value and in some speeches even largely omitted (e.g. 2010 and 2011). This again indicates a certain discrepancy between the communicated ideological identity of the party programmes and the party leader speeches and reflects an inconsistent communicated identity.

10.3.2.2. Values indicating difference between left and right

A particular type of differentiation strategy is found in the 2009 SPP speech, where the party leader positions the party against its political competitors by referring to explicit political values and pointing out the ideological differences between the two political blocs. In other words, the political values of the party are juxtaposed to opposing values of competing political ideologies thereby differentiating the party from others by virtue of the party’s ideology.

If we return to the discussion of context in section 10.1.1., the particular strategic function of juxtaposing competing ideologies of liberalism and socialism may also be caused by the specific contextual factor of the financial crisis. The particular strategy is only used by SPP before coalition government entry in the 2009 speech where the party leader was also most explicit about the party’s ideological background emphasising the value of strong state (see table 8-7, p. 133). Indeed, the 2009 SPP speech was held in the dawn of the financial crisis (The Economist, 2013), and the party leader makes numerous references to the crisis arguing that this was to a great extent caused by the unregulated financial behaviour of banks and thereby the capitalist system:

A global crisis has caused insecurity all over the world. Also Danish worker are feeling the consequences of the crisis. (...) for decades the liberals have told us that the free powers of the market would solve all problems and create prosperity and happiness for all. Banks, financial institutes and hedge funds were allowed to do as they pleased – capitalism needn’t be curbed or regulated (SF 2009, Appendix 12, p. 1)
In continuation of this, the party leader explicitly emphasises the party’s values of responsibility, social security and unity as the anti-thesis of the right wing parties and the age of greed and liberalism:

\textit{The age of greed is over. The age of liberalism is over. Now there’s a demand for completely different values than those of the right wing parties. I’m talking about values such as responsibility, social security and unity. The values of the left-wing parties. Our values.} (SPP 2009, Appendix 12, p. 3)

\textit{Tiredness with the VKO-government with all its bloc-politics, inequality and liberalism has turned into a growing hope of change. A hope of a new start for Denmark where values such as responsibility, social security and unity are the founding elements (….) We know that a democratic regulation of the market is necessary to prevent capitalism from getting out of control. That’s why we are socialists} (SPP 2009, Appendix 12, p. 5)

From these two quotes it is evident that the SPP party leader emphasises the party’s values by highlighting the party’s left-wing and socialist ideology. By juxtaposing the values and ideology of the party to those of its competitors, the values and ideology of SPP become the exact opposite of the incumbent government’s and thus also a reflection of the differences between the two ideologies and related value systems. The value of strong state is only referred to implicitly through reference to curbing capitalism (sub-feature 7C) reflected in the statements of “liberalism is over” and “preventing capitalism from getting out of control”.

The explicit focus on ideology in a sense contradicts the notions of ideological convergence (e.g. Mair, 2008). Indeed, you may argue that the SPP party leader explicitly debunks the notion of ideological convergence pointing out the manifest differences between the two ideologies. Also, he seems to be rejecting the idea that the role of ideology is decreasing (e.g. Böss, 2013; Kavanagh, 1996; Mair, 2008) by suggesting that the very ideology of the parties are in fact what distinguishes them from one another.

It is worth noting that this strategy is only used in the 2009 speech with the majority of the speeches not emphasising the party’s specific ideology. This may, as mentioned in section 10.1.3., be part of the “moderating” effect as the party sought to become government ready and have a broader electoral appeal (Christiansen et al., 2014). However, once the party has entered into the coalition, the party leader yet again mentions socialism as a differentiating factor:
My message is that SPP carries through the things in government that our size permits. We are the only
government party which is firmly based on the left wing. We are the ones pulling to the left (SPP 2013,
Appendix 16, p. 2)

The notion that SPP emphasises the party’s socialist ideology may be seen as response to the various
points of criticism directed at the party after government entry for moving too far away from its
ideological core (e.g. Østergaard, 2012). The party was ravaged by internal crisis and debates over many
of the compromises faced within the coalition – manifested in the very coalition agreement which was
supposedly more "blue" than “red” (Ringberg, 2011). Thus the SPP party leaders faced a tough task
convincing its internal stakeholders that government participation was even worth it (Østergaard, 2012)
and that the party had remained true to its ideological core within the coalition. This task is also
reflected in the SPP party leaders’ attempts to connote organisational stability through references to
values which is discussed in the section below.

10.3.2.3. Values indicating organisational stability

As the only strategic function apart from defining the party, the strategy of organisational stability is
applied by all party leaders in speeches given within the coalition government (see table 9-13, p. 181).
SLP and SD apply the function mainly after government entry, while the SPP party leaders apply this
strategy extensively both before and after government entry.

...in times of change
Party leaders may apply values strategically in order to communicate organisational stability in times of
change. This is particularly evident in the 2009 SPP speech, where the party leader attempts to express
organisational stability in a time where the party was getting ready for government participation. In
August 2009, the party officially entered into a PEC with SD (Christiansen et al., 2014) with the party
elite officially stating that the party aimed for government entry. This presented a significant break from
the past as the party had never before been participated in government and had so far not been seen as
government ready (Christiansen et al. 2014) (see section 10.1.3.). This, you may argue also reflects the
party’s transition from adhering to the responsible parties model mainly concerned with upholding
political principles to becoming more “rationally-efficient” focused at gaining political influence even at
the expense of political principles (White, 2006; see section 3.1).
In the 2009 speech, the party leader thus refers to political values in an attempt to explain how the party may have changed but how it has also stayed the same:

*Some people claim that SPP is no longer the party it used to be. They are completely right. And they are completely wrong. The core values of solidarity, social justice and gender equality are solid. There we haven’t changed a bit. Not an inkling. But SPP is a party that moves with the times. SPP is a party for people who want change. SPP is a party which is evolving all the time and come up with contemporary solutions to contemporary problems.* (SPP 2009, Appendix 12, p. 8)

This quote shows how a party in the middle of a transition period seeks to communicate that the core values – and thus the ideological identity of the party – have indeed remained the same. However, it is also clear that the party leader, in this time of change, seeks to express stability in terms of values thus strongly supporting Buckler and Dolowitz (2009) claim that parties undergoing change and ideological renewal change need to maintain references to the party’s core ideological identity as they serve as a key reference point for identity (2009:13). Indeed, what we see here is an example of the party leader making “ritual references” to the party’s goals (Panebianco: 1988: 27) necessary in normative organisations where members have a primarily value-based affiliation to organisation (Cummings, 1983).

The quote above also shows the party leader arguing for the stability of the party’s values – that they are “solid”. In this connection, it is worth noting how the party does not refer to the generic value of equality, but rather to the specific sub-features of 2F (social justice) and 2D (gender equality – equal worth). By doing so you could argue that the party leader allows room for a changed interpretation of equality. In other words, if only these specific sub-features have remained the same, the party may have altered its interpretation of equality in other respects. This supports Gioia et al.’s (2004) notion of adaptive instability and that parties may maintain the overall value labels, but change the actual interpretation of the values.

The above quote thus serves to support the notion of adaptive instability (Gioia et al, 2004) but also that despite of the change, parties will seek to communicate consistency and stability while linking their party’s past to its present (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009). Thus, the party leader explicitly acknowledges the adaptable nature of the political party and the need for adapting. As society changes, new problems arise which demand new solutions and may put pressure on the political party in terms of maintaining their core ideological identity and may also lead the party to change its value interpretation. However, at
the same time the party leader also attempts to communicate consistency in the political value offering by arguing that the party’s core values have stayed the same. This again illustrates emphasises the core challenge of political parties; the constant balancing act between idealism and realism. It also leads to the overall question of whether strategic communication with its focus of consistency is viable to expect from a political party or whether the party needs to apply another approach to communication. This will be further unfolded in section 10.4.

... between actions and values

Within the coalition government, the SPP party leader also makes heavy use of the strategic function of organisational stability to express coherence between the party’s action and values especially in the 2013 speech. At the time of this speech, the party was again experiencing a time of change this time manifested in the party’s first-time government participation (e.g. Christiansen et al., 2014). From the very outset of the government participation, the party experienced internal conflicts and debates due to the many compromises made by the party (Ringberg, 2011) and in September 2012, Villy Søvndal stepped down as party leader just about one year after the party’s entry into the coalition government (Beim, 2012). The 2013 speech is thus the first conference speech given by the new party leader, Anette Vilhelmsen, after a turbulent year for the party where it not only changed leader, but also saw a great deal of internal skirmishes between members and the different wings of the party among other things about the May 2012 tax reform (Jessen, 2012). The tax reform was passed with the support from Danish right-wing parties rather than the coalition government’s support party, RGA, and several members of SPP characterised the reform as socially unjust as it gave tax cuts to those earning a middle income by raising the income limit for the high-income-tax (Østergaard, 2012). At the same time benefits for the non-working part of the population (the unemployed, people on welfare etc.) were subject to lower increases making it “more worthwhile” to work” (Bonde and Thobo-Carlsen 2012). The tax reform resulted in the “worst crisis” for the party so far (Østergaard, 2012).

In the 2013 speech, the party leader attempts to indicate organisational stability through the use of specific rhetorical strategies in order to convince the receivers – many of whom are likely to oppose the party’s government participation - of the party’s continuity and consistency. In other words, although the circumstances may have changed and the party may have needed to make compromises, the party is, according to the party leader, the same as it has always been:
But SPP is still, in terms of attitudes, the Danish party who desperately wants social justice, a strong welfare and which has ambitions for the climate and the environment which extends far into the future for the benefit of the generations to come” (...) Yes, SPP make difficult compromises every single day. We make the compromises that are possible with the political composition and the balance of powers that exists. That does NOT (sic) mean that SPP has stopped believing what we used to believe. It does NOT (sic) means that the pragmatic, real-political compromises that constitute the art of the possible have become our new core beliefs (SPP 2013, Appendix 16, p. 2)

In this quote, the party leader through reference to the party’s values and beliefs seeks to convince the receivers that although the party has compromised, it remains the same. She refers to the values of equality, welfare and environmental sustainability which were also dominant in the party programmes, but makes no reference to economic sustainability which largely defined the party in the 2008 and 2009 speeches. Thus, she marks a communicative return to some of the party’s core values as stated in the party programmes. However, she also refers to Bismarck’s oft-quoted observation that politics simply concerns the art of the possible (e.g. Pflanze, 1968: 89). Thus, she acknowledges and explicitly addresses the notion that it is simply not possible for parties to pursue all their political goals as compromises constitute the rules of the political game – especially perhaps for the smallest and most left-wing party in a minority government as both of these aspects may have influenced the extent to which the party was forced to compromise. By using terms such as what is “possible”, “powers that exists”, “pragmatic real-political compromises” and “the art of the possible”, the party leader seems to appeal to the logic of the receivers emphasising that it is the actual state of affairs – rather than a change of political values and priorities – which affects the party’s political manoeuvring space.

By juxtaposing the political compromises to the core beliefs of the party, the party leader rhetorically draws a sharp line between the core values/beliefs of the party and its actions. In fact, these seem to be perceived as two separate entities which enables the party leader to simultaneously legitimise the actions of the party and defend the core identity and values of the party. The quote thus illustrates how communication can be applied strategically as an attempt to overcome the dichotomy between the grand ideas of the party and the reality of political life (e.g. Stoker, 2006) and to tone down the importance of the party’s behaviour and actions in the identity of the party. In sum, the party leader seeks to convey to the receivers that although the party has compromised on its values in its actions (which are a result of
the reality surrounding the political party) it is, in relation to its core values, beliefs and grand ideas, still the same as it has always been.

From a rhetorical perspective, this argument may be valid if one agrees with the party leader on the central premise that values and actions are indeed independent of each other. There is however, an overall implication of this argument namely that the receivers will only agree with the argument if they agree upon this premise and if they agree with the claim that the actions do not contradict the party’s values. If the receivers do not agree, they are likely to reject the argument. Furthermore, the distinction between actions and values contradicts a central aspect of strategic communication namely that an organisation expresses its identity through both its actions as well as its actual communication (Hallahan, et al., 2007). Thus, for the communicated ideological identity to be clear and consistent there must be coherence between the party’s behaviour and its communication to achieve a clear and consistent communicative identity (Cornelissen, 2014).

... in the party’s core ideology

In the quote below we see another example of how the SPP party leader attempts to communicate organisational stability in the middle of a turbulent time for the party (marked in bold):

_The bottom line is that SPP is a people’s party where everybody is welcome. And we are a worker’s party fighting for ordinary wage earners. That is the core of SPP. Today and tomorrow._ SPP 2012, Appendix 15, p. 9)

This quote indicates that the party leader responds to the tax-reform crisis (see p. 205) by emphasising that workers and ordinary wage earners are and have always been the core concern for the party despite the tax reform being criticised for being socially unjust (Østergaard, 2012).

The party leader also explicitly refers to the party’s socialist roots and attempts to link this ideological past to the party’s present. Thus the party’s socialist ideology is also linked to the notion of organisational stability (marked in bold):

_A socialist starting point, yes of course, because SPP is Denmark’s modern socialist party. But also a starting point in reality. In that way, SPP is where SPP has always been_ (SPP 2013, Appendix 16, p. 18)
In the quote above, we see how the SPP party leader implicitly refers to the central challenge of political parties namely balancing between idealism and the realities of political life as she explicitly refers to the party’s ideology being based in “reality”. This again highlights the notion of grand values of the parties versus the more practical aspects of political life emphasises by e.g. Stoker (2006) which reflect the continuous contrast and dichotomy between idealism and reality. Political parties are constantly faced with this dichotomy which also presents key challenges in terms of how to communicate a clear and consistent party’s identity. In this example, the political party leader actively addresses the dichotomy in order to communicate stability in the political party and its very ideology despite constant changes in the environment. This again reflects the notion of agile communication (van Ruler, 2015) where organisations adapt their communication to the specific context and communicative goal.

10.3.2.4. Values indicating a shared member identity

In a few cases, the party leaders’ references to specific values function as an indication of shared member identity and a sense of unity around the shared values of the party. This strategic function is not applied as often as could be expected given that one of the main aims of the party leader conference speech is to establish shared values between the sender and receiver (e.g. Charteris-Black 2014: xiii).

Again we see how the use of this strategy reflects the situational context for the party. The first example is taken from the 2009 SPP speech which was held at a time where the party was changing, aiming for government participation:

The core values of solidarity, social justice and gender equality are solid. There we haven’t changed a bit. Not an inkling. But SPP is a party that moves with the times. SPP is a party for people who want change. (SPP 2009, Appendix 12, p. 8)

In the example above, it is evident that the party leader attempts to unite the people around the core values which were also some of the most dominant values in the 2003 party programme. However, the party leader also argues that they party is constantly developing and that it is indeed a party for people who want change. This may be a reference to the government aspirations of the party and suggests that the party leader is trying to unite the people on the specific question of whether or not the party should aim for government participation. It may even be specifically targeted at the more fervent believers of
the party who might be less willing to make political compromises for the sake of political power (see Panebianco, 1988).

As discussed in section 10.2.2, p. 204, it is worth noting that the party leader refers to the specific sub-features of social justice and gender equality rather than the overall value label of equality. This may be a communicative attempt to avoid the more inclusive interpretation of equality which for some party members may include the sub-feature of 2B and for others not. Whatever the motivations are it is evident that this quote serves to illustrate how the powerful group (Rodriguez and Child, 2008) of an organisation may strategically select a few values to define the organisation’s and seek agreement upon these values amongst the members of the organisation.

10.4. Implications of the study

This section takes an outset in the most salient themes which emerged during the discussion of the findings: that the political party constantly balances on a tightrope between idealism and realism and that the party is a complex organisation which may not be able to speak with one consistent and unified voice but rather contains a plurality of voices. These aspects form the basis of the following discussion of the implications of the study which centers on one overriding question namely whether it is even viable to talk about strategic communication in the case of a political party.

10.4.1. Idealism and realism from a political perspective

From a political perspective, the notions of idealism and realism are first and foremost illustrated in the dichotomy between the party’s grand values versus the practical allocations of society’s resources which constitutes a key point of conflict for the party and in between parties (e.g. Stoker, 2006). In other words, a party may have grand ideas about the ideal society, but will in reality often be more concerned with the practical aspects of running a society (see Chapter 3).

The dichotomy between idealism and realism is also reflected in the normative idea of a political party versus the way parties act in practice. The ideal political party should function as an “ideological vehicle” (Walgraves and Nyutemans, 2009: 202) which offers clear and consistent choices to the electorate and in order to do so, the ideal party must stay distinct and true to its values and ideals:
Parties, indeed, have to offer choices to the electorate; that is part of their function in a democracy (…) To be able to offer choices, they must differ, and to differ they must hold on to their ideology.
(Walgraves and Nuytemans, 2009: 2002)

However, while Walgrave and Nuyteman’s notion of consistency in the party’s ideological offering represents the idealised version of the political party reality is at times significantly different. The findings in the analysis for political value content thus served as a manifest illustration of the conflicting positions of the “grand” value focus of the party programmes and the more practical value focus of the party leader speeches pertaining to the day-to-day running of society in a coalition government within the context of a financial crisis (see section 10.1.1.).

The study thus illustrates how contemporary political parties continuously weigh their ideological goals and values against the everyday realities of the political process and the societal context in which they operate. This is a challenging balancing act which not only involves navigating in a particularly complex stakeholder environment of conflicting demands (e.g. Strömbäck, 2011), but also involves adhering to institutional demands which limit the actual manoeuvring space of parties (Mair, 2008). These institutional demands are imposed on the parties by the political system in which parties are embedded e.g. the multi-party system which entails compromise and negotiations. However, parties must also consider and adhere to more supra-national factors such as the ever-growing power of institutions (e.g. the EU) as well as the international restrictions posed on national governments which severely limit the “freedom for partisan manoeuvre” and also make it more difficult to differentiate between parties or even between governments thereby contributing to the ideological convergence of political parties (Mair, 2008: 222).

In this connection, it is relevant to consider how the practical aspects of politics may at times even overshadow the parties’ overall goals and values and idea of the good life. This is manifested in the current notion of the “politics of necessity” which is seen to be more administrative than visionary in nature all adhering to the same neo-liberalist economic world-view (e.g. Mouffe, 2005). According to Mouffe (2005), some parties – especially those on the left – have abandoned their core values and have embraced capitalism as the only viable economic system which in turn leads to fewer perceived differences – or ideological convergence – between parties on the right and on the left side of the political spectrum (Mouffe, 2005).
10.4.2. **Idealism and realism from a communicative perspective**

While the dichotomy between idealism and realism is inherently central to the discussion of political party and politics as such, it is also highly relevant from a communicative perspective. A key question posed in this dissertation was how a particular institutional change (i.e. government entry) infringed upon the party’s ability to communicate a clear and consistent ideological identity to its internal and external stakeholders. Having conducted the study, I ask a further question: is it viable to expect a clear and consistent communicated ideological identity from an organisation like a political party?

Just as political theorists argue for an ideal form of political parties, communication theorists also rely on normative ideals which organisations e.g. political parties may not necessarily carry out – or be able to carry out – in practice. Within strategic communication, scholars advocate an ideal set of communication prescriptions such as clarity and consistency in all messages regardless of context and the specific stakeholder group targeted (Christensen et al., 2008: 96) (see section 5.1). Organisations are encouraged to communicate clear and consistent messages in all levels of their communication and to speak with one voice and with a corporate identity which is rooted in the organisational identity (Cornelissen, 2014). Any lack of consistency between these two identity constructs is seen as detrimental to the organisation as it leads to confused stakeholders and a loss of credibility (Belasen, 2008: 27). For the political party, a unified voice is seen as a prerequisite of electoral success as voters are simply less likely to vote for a disunited party (Smith and French, 2009: 213). Thus, although political parties operate in a complex reality and have to consider the demands from a plethora of internal and external stakeholders (e.g. Strömbäck, 2011), it is seen as particularly important for the political party that the communicated ideological identity and the related political values expressed by the party elite reflect how the members actually perceive their organisation and its values (see Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009; Panebianco, 1988).

However, while scholars may agree upon the strategic importance of corporate identity to contemporary organisations, Balmer (2008) argues that the notion of corporate identity is severely challenged in times of “institutional change” (2008: 881). In relation to the political party, the consistency of the communicated ideological identity may thus come under pressure as the party faces changes such as government entry, government exit, etc.
In my study, this tension became evident as the study revealed a significant discrepancy between the communicated identities of SPP in connection with the party’s first time government membership and the various organisational changes which took place both before and after government entry. However, the unclear communicated ideological identity did not seem to be brought on by the specific event of entering into the coalition government. Rather it seemed to be a result two things: A long-running process of ideological change leading up to the government entry on which there did not seem to be agreement between the party elite and the party’s more rank-and-file members; and events taking place in society e.g. the global economic crisis. This indicates that two aspects infringe upon the party’s ability to communicate a clear and consistent ideological: the plurality of voices within a political party and the context-dependent nature of the political party.

10.4.3. Plurality of voices

A key factor which impedes the communication of a consistent identity is the plurality of voices that exist in a political party. More than anything else perhaps this plurality challenges the notion of strategic communication as a management process in which a “powerful interest group” determines the party’s communicated ideological identity (Rodriguez and Child, 2008).

The value-based member affiliation and the different types of members in the political party (see section 3.1.1.) make the party particularly vulnerable in terms of communicating a clear and consistent identity. Not only may there be discrepancies between the value interpretations of the party elite and the more rank-and-file members less concerned with the “spoils of office” (Laver and Schofield, 1990: 24), there may also be different opinions on the actual purpose of the party and thus also to the level of value compromises accepted by the different members. As we saw in section 3.1.1., the party consists of various internal stakeholders who may differ in their view of the party’s purpose i.e. policy purity or political influence (e.g. Pedersen, 2011). Thus, they may also disagree on whether the party is primarily normative or utilitarian in nature (see section 4.4.1.). Organisations with these kinds of “hybrid identities” are indeed often characterised by particular “tension and debates” (Brown, 2008: 6).

Most of the time, the different voices within a party co-exist peacefully with parties even encouraging debate and discussion amongst members (e.g. Radikale, 2015d; Appendix 4, p.7; Appendix 5, p. 17). However, the plurality of voices is seen as potentially detrimental to the party if the party’s core values, ideological identity or core purpose are the centers of dispute (see Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009). Due to
its value-based nature, the political party is more than most other types of organisations subject to intense internal and public debates about what the party stands for. Discussions may take place on party elite level, between different groups of members, sometimes internally, but often through the media and in the public sphere (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009; Strömbäck and Kiousis, 2011). Current or former party members, or even former leaders or leading party politicians may publicly criticise the current party leadership, its overall strategy or specific policies, and in this way cast doubt as to the ideological identity of the party (for examples see Dybvad et al, 2014; Information, 2013). This level of uncontrollable communication from a plurality of voices consisting of both past and present members of the organisation is not found in most other organisations and adds to the challenges faced by the party elite in communicating a clear and consistent identity.

10.4.3.1. The ambiguous organisation

As a response to the normative idea of clear and consistent – and univocal – identities, Brown (2006: 7) argues against the “monolithic” view upon an organisation’s identity. Taking a more narrative approach to organisational identity, he emphasises that all organisations are characterised by plurality of voices:

…while some degree of shared storytelling about an organisation’s identity is a prerequisite for organised activity, it is often the case that different groups within a larger collective will tell quite different stories about themselves and the institution in which they are embedded (Brown, 2006: 6)

Brown (2006), as well as other scholars with a less normative approach to strategic communication (see Christensen et al., 2008), argue that the notion of plurivocity is not necessarily detrimental to an organisation. Indeed, acknowledging the plurality of voices may offer the organisation the opportunity for flexibility and thus facilitate processes of change and renewal (Eisenberg, 1984).

Eisenberg (1984) argues that organisations may avoid “unnecessary conflict” amongst its members if the leaders are strategically ambiguous about the organisation’s core values and thus allow for individual value interpretations thereby ensuring “flexibility, creativity and adaptability to environmental change” (Eisenberg, 1984: 230). The argument is that if the values communicated by the leaders are sufficiently vague but still effectively communicated, people can imbue the values with their own meaning and still believe that the values are shared and that the organisation is in agreement (Eisenberg, 1984).
While this may be an appropriate strategy for less value-based organisations, I argue that the normative nature of the political party makes it particularly vulnerable in relation to the flexible meaning of values. The political party is founded on values and consists of members on various levels who all have a value-based affiliation with the party. Despite differing views on the purpose of the party and the level of commitment to the party’s values, parties are - more than most other types of organisations - bound by some sense of mutual interpretations of values as these interpretations are essentially what differentiate the parties from another (Bonotti, 2011). Also, parties may be bound by a mutual understanding of the means with which to achieve these values i.e. what actions should or should not be taken which may also cause disputes within the party (see section 10.4.5).

Rather than being ambiguous about the meanings of the political values as suggested by Eisenberg (1984), parties may benefit from become more accepting of the plurality of voices that exist in a political party seeing them as a sign of strength rather than weakness. However, with the management practices of political parties becoming increasingly centralised and top-down there also seems to be a greater tendency for centralised communication departments to organise the parties’ communication strategies based on the party elite thereby relying on the party elite to formulate the corporate identity of the party (e.g. Knudsen, 2007). As the party is such a complex organisation, parties should be careful not to rely solely on the party elite in the rhetorical construction of the party’s communicated ideological identity. Although this is a way to ensure ideological consistency in the communication on party elite level, it may result in inconsistent communication on intra-party level which in turn may cause internal party conflicts and ultimately a divided party.

Whichever way the party decides to tackle the plurality of voices, it presents a challenge for political parties in terms of the communication of a clear and consistent ideological identity. If the party is too elitist in its communication relying simply on the communicated ideological identity of the party elite, it may cause internal problems and reduce the party’s internal ideological cohesion. If, on the other hand, the party is too inclusive in its communication, it may result in an identity that is too unclear and fragmented. Both situations may also have external consequences as they may both reflect a divided party.

However, as an attempt to ensure some level of ideological cohesion within the party (Jahn and Oberst, 2012) while accepting the plurality of meaning, parties may benefit from a continuous monitoring and
prioritisation of the relationship and mutual understanding between the party elite and the more rank-and-file members. While the political party will always consists of a plurality of voices, the focus of this monitoring could be to reveal common patterns of meaning within the various perceptions and interpretation of the party’s values in the different groups and how what they see as the very purpose of the party.

10.4.4. The adaptive political party – the party as context-dependent

The other key challenge which political parties face in relation to communicating a clear and consistent ideological identity is the context-dependence of the party which contradicts the core understanding of corporate identity as being context-free. Indeed, the political party is particularly sensitive to societal changes which may inflict upon the party’s core product; its political values. Panebianco (1988) recognises that the complex environment of political parties and the many contrasting demands placed upon them make it difficult for parties to maintain their ideological consistency within the reality of political life. Although he acknowledges the key role of ideological goals in the identity of the party, Panebianco thus suggests that the tendency to categorise the political organisation according to its ideological goals (or its ideological identity) is in fact misleading (1988: 7). In this complex environment, parties may simultaneously attempt to dominate the environment and influence it, but may also need to adapt to in order to reach organisational goals (Panebianco, 1988: 13). Summing up, Panebianco argues that we must acknowledge that the “true objective” of an organisation’s leaders is thus often mere survival rather than to pursue “the manifest aims for which the organisation was established” (1988: 7).

It seems that Panebianco partly debunks the normative idea of the ideologically consistent party and we may thus link his idea of survival to Bismarck’s oft-quoted observation that politics simply concerns the art of the possible (e.g. Pflanze, 1968: 89). In reality, parties simply cannot go single-mindedly for every single one of their political goals – especially not when we view politics as a game in which compromise and negotiation constitute key parts of the rules and when we consider the multiple and conflicting demands of the party’s stakeholders.

However, although Panebianco acknowledges the accommodating strategy of political parties, he simultaneously argues that adapting too much to the external environment may be detrimental to the existence of the “collective” identity of members within the party (Panebianco, 1988). The lack of a collective party identity is arguably is one of the central challenges of today’s parties which due to both
societal and institutional changes are said to have converged ideologically or indeed to have a “joint lack of ideology” (Enyedi, 2014: 194). In short, when parties emphasise policies and themes which appeal to the electorate as a whole and particularly to the “floating or less party-attached voters” (Kavanagh, 1996: 43), the parties themselves become “free-floating and available” (Mair, 2008: 220). In essence, this aptly sums up the core challenge of political parties: balancing between staying true to the party’s values in order to ensure internal cohesion and adapting to the external environment to accommodate the political reality.

Throughout the empirical analysis it became increasingly clear that the notion of consistency in the political party offering and the communication of this offering does not always take place in practice. Indeed, parties do adapt to their environment and as a result communicate inconsistent ideological identities. In the case of SPP, this party displayed the most inconsistency between its communicated ideological identity in the different genres as it sought to adapt and moderate its policies to become ready for government participation. Arguably, the case of SPP may simply be seen as a manifestation of the party’s fight for survival stressed by Panebianco (1988) as the party toned down its core political identity and values in order to have a broader appeal and become government-ready. It may also be a sign of agile communication (e.g. van Ruler, 2015) where organisations adopt a more iterative and adaptive communication strategy and focus on what works in the particular context rather than what was “agreed upon in advance” (van Ruler, 2015: 192).

Already Aristotle noted that for messages to be persuasive, the methods of persuasion needed to be adapted to the situation at hand (Charteris-Black, 2014). Rhetoric therefore involved deciding which means of persuasion were “appropriate in particular circumstances” (Charteris-Black, 2014: 5). As politics essentially concerns convincing others through “discussion and persuasion” (Chilton, 2004: 4) political actors are thus per definition required to be agile in their communication efforts, tailoring their communicative approaches to the situation, issue and receiver at hand. As political parties enter into coalition governments it puts specific demands on the party leaders and the party elite to be agile and flexible in their communication as coalition participation by definition is a game of compromise and negotiation and thus flexibility. As the member parties struggle to find common ground in shared values and concerns, they inevitably tone down or perhaps even omit values or core concerns which may divide them (e.g. Timmermans, 2006).
However, while this type of flexible or agile communication may work and be an appropriate strategy for parties with a less ideologically-founded core – e.g. the contemporary catch-all parties – it might be detrimental to parties with a strong ideological foundation and a powerful group of “believers” as seems to be the case with SPP. Indeed, although the party did succeed in becoming a member of government by adapting its communicated values, this adaptive strategy did not ensure the continued success of the party. Despite various attempts by the party leaders to communicate ideological consistency within the coalition government, the party left the coalition battered and bruised both internally and externally in January 2014 (Fancony, 2014; Lund, 2014). In terms of votes, the party is nowhere near the level they were at in the years before government entry (Folketinget, 2015). In the 2015 general election, the party only gained 4.2 percent of the votes making it the poorest election result since 1977 (Christensen, 2015).

In 2011 SPP entered into government for the first time, but today it may be characterised as a party which lost power despite being in power due to the party’s many compromises on central issues and commitments. Thereby the party epitomises the central conflict faced by political parties and one which is related to overall purpose of the political party i.e. whether to gain influence at the expense of policy purity or to maintain policy purity at the expense of political influence (Pedersen, 2011; White, 2006). This conflict in turn reflects the central dichotomy between idealism (staying true to the party values) and realism (having to compromise on central issues in order to gain power). It also leads to the central question which all parties should ask themselves: to which level can we adapt and compromise on our ideological identity and political values and still remain legitimate and credible to both ourselves and to our voters?

10.4.5. Words versus actions?

This dissertation set out to explore the strategic communication of political parties aiming to uncover whether the parties were consistent in their value communication. However, throughout the dissertation it became increasingly clear that political parties face particular challenges in connection with this specific approach to communication as they are constantly torn between the realities of political life manifested in the party’s actions and their ideal version of society manifested in the party’s core political values. This challenge leads to the question of how a party can communicate consistency when its actions are not consistent with its values. And whether the party should even attempt to do so?
In the political party, as in any other organisation, language and communication plays a vital role. Through language and rhetoric, the political sender may strategically express the party’s goals and values and thus contribute to constructing the party identity towards internal and external stakeholders. Language and rhetoric may also contribute to differentiating the party from others, creating shared values and establishing organisational stability in times of change and upheaval in the party. However, perhaps a lesson to be learnt from this case study is that communicating strategically and applying powerful rhetoric is at times simply not be enough. Although scholars have long argued for the power of rhetoric in politics as a means to persuade and convince an audience of the sender’s position (e.g. Charteris-Black, 2014; Finlayson and Martin, 2008; Krebs and Jackson, 2007), there are cases where the power of language is diminished when weighed up against the actions and behaviour of the sender. It may even be argued that in strategic communication in a political context, actions really do speak louder than words.

In this study, it became clear that party leaders often apply their values strategically in their speeches to express organisational stability in times of change and also to define and differentiate the party. However, in the case of SPP especially, persuasive language and rhetoric was far from enough to convince the party members of the benefits of government participation. Despite various attempts by the SPP party leaders to convince the party members that government participation was indeed worth it - via an increased focus on certain core values, the party’s actions and its organisational stability – the party ultimately withdrew from the government in 2014 following the sale of part of the national energy company DONG to the American hedge fund Goldman Sachs (Fancony, 2014). This sale sparked internal debates even on party elite level as it was seen as the anti-thesis of the party’s core socialist values and thus represented the final straw in a long line of political compromises made by the party (Lund, 2015). During its time in government, SPP also lost electoral support due to the compromises made and the move away from the core values of the party through the party’s actions (Redder, 2011). In sum, the case of SPP suggests that the party members as well as voters evaluate the party on its actions rather than its communication and whether these actions are perceived to be consistent with the party’s values.

The interrelatedness of the party’s actions and values is important as it again reflects the dichotomy between idealism (the party’s values) and realism (the party’s actions). However, strategic communication emphasises both the actions and communicative efforts as part of the corporate identity (e.g. Hallahan et al., 2007) and thus, in terms of the party’s communicated ideological identity, the two
aspects are highly intertwined. As discussed in Chapter 3, p. 32, what defines a party is not just their specific value interpretation, but also the means (i.e. the actions) with which parties intend to achieve these values. In other words, two parties may share the value of welfare society and the sub-feature of a full and well-functioning labour market, but may disagree strongly as to how to achieve this. Thus, you may argue that when a party changes the means with which to achieve a particular value, it may also be a reflection of a change in the overall value system of the party and may therefore also lead to an inconsistent identity.

Considering the close interrelatedness of a party’s values and actions, parties should be careful to rely just on language and rhetoric to express consistency as the members’ feeling of identity and solidarity may diminish if they feel that the party behavior “clearly belies its official aims” (Panebianco, 1988: 11). In other words, it may be risky for party leader to rely on communicating consistency and idealism if the behaviour of the party is rooted in realism and is seen to have moved too far away from the ideal position of the party i.e. its core values. In such cases a party leader will simply not be able to communicate consistency in the political party offering if the actions of the party are perceived to be inconsistent with the party’s values. In sum, parties need to be aware of and acknowledge that values are expressed both via language and actions.

The case study showed that although the party leaders acknowledged the challenges of coalition government participation and the compromises faced, they all still attempt to communicate organisational stability through reference to their core values even though the party may have acted in ways that stand in contrast to these values (e.g. see section 10.3.2.3, pp. 206-208). This seems a risky communication strategy since attempting to communicate consistency while acting inconsistently may not only lead to confusion as to what the party stands for, but may also lead to a lack of trust in the party when it says one thing and does another (see Cornelissen, 2014). From a communicative perspective, a further lesson to be learnt for political parties is thus that when the party’s actions do contradict its values, it may be a more viable strategy to acknowledge and be honest about the contradiction between values and actions rather than attempting to communicate ideological consistency.

10.4.6. Transparent communication - the way forward?

It is evident that since parties constantly navigate in a complex reality of institutional demands and limitations it is virtually impossible for a party to fulfil all of its goals and live up to all of its political
values and promises. Parties are forced to compromise, to negotiate and may also need to adapt their ideology – and thus their political values and actions - to the “changing social and political circumstances” (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009: 11) to be able to provide valuable solutions to contemporary problems. However, the question is to what level a party can adapt and still maintain its credibility. After all, a party is all a value-bound organisation which cannot simply move in any direction without losing the trust of its constituents (e.g. Walgrave and Nuytemans, 2009).

The two contrasting approaches to communication emphasised in this discussion i.e. strategic communication and agile communication seem to epitomise the central dichotomy of political parties between idealism (staying true to its values) and realism (adapting to the reality surrounding the party). Strategic communication explicitly calls for consistency between the party’s actions and actual communication (e.g. Cornelissen, 2014), while the more flexible approach to communication calls for adapting to the situation at hand compromising on the notion of consistency (van Ruler, 2015).

However, I argue that none of these approaches to communication are ideal for the political party which you could argue is caught in a communicative catch 22. If the party aims for message consistency at all costs not adapting to the context in which the party is embedded, the party may be seen as rigid and unable to adapt to the times and may also risk an unclear communicated identity when the actions of the party are seen as inconsistent with the party’s communicated values. If, on the other hand, the party becomes too flexible in its communication, continuously adapting its actions and communication to the situation at hand without considering the core identity of the organisation it may be seen as compromising on its core values which may lead to a lack of electoral support and internal cohesion.

For the political party, communication per se is thus a complex matter, and we may ask the question of what constitutes an appropriate approach to communication for the political party if not strategic or agile communication? We may even extend on this question by asking whether a party’s approach communication needs to be either one or the other? In their purest form none of these approaches seem to fit the political party because they both fail to consider important aspects of the political party. Strategic communication fails to consider the parties’ context-dependence and plurality of voices, while agile communication fails to consider that political parties are essentially value-based and need to offer some level of consistency to both internal and external stakeholders in order to remain credible and trustworthy. Due to the context-dependence of the political party, it seems inevitable that parties must
to some extent adapt their actions – and their communication - to the situation at hand. However, the level to which parties adapt should be seriously considered as it may harm the very identity of the party as an organisation. How can voters or members relate to a party through its values, if they do not know what values the party stands for?

Perhaps, then, what is needed is a third approach to communication which takes point in departure in the specific challenges of the political party, acknowledges the importance of a the party’s core values, but also that the party – and its values – may need to adapt to the changing times. Thus, this approach would draw on both strategic and agile communication, but with two overall keywords: honesty and transparency. We may call it transparent communication. Being honest about the gap between idealism and realism, the processes of politics, the negotiations that take place as well as the limitations of the multi-party system may increase understanding in the electorate as well as the party’s rank-and-file members as to why parties may not be able to fulfill all of their values and goals even when in power. Furthermore, rather than attempting to communicate consistency while the party’s actions contradicts the values, the party should acknowledge the process of adapting and admit that the party has in fact changed. Arguing that the party’s values are still the same while acting against these values is contradictory and may perhaps be the most detrimental communication strategy of all as it may lead to lack of trust in the political party as such.

I also argue that a way to ensure transparent communication is for parties to be more honest about who they are and what they stand for in order to provide real choice for the electorate. In the current political climate of ideological convergence and catch-all parties, this choice has been reduced considerably especially on the political middle ground. No doubt the institutional demands and the reality of political life demand adaptability of the party and impede its ability to be consistent and distinct thereby fostering increased similarities and ideologically convergence between parties. However, while adaptation may simply be a condition of the political party necessary for its immediate survival, it also sparks the overriding question of whether parties by communicatively abandoning their core identity and values in their fight for survival are in fact digging their own grave.

Voters demand distinction and clarity in the political party offering, and they also seem to be demanding clear values (Thorup, 2015). Indeed, there is a growing societal response to the ideological convergence of parties and the lack of clear values. In the US, the Tea Party association represents an example of a
movement built on values and which explicitly promotes a return to the “core values that built America” (Tea Party, 2015). In the UK, the Labour Party seems to be still suffering from its move away from the party’s core values (Evans and Tilley, 2011; Evans and Neundorf, 2013; White and de Chernatony, 2002). And in Denmark, the recent general election (Folketinget, 2015c), saw considerable progress for the more ideologically founded parties such as the far left-wing RGA, the very liberal LA; the DPP which differentiates themselves by a nationalist and patriotic rhetoric (Dansk Folkeparti, 2015); and for Alternative (the Alternative), a new party which explicitly differentiates themselves as an “alternative” to the old and “another way of seeing democracy, growth, working life, responsibility and quality of life” (Alternativet, 2015).

These four parties stand out from the political party crowd as they all offer something different than the more middle-ground parties (Thorup, 2015). However, another feature shared by the four parties is that they have never once participated in government. The question is, then, how the parties would fare if they were ever to become member of a coalition government and had to face the compromises entailed with government participation. In essence, it is arguably easier for parties to communicate a clear and consistent ideological identity if they do not face the everyday challenges of negotiation and compromise which is a prerequisite of coalition government participation (see Walgraves and Nuytemans, 2009). Would the parties be able to maintain their ideological purity? Or would their ideological purity be diluted by its political actions? Only time can tell…
11. Conclusion

Contemporary political parties face a key challenge. Not only do they have to appeal to a growing group of unpartisan middle ground voters, they also need to stay distinct and true to their core values in order to remain legitimate and provide choice for an increasingly detached electorate (e.g. Caul and Gray, 2000; Walgrave and Nuytemans, 2009). The central claim explored in this dissertation was that in order to communicate distinct identities to both internal and external stakeholders, political parties need to communicate consistent core values as these represent the essence of the party and its raison d’être (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009). This may be particularly important for parties in multi-party systems where voters face more choice and may share their loyalty between more than one party (Garry, 2007). However, it may also be particularly challenging for parties in multi-party systems – especially those who enter into coalition governments – as these parties need to find common ground and still remain distinct and consistent in their own political value offering (e.g. Boston and Bullock, 2009; Strøm and Müller, 1999).

11.1. The main assumption partly confirmed

The main assumption explored in this dissertation was that parties who enter into coalition governments become less consistent in their political value content after government entry, but that the party leaders will simultaneously attempt to communicate consistency through their strategic use of values in their party leader speeches given within the coalition government.

11.1.1. Political value content

Overall, the main assumption was only partly confirmed as the parties did not become significantly more inconsistent in their political value focus after government entry. Thus, regarding RQ1 and RQ2 the differences between the value content of the speeches before and after government entry were not a significant as expected as core values of the speeches – economic sustainability and the welfare society – were dominant in speeches made both before and after government entry. Both SPP and SLP return to some of their core values within the coalition government which reflects an attempt to express consistency and convince the rank-and-file members and the party’s believers that the party has stayed true to its core values and still has the same main concerns despite the compromises faced within the coalition.
However, the analysis also shows that the political parties do communicate inconsistent identities in terms of values in the two genres of the data set i.e. the party programme and the party leader conference speeches. This is especially the case for SPP, which shows the most incoherence between the ideology presented in the party programmes and in the speeches in terms of both overall political values focus (e.g. strong state, equality, environmental sustainability) and sub-features emphasised (e.g. 2B common ownership).

The difference in the value content of the two genres may not be surprising given their essentially different natures. However, it serves to reflect the central dichotomy of political parties namely the parties’ ideal vision of society as expressed in the party programmes versus the more practical day-to-day running of a country (e.g. Stoker, 2006). For SPP, the discrepancy between the communicated ideological identities in the two genres seems not caused by the particular event of government entry but rather by a longer-running ideological change process as the party aimed for government participation – a change that seemed to represent a point of conflict between the party elite and other members of the party. Thus the plurality of voices in a political party is seen as a challenge to the communication of a clear and consistent ideological identity.

The notion that the differences in the value content before and after government entry are not as significant as expected suggests that other aspects apart from internal organisational changes are at play when it comes to the selection of political values communicated by party leaders. The focus on the welfare society and economic sustainability in all speeches both before and after government entry indicates that the parties’ political value focus is highly dependent on contextual factors (e.g. the economic crisis) rather than on the specific event of entering into a coalition government.

11.1.2. Strategic use of values

Regarding RQ 3 and RQ4 which focus on the rhetorical strategies of party leaders and their strategic use of values to communicate consistency after government entry, this assumption was confirmed. The party leaders do attempt to communicate consistency within the coalition government. This is manifested in an increased internal organisational focus in the rhetorical strategies applied in speeches within the coalition government and an increasing use of references to the party’s actions and how these cohere with the party’s values. Also, all party leaders apply their values strategically within the coalition government to emphasise organisational stability and thus consistency in the political party offering.
Again, the SPP stood out from the other two parties. The SPP party leaders made particularly extensive use of strategic and explicit references to values both before and after government entry as the party leader attempted to get the party ready for government. Thus, while SPP was the most inconsistent in political value content of the two genres, the SPP party leaders were also the most strategic in their value communication both before and after government entry using values to differentiate the party and communicate organisational stability.

11.1.3. Overall conclusion

One of the conclusions drawn from the findings of this study is that compared to other kinds of organisations the political party faces particular communicative challenges when it comes to fulfilling the normative prescriptions of strategic communication namely a clear and consistent identity (Cornelissen, 2014; Strömbäck, 2011). The challenges are both due to parties’ context-dependence which often leads to a discrepancy between idealism and realism, and also to the plurality of voices which co-exist within a party and the subsequent risk linked with relying on the party elite to formulate the party’s values.

While the case may merely indicate that political parties – like any other organisation – must learn how to communicate strategically in the midst of certain institutional changes (e.g. Balmer, 2008), several aspects lead to the overall question of whether it is even possible for political party to live up to this central purpose of strategic communication or if the political party should consider other communicative approaches such as communicative adaptability. Indeed, political parties need to and also do adapt – both to institutional demands and contextual changes (e.g. Panebianco, 1988).

However, as the case of SPP suggested, parties that adapt too much run the risk of lack of ideological cohesion in the party which may ultimately lead to decreased electoral viability. Thus, the political party seems to be caught in a catch-22. Too little adaptation and the party is seen as out of sync with reality and too much adaption and it is out of sync with its ideological identity. This may call for another approach to communication for the political party namely transparent communication in which the parties are open and honest about the challenges of the political party in being consistent and communicating consistently, but also acknowledges that political values are the essence of the party and that there needs to be consistency between words and actions. If there is not, the party should attempt to be honest about this inconsistency.
Ultimately, it may also be argued that in the case of a political party it is not the party’s actual communication, but rather its actions that matter. Regardless of how the party elite attempts to communicate organisational stability and consistency through references to values, it seems to have little effect if the actions (the enacted values) are not seen to support the words (the espoused values). An overall lesson to be learnt for political parties is thus that in strategic communication in a political context, actions really do seem to speak louder than words.

11.2. Theoretical, empirical and methodological contributions

This study represents the first qualitative and empirical study into how a party’s political value communication is affected by coalition government entry. Thereby the study contributes to the underexplored area of the political value communication of contemporary political parties.

11.2.1. Two analytical tools

Methodologically, the dissertation contributes with two analytical tools which may be used in the identification of political values and rhetorical strategies in texts namely the Political Value Taxonomy (table 8-2, p. 111) and the Political Value Expression Framework (table 9-1, p. 150).

The Political Value Taxonomy represents an operationalisation of the political value concept which may be used for the systematic identification of political values in discourse. Existing lists of values (e.g. Feldman, 1988; Schwartz et al., 2010) attach rather broad descriptions to the political values thus making the lists difficult to apply in practice. Although scholars assume that parties interpret political values differently (e.g. Bonotti, 2010; Rokeach, 1973), no scholars have so far attempted to map out the different interpretations of the values (the actual value content) by taking a micro-view upon political values and dividing them into sub-features. The Political Value Taxonomy includes both the overall value labels as well as the different value sub-features which different political parties may attribute to the values. Thereby, the study also contributes to political value theory and towards an understanding of how political values are interpreted by political parties.

The taxonomy also represents an empirical contribution as it is based on the thorough analysis of the latest party programmes of all Danish political parties. Thus it offers an empirical insight into the political values and value interpretations across the ideological scale. This is in contrast to other lists of political values which are based on the political attitudes of the electorate and not on empirical studies.
of actual political texts. Although the taxonomy and the sub-features would have to be tested and possibly adapted before being applied in other political systems (see Sowińska, 2013: 793), the taxonomy represents a starting point and an overall theoretical framework for future empirical studies on the representation of political values in political texts and may also be used in comparative studies of the representation of political values in different genres, different culture and different periods of time.

The Political Value Expression Framework offers a tool for the identification of the rhetorical strategies applied to express political values in party leader speeches. The framework is based on the rhetorical strategies identified in the party leader speeches of the data set and draws on existing theories such as evaluative language (Bednarek, 2010), goal-oriented sentences (Thompson and Hunston, 2010) and van Dijk’s (2006) ideological square. However, it contributes with an attempt to integrate different theories in a more systematic and complete approach to analyse the expression of political values by party leaders and thus also offers an empirical insight into how political values are strategically applied in political discourse.

Naturally, the identification of rhetorical strategies in the expression of political values requires that the political values have already been identified in the texts. Thus, the two frameworks could either be used in combination to explore for political values and rhetorical strategies concurrently or the Political Value Expression Framework could be applied after the identification of political values.

11.2.2. The use of values in political discourse

With its qualitative approach, the study differs from the many quantitative explorations of ideology and values and thus contributes towards greater understanding of the use of political values in political discourse by taking a micro-level rhetorical approach to how values are rhetorically constructed by the political actors involved. The benefit of the qualitative approach is that it allows for an in-depth and nuanced exploration of a specific topic by exploring “detailed, rich and complex data” (Ormston et al., 2014: 4). It also involves letting theories and explanations emerge inductively from the data (Ritchie et al., 2015). Thus, by conducting a micro-level analysis of the language of political actors, the study thus contributes with empirical knowledge of how the political values are expressed in key value-based genres. As it draws on rhetorical analysis in the identification of the values, the study also contributes with an insight into how language constructs political values.
11.2.3. The strategic communication of political parties

While several studies have explored the notion of ideology and values from the perspective of political science focusing on how the parties are positioned on the ideological scale, this study investigates political values from a communication point of view and looks at how communication can help construct a party’s ideological identity through the use of political values. By exploring the actual rhetorical strategies applied by political leaders to express political values in discourse, the study thus contributes towards an empirical understanding of how party leaders apply political values strategically in order to communicate consistency in the political value offering and in the communicated ideological identity of the party.

As the study focuses on the specific event of government entry, it also contributes with an empirical insight into how political leaders apply political values strategically in discourse in times of organisational change as a means to achieve specific communicative goals (e.g. expressing organisational stability).

Throughout the study, it became clear that the political party faces particular challenges in connection with fulfilling the normative goals of strategic communication. Thus, the dissertation contributes with a critical view upon the notion of strategic communication in connection with the political party opening up for the discussion of what other approaches to communication may be more appropriate for this particular type of organisation.

Finally, by taking an in-depth look at how party leaders in their speeches attempt to communicate a consistent ideological identity within the coalition government through the strategic use of the party’s political values, the study contributes with a value-based and communicative perspective towards an understanding of how political party leaders through their use of strategic language may tackle the unity/distinctiveness dilemma faced by political parties within coalition governments (Boston and Bullock, 2009). As the study illustrates how the communication of a party’s values is affected by government entry, it also adds a value-based, communicative and empirical perspective to the theory of the “moderating” effect of political parties which enter into government (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2013).
11.2.4. Limitations of the study and areas for future research

11.2.4.1. The qualitative approach

In the study, I only make use of the qualitative approach despite quantifying my findings which was done on with the sole purpose of providing a better overview of the findings of the qualitative analysis (see section 6.5). Due to the qualitative nature of my study, I am not able to provide any overall statistical generalisations as my study is based on a single-case study in a specific and limited point in time (Neergaard, 2007; Wesley, 2014). However, the study may contribute with some level of analytical generalisation since the case chosen may be viewed as a “typical case” (Neergaard, 2007) reflecting the typical challenges faced by coalition government parties not least former “fringe” parties participating in government for the first time.

As the study conducted is of a qualitative nature, the notions of reliability and validity are not applicable in the strictest sense of the words as qualitative studies are by nature interpretive and based in the overarching assumption that one single reality which can be measured and weighed does not exist (e.g. Höijer, 2008). In qualitative research, the notions of credibility, precision, and confirmability are thus seen are more relevant research criteria (see section 2.2.)

One of the key concerns in qualitative studies is that the findings are based on the subjective world-view of the researcher (Creswell, 2009: 17). Thus, to enhance the credibility, precision and confirmability of qualitative research it is important to be transparent as for the data selection, the methods applied and the way the findings were reached. Throughout the dissertation, I have thus included explicit and comprehensive descriptions of the methods applied, of the development of the two analytical tools as well as of how I reached my findings applying the tools applying examples. I have also attempted to be clear about how the context of the texts under study may influence the findings. Furthermore, the various rounds of coding the same data (see section 6.4) should add to the credibility of the findings.

11.2.4.2. Sender-based focus

In the study, I take only a sender-based perspective on the construction of ideological identity through political values. Future studies may include the political receivers and explore how the party is perceived in the electorate in terms of its political values and ideological identity. This could provide a valuable insight into the link between the intended communicated ideological identity and perceived ideological
identity of the party and may also shed further light on the overall question of consistent or inconsistent communicated ideological identities of political parties. It may just be that the receivers are blithely unaware of the discrepancies in the communicated ideological identities of political parties and that they perceive them as being highly consistent. Future studies may unveil any such dichotomies.

Future studies may also explore the political values and ideological identity from the perspective of the rank-and-file members versus the party elite thereby focusing on the plurality of voices found within the political party. By exploring how different voices compete within the party and how they interpret the party’s political values, we may learn more about any discrepancies between the values as interpreted on party elite level and on lower levels in the party. Future studies may employ narrative analysis to explore how different members of the party construct the party identity through its political values. This will add a valuable empirical insight into the challenges of strategic communication of the political party due to the plurality of voices.

11.2.4.3. Text-oriented focus

The present study focuses only on the output of the party’s communication processes i.e. the texts rather than the processes of creating the texts. In order to add another layer to the understanding of strategic communication in political parties, future studies may take a more explorative approach in order to uncover how strategic communication is used in practice. Here, the focus might be on exploring the strategic deliberations of the senders of the actual communication and how they consider the party’s political values in the planning of the party’s strategic communication. This would provide an important insight into the interplay between the party’s political values and the strategic considerations of the political senders.

In the study, I also refrain from exploring how the enacted values i.e. the actions of the party cohere with the espoused values of the party. However, the study shows that actions play an important part of a party’s strategic communication efforts and that there is a great need for consistency between what the party says and what it does. Thus, future studies may take a closer look at the interplay between actions and language and may for example explore how the party leaders apply values to account for specific actions across genres.
Finally, in the study I only explore the language in the construction of political values. Future studies on the communication of political values in key value-based genres such as the party programme may take a multi-modal approach including aspects such as visual imagery, layout, colours etc. This may contribute towards an understanding of the multi-modal aspects of the strategic communication of political values. Political parties often make use of specific logos or symbols, specific fonts and colours (e.g. Vliegenhart, 2012) and may even have their own design manuals ensuring a consistent and uniform visual expression (Socialdemokraterne, 2015c). Thus future studies may focus on exploring the interplay between the party’s political values and the visual identity of the party.

11.2.4.4. **Limited time period**

Another limitation of the study is that – although longitudinal – it focuses only on a limited number of years in which a global financial crisis took place. This particular event is reflected in all party leader speeches which inevitably leads to the question of how the party leaders’ value focus would have been if not for the crisis. Thus, future studies might explore the political value focus in a period of economic prosperity or indeed conduct a comparative study of the political value focus in speeches made before and after the financial crisis.
12. **English summary**

Contemporary political parties face a key challenge. Not only do they have to appeal to a growing group of unpartisan middle ground voters, they also need to stay distinct and true to their core values in order to remain legitimate and provide choice for an increasingly detached electorate (e.g. Caul and Gray, 2000; Walgrave and Nuytemans, 2009). To communicate distinct identities to both internal and external stakeholders, political parties thus need to communicate consistent core values as these represent the essence of the party and its raison d’etre (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009). This may be particularly important for parties in multi-party systems where voters face more choice and may share their loyalty between more than one party (Garry, 2007). However, at the same time it may also be particularly challenging for parties in multi-party systems – especially those who enter into coalition governments – as these parties need to find common ground and still remain distinct and consistent in their own political value offering (e.g. Boston and Bullock, 2009; Strøm and Müller, 1999).

The main assumption explored in this dissertation is that parties who enter into coalition governments become less consistent in their political value content after government entry, but that the party leaders will simultaneously attempt to communicate consistency through their strategic use of values in their party leader speeches given within the coalition government. Theoretically, the dissertation is founded in the field of strategic communication in a political context.

In order to explore the main assumption, the dissertation employs a single-case study namely the Danish 2011-2014 three-party coalition government consisting of the Socialist People’s Party, the Social Democrats and the Social Liberal Party. The data consists of key value-based genres i.e. the party programme and the party leader conference speeches from both before and after government entry (2008-2013). These texts are explored for political values using the qualitative approach to textual analysis focusing on two aspects namely political value content (what value are expressed in the total data set) and the form of expression (what rhetorical strategies are applied to express the values in the party leader speeches).

Overall, the main assumption was only partly confirmed as the political value content of the party leader speeches did not become significantly more inconsistent after government entry. Rather, the core values of the speeches – economic sustainability and the welfare society – were dominant in speeches made both before and after government entry. Also, both SPP and SLP return to some of their core values.
within the coalition government thus which reflects an attempt to express consistency and convince the rank-and-file members as well as the party’s believers that the party has stayed true to its core values and still has the same main concerns despite the compromises faced within the coalition.

Thus in terms of political value content, the analysis shows that the main difference is found not in speeches made before and after government entry, but between the two genres of party programmes and party leader conference speeches. This is particularly noticeable for SPP. The difference in the value content of the two genres may not be surprising given their essentially different natures. However, it reflects the central dichotomy of political parties namely the parties’ ideal vision of society as expressed in the party programmes versus the more practical day-to-day running of a country (e.g. Stoker, 2006). For SPP, the discrepancy between the ideological identities in the two genres seems to be caused by a longer-running ideological change process as the party aimed for first-time government participation – a change that seemed to represent a point of conflict between the party elite and other members of the party.

Regarding the party leaders’ use of rhetorical strategies and their strategic use of values to communicate consistency after government entry, this assumption was confirmed. The party leaders do attempt to communicate consistency within the coalition government which is manifested in an increased internal organisational focus within the coalition government and an increasing use of references to the party’s actions and how these cohere with the party’s values. Also, all party leaders apply their values strategically within the coalition government to emphasise organisational stability and thus consistency in the political party offering. However, despite the various attempts by the SPP party leaders to communicate consistency and organisational stability, the party left the coalition in January 2014, supposedly after having made too many political compromises (Lund, 2015).

A main conclusion drawn from the findings is that the political party faces particular communicative challenges when it comes to fulfilling the normative prescriptions of strategic communication namely a clear and consistent identity (Cornelissen, 2014; Strömbäck, 2011). The challenges are both due to parties’ context-dependence which often leads to a discrepancy between idealism and realism – manifested in the genres of party programmes versus -, but also to the plurality of voices which co-exist within a party and the subsequent risk linked with relying on the party elite to formulate the party’s values.
Several aspects lead to the overall question of whether it is even possible for political party to live up to this central purpose of strategic communication or if the political party should consider other communicative approaches such as communicative adaptability (see van Ruler 2015). Indeed, political parties need to and also do adapt – both to institutional demands and contextual changes (e.g. Panebianco, 1988). Thus, they may also need to adapt their communication. However, as the case of SPP suggested, parties that adapt too much may face a lack of internal party cohesion which may ultimately lead to decreased electoral viability as voters are reluctant to support a divided party (Smith and French, 2009). Thus, the political party seems to be caught in a catch-22. Too little adaptation and the party is seen as out of sync with reality and too much adaption and it is out of sync with its ideological identity. It made therefore be necessary for political parties to apply another approach to communication namely the transparent approach, which is honest about any changes in the party’s values and actions, but also acknowledges the central role of values in the political party.

Ultimately, it may also be argued that in the case of a political party it is not the party’s actual communication, but rather its actions that matter. Regardless of how the party elite attempts to communicate organisational stability and consistency through references to values, it seems to have little effect if the actions are not seen to support the words. Therefore, an overall lesson to be learnt for political parties is that in a political context, actions really do speak louder than words.
13. **Dansk sammendrag**


Hovedantagelsen som undersøges i denne afhandling, at partier som indgår i koalitionsregeringer bliver mindre konsistente i deres politiske værdiindhold, når de træder ind i regeringen. Samtidig vil partilederne forsøge at kommunikere konsistens gennem deres strategiske brug af værdier i deres partiledertaler. Teoretisk er afhandlingen funderet i strategisk kommunikation i en politisk kontekst.


Den overordnede antagelse bekræftes kun delvist. Det politiske værdiindhold bliver ikke signifikant mindre konsistent efter partierne trådte ind i koalitionsregeringen. Tværtimod var de mest centrale politiske værdier i talerne – økonomisk bæredygtighed og velfærdsamfundet – også dominerende i talerne holdt inden dannelsen af koalitionsregeringen. Desuden vendte både SF og RV tilbage til centrale værdier i talerne holdt efter partiets indtrædelse i koalitionsregeringen. Dette kunne illustrere et forsøg
på at udtrykke konsistens og på at overbevise partiets almindelige medlemmer om at partierne var tro mod deres egne værdier på trods af de kompromisser, partierne måtte indgå i regeringen.

I forbindelse med teksternes værdiindhold viser undersøgelsen, at den største forskel findes mellem de to genrer i datasættet. Dette er mest tydeligt i SFs tilfælde. Forskellen på indholdet i de to genrer er måske ikke overraskende, når man tager genrernes forskellige formål i betragtning. Men den understreger den helt centrale konflikt som politiske partier står i – nemlig mellem partiernes ide om idealsamfundet som kommer til udtryk i partiprogrammerne og den mere praktiske og daglige styring af landet, som kommer til udtryk i talerne (f.eks. Stoker, 2006). I SFs tilfælde lod det til at forskellen mellem de to genrer skyldes en længerevarende ideologisk forandringsproces, idet partiet før første gang gjorde sig klar til at blive en del af en kommende regering. Denne forandringsproces lod desuden til at være et konfliktpunkt mellem partiets ledelse og de mere almindelige medlemmer af partiet.

I forbindelse med partilederernes brug af retoriske strategier og deres strategiske brug af værdier til at udtrykke konsistens efter regeringsindtrædelsen, bekræfter undersøgelsen denne antagelse. Partilederne forsøger i høj grad at kommunikere konsistens hvilket kommer til udtryk i et øget internt organisatorisk fokus i talerne og flere referencer til partiets handlinger og hvordan disse værdimæssigt hænger sammen med partiets værdier. På trods af at SF’s partilederere flere gange forsøger at kommunikere konsistens og organisatorisk stabilitet, træder partiet dog ud af regeringen i januar 2014 efter at have indgået for mange kompromisser (Lund, 2015).

En overordnet konklusion som kan drages fra dette studier er, at politiske partier er særligt udfordrede, når det drejer sig om at opfylde de normative krav, der stilles til organisationers strategiske kommunikation; nemlig en klar og tydelig kommunikeret identitet (Cornelissen, 2014; Strömbäck, 2011). Udfordringerne skyldes både partiernes afhængighed af den kontekst, som de er en del af, hvilket udmønter sig i konflikten mellem idealisme og realisme og kommer til udtryk i de to genrer; men skyldes også den flerstemmighed, som findes i et politisk parti og som gør det risikabelt at lade partiets kommunikerede identitet være udelukkende et ledelsesansvar.

Flere aspekter peger i retning af et overordnet spørgsmål; nemlig om det overhovedet er muligt for et politisk parti at leve op til det centrale krav i strategisk kommunikation, eller om partiet bør overveje andre kommunikationsmetoder så som tilpasset kommunikation (se Van Ruler, 2015). Partier bør tilpasse sig og gør det også både i forbindelse med institutionelle krav og forandringer i partiernes

I sidste ende kan man også argumentere for, at det i forbindelse med politiske partier ikke er den faktiske kommunikation, der tæller, men partiets handlinger. Uanset hvor meget partiets leder(e) forsøger at udtrykke konsistens og organisatorisk stabilitet gennem partiets værdier lader det ikke til at have nogen effekt, hvis partiets handlinger ikke understøtter ordene. Derfor kunne en overordnet konklusion være, at i en politisk kontekst er handlinger virkelig vigtigere end ord.
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